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ABSTRACT OF THE DISSERTATION
Testing the Common-Mechanisms Theory of False Hearing and False Memory: The Roles of
Executive Functioning and Inhibitory Control
by
Eric Failes
Doctor of Philosophy in Psychological & Brain Sciences
Washington University in St. Louis, 2020
Mitchell S. Sommers, Chair
Recent studies have shown that older adults are more susceptible to context-based
misperceptions in hearing than are younger adults, a phenomenon that has been referred to as
false hearing (Rogers et al., 2012; Sommers et al., 2015). The authors of these studies have noted
similarities between false hearing and false memories (Jacoby et al., 2005), suggesting that the
two phenomena may arise from similar cognitive mechanisms. The present dissertation project
investigated similarities between false hearing and false memories. In Experiment 1, I directly
compared susceptibility to false hearing and false memories in younger and older adults. I then
investigated two cognitive mechanisms that could underlie these phenomena: inhibitory control
and executive functioning. I found that poorer executive functioning was related to increased
susceptibility to both false hearing and false memory, supporting executive functioning as a
common cognitive mechanism underlying these phenomena. In Experiment 2, I tested whether
the predictive strength of sentences influenced susceptibility to false hearing, building upon the
finding of a strong relationship between backwards associative strength and susceptibility to
false memory (Deese, 1959; Roediger et al., 2001b). I found that the predictive strength of
sentences was positively associated with susceptibility to false hearing, supporting the idea that
xi

increasing inhibitory control demands increased the likelihood that false hearing would occur.
Finally, I present eye-tracking data suggesting that predictive sentences increased activation of a
single word, and that older adults were less likely than younger adults to suppress this activation
when a different word was presented. The findings of these experiments support the idea that
false hearing and false memory share at least one common cognitive mechanism, but highlight
differences between these phenomena and between younger and older adults.
Keywords: false hearing, false memory, speech perception, context effects, aging, eye-tracking
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Chapter 1: Introduction
The ability to comprehend speech is one that is largely taken for granted because speech
perception and comprehension seem almost automatic in one’s native language. The average
conversational speech rate is estimated to be between 140 and 180 words per minute (Miller et
al., 1984; Wingfield et al., 1999), a quickly flowing stream of sounds that a listener must parse
into individual words, match to internal representations in the mental lexicon, process for
meaning, and fit within the context of what has previously been said. Add to this the extra
challenges imposed by difficult listening situations, such as holding a conversation in a noisy
environment, and one might question how speech can be processed in such a fluid manner.
Although speech comprehension in younger, normal-hearing, adults does seem effortless
and automatic, there are a number of populations who may have increased difficulty given the
perceptual demands described above. For example, older adults may be expected to have an
especially difficult time comprehending speech due to age-related hearing loss (Morrell et al.,
1996; Sommers et al., 2011). However, despite declines in hearing acuity, speech comprehension
has been shown to be relatively stable until late in life. For example, in a cross-sectional study of
adults ages 20 through 90, Sommers et al. (2011) found that listening comprehension remained
stable until approximately age 65, whereas hearing acuity – especially in the high audiometric
frequencies – began to decline earlier in life. Indeed, there is evidence that decline in hearing
acuity can begin as early as the third decade of life (Morrell et al., 1996).
Sommers et al. (2011) suggested that one explanation for their finding of preserved
listening comprehension despite declines in hearing acuity is that the passages used in their
comprehension tasks provided a cohesive semantic context, which may have allowed older
1

adults to infer what was missed due to hearing loss. There is substantial evidence showing that,
relative to younger adults, older adults benefit as much or more from the addition of semantic
context in speech perception (Benichov et al., 2012; Dubno et al., 2000; Hutchinson, 1989;
Nittrouer & Boothroyd, 1990; Pichora-Fuller et al., 1995; Rogers et al., 2012; Sommers &
Danielson, 1999; Sommers et al., 2015; Wingfield et al., 1991). For example, Wingfield et al.
(1991) used a word-onset gating procedure – a task in which words were presented in 50 ms
increments until their first phoneme could be correctly identified – under three different
conditions: 1) where the target word was preceded by no context (e.g., The word is _____), 2)
where the word was preceded by what the authors deemed a weakly predictive sentence (i.e., a
sentence with a cloze value1 of less than .15), or 3) where the word was preceded by what the
authors deemed a highly predictive sentence (i.e., a sentence with a cloze value greater than or
equal to .15). The authors found that older adults needed to hear more of the target word before
they could correctly identify the first phoneme than did younger adults when the target word was
preceded by either no context or a weakly predictive sentence. The authors attributed this agerelated deficit in the gating paradigm to impaired hearing acuity in the older adults. However,
younger and older adults identified words at similar gates when the target word was preceded by
a highly predictive sentence (see Figure 1). This finding suggests that older adults may be able to
compensate for deficits in hearing acuity by using available contextual cues to infer what was
missed due to hearing loss or cognitive decline, which could at least partly explain the Sommers
et al. (2011) finding of preserved listening comprehension despite declining hearing acuity.

1

A cloze value is a measure of predictive strength and refers to the proportion of participants
who complete a given sentence with a specific word. For example, a sentence with a cloze value
of .15 indicates that 15% of participants completed that sentence with the same word.
2

Figure 1. Figure from Wingfield et al. (1991) depicting the amount of a target word that needed
to be presented before the first phoneme could be correctly identified by younger and older
adults when the target word was preceded by no context, a weakly predictive sentence (low
context condition), or a highly predictive sentence (high context condition).

Although semantic context can help older adults compensate for hearing loss, it can also
lead older adults astray. Rogers et al. (2012), for example, demonstrated that older adults can be
over-reliant on contextual cues in speech perception such that they report hearing a contextually
predicted word when a similar sounding (but unpredicted) word is presented. Specifically,
Rogers et al. used a process dissociation procedure (see Jacoby, 1991) to create conditions in
which using context as a basis for responding would lead to a different response than if
participants used the phonological content of the speech signal as a basis for responding,
allowing the researchers to determine the extent to which participants relied on context. In the
study by Rogers et al., this was accomplished by first having participants study semantically
related cue-target word pairs (e.g., barn – hay) presented both visually and aurally to establish a
relationship between the word pairs. After the study phase, participants completed a speech
perception task in which two words were presented aurally, the first word in the clear (i.e.,
without background noise) and the second word in background noise. The word pairs were one
of three types: 1) a cue-target pair from the study phase (congruent condition; e.g., barn – hay);
3

2) a cue from the study phase paired with a word differing from the learned target word by a
single phoneme, known as a phonological neighbor (incongruent condition; e.g., barn – pay); or
3) a pair of unstudied, unrelated words (baseline condition; e.g., cloud – fun). Participants were
tasked with identifying the word in the background noise and also reporting their confidence in
the accuracy of their response from 0-100% certainty. In the congruent condition, the same
response (hay) would be supported regardless of whether participants used context (i.e., the
paired cue word) or the phonological characteristics of the target word as a basis for responding.
In the incongruent condition, however, using context as a basis for responding would lead to a
different response (hay) than using the phonological content of the target word as a basis for
responding (pay). Thus, the authors were able to determine the extent to which participants relied
on context by determining the proportion of incongruent trials in which participants erroneously
provided the contextually predicted response (e.g., reporting hearing hay when presented with
the pair barn – pay), which the authors referred to as false hearing.
Rogers et al. (2012, Experiment 2) found that both younger and older adults frequently
experienced false hearing on incongruent trials. However, despite performance being equated
across age groups in the baseline condition by manipulating the signal-to-noise ratio (SNR)
individually for each participant, older adults were significantly more likely to experience false
hearing than were younger adults (.39 vs. .26). Additionally, older adults experienced higher
confidence in cases of false hearing than did younger adults, with older adults being almost four
times more likely to report 100% confidence in cases of false hearing than younger adults (.27
vs. .07). This data showed that both younger and older adults often used context to facilitate
speech perception in noise and indicated that older adults were especially reliant on contextual
cues as a basis for responding.
4

More recent research (Sommers et al., 2015, Experiment 2) has reported that false
hearing can also be evoked using sentence contexts. Instead of using learned word pairs to
provide context as in Rogers et al. (2012), Sommers et al. (2015; Experiment 2) used complete
sentences divided into three conditions: 1) sentences providing no context for predicting the
sentence-final word (baseline condition; e.g., He was thinking about the sheep), 2) sentences
providing a valid context for predicting the sentence-final word (congruent condition; e.g., The
shepherd watched his sheep), and 3) sentences in which the sentence-final word was a
phonological neighbor of the predicted sentence-final word (incongruent condition; e.g., The
shepherd watched his sheath). In all cases, the participant’s task was to report the sentence-final
word, which was presented in background noise, and to judge their confidence in the accuracy of
their response on a 0-100 point scale. As in Rogers et al. (2012, Experiment 2), SNRs for the
final word were set individually to obtain approximately 50% accuracy for all participants in the
baseline condition. Importantly, all participants were warned that sentences would sometimes be
misleading, and there were three times as many incongruent sentences as congruent sentences.
Both the warning instructions and the disproportionate use of incongruent sentences should have
discouraged a context-based response strategy.
The proportion of accurate responses (hits) in the congruent and baseline conditions and
the proportion of context-based misperceptions in the incongruent condition (i.e., cases of false
hearing) from Sommers et al. (2015, Experiment 2) are shown in panel A of Figure 2, and the
confidence associated with those responses is shown in panel B. Despite explicitly warning
participants that sentences could be misleading and instructing participants to respond based on
what they heard and not based on context, Sommers et al. found that both younger and older
adults experienced false hearing in the incongruent condition (e.g., reported hearing sheep when
5

presented The shepherd watched his sheath). However, as in Rogers et al. (2012), older adults
were more susceptible to false hearing than were younger adults (.50 vs. .39), and were more
confident in cases of false hearing than were younger adults, with older adults reporting
maximum confidence in cases of false hearing four times as often as younger adults (.16 vs. .04).
Participants’ continued use of contextual cues in conditions that discouraged use of context lends
further support to the argument that both age groups – but especially older adults – relied on
context as a basis for responding.
A)

B)

Figure 2. Plots from Sommers et al. (2015; Experiment 2) depicting the proportion of
correct responses in the congruent and baseline conditions and cases of false hearing (false
alarms) in the incongruent condition (A) and the confidence in congruent and baseline
condition hits and cases of false hearing in the incongruent condition (B).

1.1 False memory and similarities to false hearing
As in speech perception, memory can also be biased by contextual cues and prior knowledge.
Bartlett (1932) was among the first researchers to study how memory can be distorted by prior
knowledge. In his seminal work, Bartlett had participants read the short story “The War of the
Ghosts” and asked them to recall the story verbatim. Bartlett found that, when recalling the story,
participants often changed details to better conform to their own experiences. For example,
6

whereas the story depicts two men hunting seals, participants often falsely recalled that the two
men had been fishing. Bartlett’s study is often considered one of the first studies demonstrating
false memory, an umbrella term used to describe a variety of memory distortions.
Since Bartlett’s (1932) study, several paradigms have been developed to study false
memory, perhaps the most prevalent being the Deese-Roediger-McDermott (DRM) paradigm
(Deese, 1959; Roediger & McDermott, 1995). In the DRM paradigm, participants study lists of
words in which each word in the list is semantically related (or sometimes phonologically
related, see Finley et al., 2017; Sommers & Huff, 2003; Sommers & Lewis, 1999; Watson et al.,
2003) to an unpresented critical word. For example, for the critical word needle, participants
might study the words thread, pin, eye, sewing, etc., but would not study the word needle.
Roediger and McDermott (1995, Experiment 1) found that when asked to remember the studied
words, participants falsely reported having studied the critical word in 40% of cases in a recall
test and in 84% of cases in a recognition test. Additionally, participants indicated that they were
sure they had studied the critical word in 58% of cases in the recognition test, demonstrating
high confidence in their false memories.
A number of other paradigms have also been used to study false memories. In schema
paradigms like Bartlett’s (1932) study described above, researchers test how participants’
expectations based on past experiences influence memory. Brewer and Treyens (1981), for
example, found that after being left alone in a graduate student’s office for 35 seconds,
participants falsely recalled seeing at least one item, on average, that might be expected to be in
this setting (e.g., a book) even though the item was not present. In misinformation paradigms,
participants witness an event (through films, written narratives, or lists), then are asked questions
about the event before completing a final memory test. Critically, some of the post-event
7

questions introduce details that were not present in the original event. Loftus (1975, Experiment
4) showed that nearly 30% of participants incorporated incorrect information introduced through
post-event questioning into their memory for an event after a one-week delay. In pragmatic
inference paradigms (Brewer, 1977; Chan & McDermott, 2006; Chan & McDermott, 2007),
participants study sentences for which an inference regarding the outcome can be made, although
the inferred outcome is not guaranteed. For example, when reading the sentence “The safecracker put the match to the fuse,” the reader may infer that the fuse was lit, but this outcome is
not guaranteed. Brewer (1977) found that participants were more likely to falsely recall
pragmatic inferences of a studied sentence (e.g., The safe-cracker lit the fuse) than the studied
sentence verbatim (.26 vs. .19). Finally, having participants repeatedly imagine that an event
occurred increases participants’ likelihood of falsely remembering that the event occurred (Goff
& Roediger, 1998), a phenomenon known as imagination inflation. Thus, false memories can be
evoked using diverse methods.
Interestingly, the patterns of age differences observed by Rogers et al. (2012) and
Sommers et al. (2015) in false hearing are remarkably similar to those observed in past studies of
false memory: Older adults have been shown to be more susceptible to false memory than
younger adults in the DRM paradigm (Balota et al., 1999; Kensinger & Schacter, 1999; Watson
et al., 2001) and a number of variations of the misinformation paradigm (Jacoby, 1999; Jacoby et
al., 2005; Mitchell et al., 2003; Roediger & Geraci, 2007; but see Huff & Umanath, 2018; Prull
& Yockelson, 2013 for equal performance across age groups). Additionally, older adults have
been shown to be more confident in the accuracy of their false memories than younger adults
(Jacoby et al., 2010; Mitchell et al., 2003), just as older adults were more confident in cases of
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false hearing than younger adults in the studies by Rogers et al. (2012) and Sommers et al.
(2015).
One study of false memory that is particularly useful for comparison with studies of false
hearing was conducted by Jacoby et al. (2005) who, like Rogers et al. (2012) and Sommers et al.
(2015), used the process dissociation framework to separate context-based responding from, in
this case, responding based on conscious recollection. As in the study by Rogers et al. described
above, Jacoby et al. first had participants study semantically related word pairs (e.g., knee-bone).
Participants then completed a cued fragment completion test in which they saw a cue word and a
fragment of its paired target word from the study phase (e.g., knee-b_n_) and were tasked with
completing the fragment with the word from the study phase (e.g., bone). Critically, before each
cue-fragment pair, one of three types of primes was presented: 1) the studied target word
(congruent condition; e.g., bone), 2) an unstudied word that was semantically related to the cue
word and that could plausibly complete the fragment (incongruent condition; e.g., bend), or 3) a
string of ampersands (baseline condition; &&&&&). These primes provided valid, invalid, and
neutral cues for recalling the studied target word, respectively. Participants also characterized the
subjective experience of their memory by making a remember/familiar/guess judgement.
Participants were instructed to rate their response as “remembered” if they recalled specific
details from when the item was presented at study, “familiar” if they knew that the word had
been in the study list but could not remember specific details about its presentation, and
“guessed” if they had no idea what word had been paired with the cue word in the study phase.
In line with findings from other studies of false memory (Balota et al., 1999; Jacoby,
1999; Jacoby et al., 2005; Kensinger & Schacter, 1999; Mitchell et al., 2003; Roediger & Geraci,
2007; Watson et al., 2001) and from the false hearing studies described above (Rogers et al.,
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2012; Sommers et al., 2015), Jacoby et al. (2005, Experiment 2) found that both younger and
older adults often erroneously completed the fragment with the prime word in the incongruent
condition (e.g., completing the cue-fragment pair “knee-b_n_” with “bend” when “bone” had
been presented in the study phase), although older adults were more susceptible to these false
memories than were younger adults (.68 vs. .48). Additionally, older adults were more than ten
times as likely to characterize their false memories as “remembered” than were younger adults
(.43 vs. .04), providing a conceptual replication of older adults’ elevated confidence in cases of
false hearing relative to younger adults (Rogers et al., 2012; Sommers et al., 2015). These
findings suggest that false memories evoked using the process dissociation framework – like
cases of false hearing – result largely from overreliance on context as a basis for responding.
The similarity of their false hearing findings with those of Jacoby et al. (2005,
Experiment 2) in false memory led Rogers et al. (2012) and Sommers et al. (2015) to suggest
that false memory and false hearing might result, at least in part, from common cognitive
mechanisms as opposed to mechanisms specific to either memory or perception. However, no
published work has directly investigated the relationship between false hearing and false
memory. The primary goals of the present study were to fill this gap in the literature and to
investigate specific cognitive mechanisms that may underlie these two phenomena. Identifying
specific mechanisms will not only advance our understanding of false hearing and false memory,
but will also allow for creation of interventions to reduce susceptibility to these errors.

1.2 Potential mechanisms underlying false hearing and
false memory
Although no published research has directly tested the mechanisms underlying false hearing, a
wealth of research has investigated potential mechanisms underlying false memory (Bixter &
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Daniel, 2013; Butler et al., 2004; Chan & McDermott, 2007; Colombel et al., 2016; Jacoby et al.,
2005; Long et al., 2008; McCabe et al., 2009; Meade et al., 2012; Sommers & Huff, 2003,
Experiment 2; Unsworth & Brewer, 2010; Watson et al., 2005). Several cognitive abilities have
been shown to be correlated with susceptibility to false memory, but here I will focus on
executive functioning and inhibitory control due to their proposed relations to false hearing in
past studies (Jacoby et al., 2012; Rogers et al., 2012; Sommers et al., 2015). It is important to
note that executive functioning is composed of a number of different cognitive abilities,
including inhibitory control. I consider executive functioning and inhibitory control separately in
the present study for two reasons. First, each of these constructs have been shown to be
predictive of susceptibility to false memory (Butler et al., 2004; Chan & McDermott, 2007;
Colombel et al., 2016; Jacoby et al., 2005; McCabe et al., 2009; Meade et al., 2012; Sommers &
Huff, 2003, Experiment 2), and one of the primary goals of this dissertation project is to test for
similarities between false hearing and false memory. Therefore, I used the same measures of
executive functioning and inhibitory control that have been shown to be predictive of false
memory in past studies to determine whether they were also predictive of false hearing. Second,
it is important to determine whether the relationship between executive functioning and false
hearing and false memory can be accounted for by inhibitory control’s inclusion in the executive
functioning construct. Since executive functioning is composed of multiple cognitive abilities,
showing that executive functioning is related to false hearing and false memory would narrow
down the list of potential cognitive abilities that could underlie these phenomena but would not
single out any specific cognitive ability. Additionally, there is evidence to suggest that there are
multiple functions of inhibitory control (Kramer et al., 1994; Lustig et al., 2007) – controlling
what information enters working memory, removing information that is no longer relevant from
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working memory, and suppressing prepotent, but incorrect, responses – and only the suppression
function is referenced in the inhibitory control theory of false hearing (Jacoby et al., 2012;
Rogers et al., 2012; Sommers et al., 2015). Including a separate measure of the suppression
aspect of inhibitory control – here, an auditory Stroop task – in addition to a measure of
executive functioning allowed me to determine whether the relationship between executive
functioning and false hearing and false memory persisted after statistically controlling for this
aspect of inhibitory control, which would indicate that components of executive functioning
aside from response suppression were related to false hearing and false memory. However, if the
relationship between executive functioning and false hearing and false memory became nonsignificant after controlling for this aspect of inhibitory control, this would suggest that this
relationship could be fully accounted for by variance attributable to differences in the ability to
suppress a prepotent response.

1.2.1 Executive functioning
Baddeley and Hitch (1974) were among the first researchers to allude to executive functioning.
In their model of working memory, the authors described a central executive component that
oversaw the functioning of two primary storage subsystems of working memory: the
phonological loop and the visuospatial sketchpad. The central executive in this model was
involved in allocation of attention and improving efficiency of working memory when the
capacity of the storage subsystems was exceeded by implementing encoding and retrieval
strategies (e.g., chunking). Shortly thereafter, Posner and Snyder (1975) coined the term
cognitive control, which the authors described as a limited-capacity mechanism involved in
directing attention based on one’s goals. The role of cognitive control proposed by Posner and
Snyder is similar to that of the modern conception of executive functioning, which is often
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described as the set of cognitive abilities involved in maintaining goals and directing behavior
toward achieving those goals. As stated above, the modern construct of executive functioning is
comprised of several cognitive abilities, and is typically thought to include inhibitory control,
working memory, planning, and set shifting, although an exhaustive list of the components of
executive functioning is up for debate (Jurado & Rosselli, 2007). Executive functioning is
generally believed to be controlled by the frontal lobes of the brain – particularly the prefrontal
cortex – as evinced by the development of executive functioning coinciding with maturation of
the frontal lobes through adolescence (Anderson et al., 2001) and disorders affecting the frontal
lobes (e.g., ADHD and autism) being associated with impaired executive functioning (see Jurado
& Rosselli, 2007). For this reason, the term “frontal lobe functioning” is sometimes used
interchangeably with executive functioning (Butler et al., 2004; Chan & McDermott, 2007;
McCabe et al., 2009; McCabe et al., 2010; Meade et al., 2012; Roediger & McDaniel, 2007) and
executive functioning is often assessed by measures shown to activate frontal lobe activity, such
as the battery developed by Glisky et al. (1995) that was used in the present study, which will be
discussed in further detail below.
Studies investigating the role of executive functioning in false memory have focused
almost exclusively on explaining the increased susceptibility to false memory experienced by
older, relative to younger, adults. Since older adults have been shown to be both more likely to
experience deficits in executive functioning (Chan & McDermott, 2007; McCabe et al., 2009;
Roediger & McDaniel, 2007) and more susceptible to false memory (Balota et al., 1999; Chan &
McDermott, 2007; Jacoby, 1999; Jacoby et al., 2005; Kensinger & Schacter, 1999; Mitchell et
al., 2003; Roediger & Geraci, 2007; Watson et al., 2001; but see Huff & Umanath, 2018; Prull &
Yockelson, 2013 for equal performance across age groups) than younger adults, it is possible that
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deficits in executive functioning could increase susceptibility to false memory. Supporting this
conclusion, executive functioning has been shown to partially mediate the relationship between
age and susceptibility to false recognition of lures on a recognition memory test (McCabe et al.,
2009). Additionally, several studies investigating the role of executive functioning in false
memory have revealed that older adults’ increased susceptibility to false memory relative to
younger adults is partially, if not fully, eliminated when considering only older adults with high
executive functioning (Butler et al., 2004; Chan & McDermott, 2007; Meade et al., 2012;
Roediger & Geraci, 2007). There is also evidence that younger adults with lower executive
functioning are more susceptible to false memory than those with higher executive functioning
(Chan & McDermott, 2007). Therefore, it is plausible that deficits in executive functioning give
rise to false memories and that older adults’ increased susceptibility to false memory relative to
younger adults results, at least in part, from age-related declines in executive functioning.
The authors of past studies have suggested that older adults with high executive
functioning are less susceptible to false memories than those with low executive functioning due
to preserved source monitoring (Butler et al., 2004; McCabe et al., 2009; Roediger & Geraci,
2007). According to this theory, better executive functioning improves one’s ability to
distinguish between true memory traces and information activated due to its association with
available contextual cues. However, Meade et al. (2012) presented evidence to suggest that
improved source monitoring cannot fully account for the relationship between executive
functioning and susceptibility to false memory. The authors found that older adults with high
executive functioning demonstrated decreased susceptibility to false memory of the critical word
in a categorized list memory paradigm relative to older adults with low executive functioning
when given a free report cued recall test, but similar performance across the high and low
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executive functioning groups when given a forced report cued recall test. Additionally, older
adults with high executive functioning displayed equal susceptibility to false memory relative to
older adults with low executive functioning when the authors controlled for guessing by
subtracting the proportion of unpresented critical words that were recalled from the proportion of
presented critical words that were recalled. This led the authors to suggest that differences in
susceptibility to false memory between older adults with high versus low executive functioning
may reflect differences in retrieval strategies. Specifically, older adults with low executive
functioning may have been more likely to guess that the critical word was present due to its
association with the studied list words, whereas older adults with high executive functioning may
have employed a more conservative retrieval strategy. This conclusion was also endorsed by
Chan and McDermott (2007), who stated that higher executive functioning may be related to
increased use of controlled recollective processes, whereas individuals with lower executive
functioning may rely to a greater degree on automatic, familiarity-based processing (see Jacoby,
1991; McDermott & Chan, 2006 for additional information on controlled versus automatic
processing).
It is interesting to note that both Rogers et al. (2012) and Sommers et al. (2015) invoked
the distinction between controlled and automatic processing to explain age differences in
susceptibility to false hearing. Specifically, the authors suggested that the older adults in their
studies were less able than younger adults to constrain their responding to available sensory
information – which the authors called controlled or careful listening – and instead gave the
automatic response that was supported by context. Sommers et al. suggested that the inability to
suppress the automatic, context-based response reflected a failure of inhibitory control. Since
inhibitory control is typically considered to be a component of executive functioning (see Jurado
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& Rosselli, 2007), it is possible that differences in susceptibility to false memory between older
adults with high and low executive functioning observed in past studies (Butler et al., 2004;
Chan & McDermott, 2007; Meade et al., 2012; Roediger & Geraci, 2007) resulted from
differences in inhibitory control. In the next section, I describe evidence for the role of inhibitory
control in false memory and false hearing.

1.2.2 Inhibitory control
One specific component of executive functioning that has received a great deal of attention in the
false memory and false hearing literatures is inhibitory control. As noted above, there are thought
to be three different aspects of inhibitory control: controlling what information enters working
memory, removing information that is no longer relevant from working memory, and
suppressing prepotent, but incorrect, responses (Lustig et al., 2007). In support of distinct
functions of inhibitory control, measures purported to tap into different functions of inhibitory
control have been shown to be uncorrelated in previous studies (Kramer et al., 1994; Pineda &
Merchan, 2003). For example, the number of categories achieved on the Wisconsin Card Sorting
Test – a measure of the aspect of inhibitory control involved in removing no-longer-relevant
information from working memory – has been shown to be uncorrelated with interference on a
Stroop task (Pineda & Merchan, 2003) – a measure of the response suppression aspect of
inhibitory control – and performance on the two tasks have loaded onto separate factors in
exploratory factor analyses (Boone et al., 1998; Pineda & Merchan, 2003) and principle
components analyses (Rodríguez-Aranda & Sundet, 2006). Thus, there are distinct aspects of
inhibitory control that can be separated in different tasks.
The response suppression function of inhibitory control is often referenced in explaining
false hearing (Jacoby et al., 2012; Rogers et al., 2012; Sommers et al., 2015). According to the
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inhibitory control theory of false hearing, misleading contextual information increases the
activation of words in the mental lexicon that fit with the semantic context, thereby increasing
competition for perception when the target word is unpredicted by context. For example, hearing
the sentence “The shepherd watched his…” creates a strong expectation that the word sheep
should follow, so the word sheep should become highly activated while listening to the sentence.
When an unexpected but similar sounding word (e.g., sheath) is presented instead of the
predicted word – as in the incongruent condition of the study by Sommers et al. (2015,
Experiment 2) described above – participants may still perceive the predicted word if that word
received more activation from context than the target word received from the auditory signal. To
improve the chances of accurately hearing the unpredicted target word, it is thought that
inhibitory control can be used to suppress the activation of the unpresented, but contextually
predicted, word. Thus, according to this theory, false hearing occurs when people are unable to
sufficiently inhibit the contextually predicted word, and older, relative to younger, adults are
especially prone to false hearing due to an age-related deficit in inhibitory control (Cohn et al.,
1984; Hasher & Zacks, 1988; Hasher et al., 1997; Jacoby et al., 2005; MacLeod, 1991; Sommers
& Danielson, 1999, Experiment 2; Sommers & Huff, 2003, Experiment 2; West & Alain, 2000).
Past studies have provided at least indirect evidence to support inhibitory control as a
mechanism underlying false hearing. Sommers and Danielson (1999, Experiment 2), for
example, conducted a study to investigate how inhibitory control influenced veridical speech
perception of lexically easy words (i.e., words with few phonological neighbors, that have
relatively low frequency of occurrence in language) and lexically hard words (i.e., words with
many phonological neighbors, that have relatively high frequency of occurrence in language).
According to the Neighborhood Activation Model (NAM; Luce & Pisoni, 1998), hearing a word
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activates both the spoken word and its phonological neighbors in the mental lexicon. The NAM
postulates that relative activation of these words is determined by two primary factors: 1) the
phonological similarity of the activated words to the presented word, and 2) the frequency with
which the activated words appear in language. Thus, lexically hard words should be harder to
identify in noise than lexically easy words because they have a greater number of high-frequency
phonological competitors. Sommers and Danielson suggested that inhibitory control might be
needed to reduce the activation of phonological neighbors to accurately hear the target word.
Consequently, they hypothesized that lexically hard words, which have more high-frequency
phonological neighbors to compete for perception, should require greater inhibitory control than
lexically easy words. Additionally, they hypothesized that valid contextual cues may aid speech
perception by selectively increasing the activation of the contextually predicted target word in
the mental lexicon, thereby decreasing the need to inhibit phonological neighbors that did not fit
with semantic context.
Sommers and Danielson (1999) tested these predictions by having younger and older
adults listen to sentences with the final word in noise for identification, similar to the design of
the false hearing study by Sommers et al. (2015, Experiment 2). Unlike the study by Sommers et
al., however, the sentences used in Sommers and Danielson’s study were never misleading.
Instead, the sentences used by Sommers and Danielson provided either little context for
predicting the target word (low-predictability sentences; e.g., She was thinking about the path) or
a highly predictive context supporting the target word (high-predictability sentences; e.g., She
was walking along the path). Participants also completed two measures of the response
suppression aspect of inhibitory control – a selective attention paradigm developed by Garner
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(1974) and an auditory Stroop task (Stroop, 1935) – scores from which were combined to form a
composite measure of inhibitory control.
In line with their hypotheses, Sommers and Danielson (1999, Experiment 2) found that
their measure of the response suppression aspect of inhibitory control was significantly
correlated with identification of lexically hard, but not lexically easy, words, such that
individuals with poorer inhibitory control had more difficulty identifying lexically hard words
than individuals with better inhibitory control. Supporting the idea that valid contextual cues
decreased the need to inhibit activated phonological neighbors of the target word, the correlation
between their measure of inhibitory control and identification of lexically hard words was
stronger when the word was preceded by a low-predictability sentence (r = -.73) than a highpredictability sentence (r = -.58). Together, these findings suggest that inhibitory control was
needed to suppress activation of phonological neighbors of a target word, and that the
availability of predictive context partially alleviated reliance on inhibitory control to achieve
accurate perception.
Sommers and Danielson’s (1999, Experiment 2) study established the relationship
between the response suppression aspect of inhibitory control and veridical hearing but does not
tell us whether inhibitory control contributes to false hearing. However, the proposal that
inhibitory control is needed to reduce activation of a target word’s phonological neighbors and
that context increases the activation of semantically viable words is highly pertinent to the
studies of false hearing discussed above. Recall that the target words in the incongruent
condition of the tasks used by Rogers et al. (2012) and Sommers et al. (2015) were phonological
neighbors of the word predicted by context. Based on the NAM (Luce & Pisoni, 1998) and the
findings of Sommers and Danielson, we would expect that hearing the incongruent target word
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(e.g., sheath in the sentence The shepherd watched his sheath) would activate the contextually
predicted phonological neighbor of the target word (e.g., sheep), and that the activation of this
phonological neighbor would be boosted due to its compatibility with available contextual cues.
This set of conditions should result in an increased probability that participants would mistakenly
“hear” the contextually predicted phonological neighbor, a case of false hearing. Therefore, if the
role of inhibitory control is to decrease activation of phonological neighbors of the target word,
as suggested by Sommers and Danielson, then we might expect that individuals with better
inhibitory control would be less susceptible to false hearing than those with poorer inhibitory
control.
One experimental method that may be particularly useful for testing the inhibitory control
account of false hearing described above is eye-tracking. Eye-tracking has been increasingly
used to study language processing because it allows the researcher to observe changes in
attentional focus over time, providing a real-time assessment of the processing that occurs before
a response is made. In speech perception research, eye-tracking is often used within a visual
world paradigm (Allopenna et al., 1998; Dahan & Gaskell, 2007; Ito et al., 2018; Kukona, 2020;
Mishra & Singh, 2013; Revill & Spieler, 2012), in which different response options are depicted
in the form of written words or pictures. It has been argued that changes in the proportion of
fixations on the images in the visual world paradigm can be used as a proxy for changes in
activation, with more highly activated response options receiving more attention than less highly
activated options (Tanenhaus et al., 2000). Supporting this claim, images depicting highfrequency words, which are assumed to gain more activation than low-frequency words by
speech perception models such as the NAM (Luce & Pisoni, 1998), tend to receive a greater
proportion of fixations than images depicting low-frequency words (Dahan & Gaskell, 2007;
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Dahan et al., 2001; Revill & Spieler, 2012). Similarly, following from Sommers and Danielson’s
(1999) claim that words gain activation when supported by contextual cues, images depicting
words that are congruent with available semantic context tend to receive a greater proportion of
fixations than images depicting words that do not fit with context (Ito et al., 2018; Kukona,
2020). Therefore, the eye-tracking methodology could allow for a test of the inhibitory control
theory of false hearing. Misleading sentences, as in the incongruent condition of the study by
Sommers et al. (2015), should lead to increased fixations on an image depicting the contextually
predicted (but incorrect) word. If participants are able to suppress the activation of the
contextually predicted word when the unpredicted target word is presented, fixations on the
image depicting the contextually predicted word should decrease and fixations on the image
depicting the target word should increase following presentation of the target word. In
Experiment 2 of the present study, I used eye-tracking to test this hypothesis.
Whereas the relationship between inhibitory control and false hearing has not been tested
directly in past studies, there has been empirical support for a relationship between inhibitory
control and false memory (Colombel et al., 2016; Lövdén, 2003; Sommers & Huff, 2003,
Experiment 2). Similar to the inhibitory control theory of false hearing, the inhibitory control
theory of false memory suggests that false memories occur when an individual is unable to
suppress activation of unpresented information. Using the DRM paradigm as an example, the
inhibitory control theory suggests that reading a list of words in which each word is semantically
(or phonologically) related to an unpresented critical word increases the activation of the critical
word. False memories occur when the individual is unable to suppress activation of the critical
word using inhibitory control (see Balota et al., 1999), leading to the experience of remembering
the critical word even though it was not presented. In support of this theory, Sommers and Huff
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(2003, Experiment 2) found that reaction time on incongruent trials of an auditory Stroop task
(Stroop, 1935) – an indicator of the response suppression aspect of inhibitory control – was
positively related to both false recall and false recognition in phonologically-associated DRM
lists, accounting for 11% of variance in false recall and 7% of variance in false recognition after
controlling for differences in age and processing speed (assessed by reaction time on baseline
trials of the auditory Stroop task). Similarly, Colombel et al. (2016) found that a composite of
four measures of inhibitory control predicted false recall of critical words in the DRM paradigm,
also accounting for 11% of the variance in susceptibility to false recall. Thus, poor inhibitory
control has been shown to be related to increased susceptibility to false memory, at least within
the DRM paradigm.
Further evidence for the role of inhibitory control in false memory comes from the
capture model (see Figure 3), a multinomial processing tree (MPT) model that has been shown to
explain age differences in susceptibility to false memories evoked using the process dissociation
framework (Jacoby et al., 2005, Experiment 2). The capture model used by Jacoby et al. (2005,
Experiment 2; see study description above) had five parameters: 1) a capture parameter (C)
corresponding to the probability of being captured by available contextual cues, in which case
participants respond with the prime without attempting recollection; 2) a recollection parameter
(R) corresponding to the probability of successfully remembering the studied target word when
the individual was not captured by context; 3) an accessibility bias parameter (A) reflecting the
probability of responding with the easily accessible prime following an unsuccessful attempt at
recollection; 4) a word generation parameter (W) corresponding to the probability of generating
the pre-determined alternative response on a given trial; and 5) an attribution threshold parameter
(AT) signifying the likelihood of characterizing a response as “remembered” or “familiar” versus
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“guessed.” The authors suggested that the capture parameter represented inhibitory control,
indexing the ability to resist the context-based response. They were then able to test the
contribution of inhibitory control to responding in their memory task by comparing the fit of an
MPT model that did not include the capture parameter to a model that included the capture
parameter.

Figure 3. The capture model from Jacoby et al. (2005, Experiment 2). The table indicates
performance in the three prime conditions (congruent/incongruent/baseline). Correct responses
are signified by a plus sign (+), incorrect responses are signified by a minus sign (−), and
“Other” refers to responses other than the target word or the pre-determined alternative word.
Responses are characterized as either “remembered” or “familiar” (RF) or as “guessed” (G).

Supporting the role of inhibitory control in their memory task, Jacoby et al. (2005,
Experiment 2) found that model fit was improved by adding the capture parameter. This finding
was important, as it suggested that an additional means of achieving an accurate response in the
congruent condition and a false memory response in the incongruent condition other than
remembering the target word (the recollection parameter), responding based on ease of
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accessibility in memory (the accessibility bias parameter), or guessing (the word generation
parameter) was necessary to fit the data. This provided evidence that capture – interpreted as
representing inhibitory control – contributed to accurate responses in the congruent condition and
false memory responses in the incongruent condition in the memory task.
In addition to finding that capture influenced responding in the memory task, the MPT
model created by Jacoby et al. (2005, Experiment 2) also provided evidence that age differences
in their memory task could be fully accounted for by differences in capture. When allowing all of
the parameters in their MPT model to vary across age groups, the authors found that only the
capture parameter differed significantly between younger and older adults. In fact, the model
estimated that younger adults were never captured by context (capture parameter = .00) whereas
older adults had a 38% chance of being captured by context. This aligns with previous studies
suggesting that inhibitory control is better in younger adults than older adults (Cohn et al., 1984;
Hasher & Zacks, 1988; Hasher et al., 1997; Jacoby et al., 2005; MacLeod, 1991; Sommers &
Danielson, 1999, Experiment 2; Sommers & Huff, 2003, Experiment 2; West & Alain, 2000),
and suggests that younger adults’ false memories may have resulted predominantly from
accessibility bias (i.e., the other parameter in the MPT model that gives rise to false memory
responses) whereas older adults’ false memories may have reflected a combination of
accessibility bias and failures of inhibitory control. Therefore, it is possible that differences in
inhibitory control can fully account for older adults’ increased susceptibility to false memory
relative to younger adults, and that different mechanisms may give rise to false memories in
younger and older adults.
The ability of the capture model to account for age differences in false memory may be
important for advancing our understanding of the mechanisms underlying false hearing. As noted
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above, the methods and results of the study of false memory by Jacoby et al. (2005, Experiment
2) were quite similar to those of the study of false hearing by Rogers et al. (2012). Additionally,
much as the false memories in the Jacoby et al. study were described as resulting from being
captured by an easily accessible prime, the words that were falsely heard in the studies by Rogers
et al. and Sommers et al. (2015) were also easily accessible due to their association with
available contextual cues. Therefore, it is possible that both false memory and false hearing arise
from being captured by available contextual cues (i.e., failures to inhibit the contextually
predicted response). Together, these similarities suggest that the capture model might be a good
fit to false hearing data.
It is important to note that although Jacoby et al. (2005) interpreted the capture parameter
as representing inhibitory control, this is not necessarily the case. The authors’ interpretation of
capture was based on the idea that capture occurs when participants are unable to resist the
prepotent response – resulting in accurate responses in the congruent condition and false memory
responses in the incongruent condition – a description that aligns with that of the response
suppression aspect of inhibitory control (Lustig et al., 2007). However, the capture model does
not manipulate any factors to isolate cognitive processes, but instead estimates parameters based
on the patterns of responses across context conditions that would be expected if responding was
influenced by a particular cognitive ability. Thus, it is possible that the capture parameter could
reflect processes other than inhibitory control that would result in a similar pattern of responding.
For example, the capture parameter could reflect personality factors such as conscientiousness,
with less conscientious participants being less likely to follow instructions or pay attention to the
target word, instead using context as a basis for responding to decrease listening effort. Whereas
personality factors such as this may be partially accounted for by other parameters in the model,
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such as the accessibility bias parameter, these factors could influence the capture parameter.
Therefore, finding that adding the capture parameter improves model fit is weak evidence in
isolation for the role of inhibitory control in false hearing and false memory. In conjunction with
other evidence supporting the role of inhibitory control, however, finding that adding the capture
parameter improves model fit may increase our confidence that inhibitory control influences
responding.

1.3 The present study
In Experiment 1 of the present study, I examined whether the age-related increase in
susceptibility to false hearing observed in past studies (Rogers et al., 2012; Sommers et al., 2015)
could be accounted for by two related mechanisms that have been shown to explain age
differences in susceptibility to false memory: executive functioning and the response suppression
aspect of inhibitory control. I used a speech perception in noise (SPIN) task that was nearly
identical to that used by Sommers et al. (2015, Experiment 2) in which participants identified
words in noise at the end of three types of sentences: 1) sentences providing no context (baseline
condition; e.g., The word is page), 2) sentences providing a valid semantic context (congruent
condition; e.g., She put the toys in the box), or 3) sentences providing a misleading semantic
context (incongruent condition; e.g., She put the toys in the fox). Participants characterized their
responses as either “heard,” “known,” or “guessed” to correspond to the
remember/familiar/guess judgements made in the study of false memory by Jacoby et al. (2005,
Experiment 2). Participants also completed the memory task used by Jacoby et al., allowing for
direct comparison of susceptibility to false hearing and false memory.
In addition to the SPIN and memory tasks, participants completed a battery of executive
functioning measures (Glisky et al., 1995) and an auditory Stroop task (Stroop, 1935) – each of
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which has demonstrated significant relationships with false memory (Butler et al., 2004; Chan &
McDermott, 2007; McCabe et al., 2009; Meade et al., 2012; Roediger & Geraci, 2007; Sommers
& Huff, 2003, Experiment 2) – to assess the relationships between executive functioning,
inhibitory control, false hearing, and false memory. To further assess the role of inhibitory
control in false hearing and false memory, the capture model created by Jacoby et al. (2005,
Experiment 2) was fit to the data from the SPIN and memory tasks to determine 1) whether
adding a capture parameter improved model fit relative to models that did not account for
capture, and 2) the extent to which differences in responding between younger and older adults
could be explained by differences in capture. To fit the capture model to data from the SPIN
task, the recollection parameter from the original capture model was replaced with a hearing
parameter, which corresponded to the likelihood of accurately hearing the target word in noise.
This experiment provided the first direct test of the relationship between false hearing
and false memory, and was the first to examine the roles of executive functioning and inhibitory
control in false hearing. Additionally, this was the first use of the capture model to investigate
the cognitive processes contributing to false hearing. Consequently, the findings of this
experiment will have important implications for our understanding of speech perception and
memory, separately, and for formulation of a united theory of context-based errors across
perceptual and memory systems.
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Chapter 2: Experiment 1
2.1 Methods
2.1.1 Participants
An a priori power analysis was conducted in G*Power 3.1 (Faul et al., 2009) to determine the
sample size needed to detect a correlation of -.32 – the correlation between executive functioning
and false alarms characterized as “remembered” on a recognition memory test (i.e., false
memories) from McCabe et al., (2009), who used the same executive functioning battery as in
the present study (Glisky et al., 1995) – with a power of .80. The power analysis revealed that 56
younger and 56 older adults would be needed. Based on the results of this power analysis, data
was collected from 60 younger adults ages 18-23 (M = 19.05, SD = 1.05) and 58 older adults
ages 65-81 (M = 71.17, SD = 4.14) for Experiment 1.
All participants were native English speakers who did not require the use of a hearing aid
and who self-reported normal or corrected-to-normal vision. Participants completed a
demographic questionnaire gathering information about gender, age, handedness, years of
education, ethnic group, occupation or area of study, domestic arrangement (i.e., live alone or
with others), current/past health issues that could affect performance, and number of languages
spoken in addition to English.

2.1.2 Hearing acuity
Hearing thresholds were assessed for octave frequencies from 250 to 8000 Hz in a soundattenuating booth using standard pure-tone audiometry. Best-ear pure-tone averages (PTA)
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across the 500, 1000, and 2000 Hz frequencies2 differed significantly between younger (M =
4.72, SD = 4.51) and older adults (M = 17.39, SD = 9.74), t(79.78) = -9.01, p < .001. Therefore,
the older adults in this study exhibited poorer hearing acuity, on average, than the younger
adults, as would be expected due to age-related hearing loss (Morrell et al., 1996; Sommers et
al., 2011).

2.1.3 Speech Perception in Noise (SPIN) task
2.1.3.1 SPIN task stimuli
Stimuli in the SPIN task were 42 carrier sentences (baseline sentences; e.g., The word is page)
and 42 high-predictability sentences (congruent sentences; e.g., She put the toys in a box)
selected from the Revised Speech Perception in Noise Test (Bilger et al., 1984) or created
specifically for this study. For each congruent sentence, an incongruent sentence was created by
changing either the first or last sound in the sentence-final word (first sound changed in 85% of
cases) to form an alternative word that was not predicted by the sentence context (e.g., She put
the toys in the fox). The length, frequency, and phonological neighborhood density of all target
words were gathered from the English Lexicon Project (Balota et al., 2007). The length of target
words in the congruent (M = 4.35, SD = .99), incongruent (M = 4.36, SD = 1.05), and baseline
conditions (M = 4.08, SD = .73) did not differ significantly, F(2,197) = 1.35, p > .05. The
frequency of target words in the congruent (M = 53,839, SD = 120,601.25, incongruent (M =
57,573, SD = 86,165.11), and baseline conditions (M = 59,267, SD = 115,873.36) also did not
differ significantly, F(2,197) = .04, p > .05. Finally, the phonological neighborhood density of
target words in the congruent (M = 19.22, SD = 11.03), incongruent (M = 19.20, SD = 11.45),
and baseline conditions (M = 18.95, SD = 9.73) did not differ significantly, F(2,197) = .01, p >
2

The 500, 1000, and 2000 Hz frequencies were chosen because these frequencies are known to
be important for speech perception (Dobie, 2011).
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.05. Congruent and incongruent sentences were counterbalanced such that the congruent and
incongruent versions of a sentence appeared an equal number of times across participants but
with only one version appearing in a single experimental session. All sentences were recorded at
44,100 Hz and 16-bit resolution in a double-walled, sound-attenuating booth, and were spoken at
a normal rate by a male with a Midwestern American accent. All sentences were played at an
average amplitude of 64 dB sound pressure level (SPL).

2.1.3.2 SPIN task procedure
Baseline, congruent, and incongruent sentences were played through headphones with the final
word presented in speech-shaped noise for identification. The SNR was set to -4 dB SPL for
younger adults and to +1 dB SPL for older adults, SNRs shown to achieve approximately 50%
target word identification accuracy in the baseline condition in pilot testing. Participants
completed six practice trials divided equally among baseline, congruent, and incongruent stimuli.
They then completed 120 test trials composed of 40 baseline trials, 40 congruent trials, and 40
incongruent trials. Stimuli in each counterbalancing condition were randomized once and that
order was used for all participants in that condition. Participants were instructed to identify the
word in noise, and to type their response after hearing each sentence. Participants were warned
that sentence contexts could be misleading, and were given an example of an incongruent
sentence.
After typing their response, participant completed a version of the remember/know
paradigm (Tulving, 1985) – a hear/know/guess paradigm – in which they were instructed to
indicate whether they heard the word they typed on the previous screen, did not hear the word
they typed on the previous screen but knew that it was the word that was presented, or simply
guessed the word they typed on the previous screen. Descriptions of the hear, know, and guess
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responses were presented on screen each time participants made this judgement. Participants
indicated their response by pressing the number key corresponding to their judgement. This task
was self-paced, with participants having an unlimited amount of time to type their response for
the SPIN task and to make their hear/know/guess judgement.
It should be noted that context was only a valid predictor of the target word in one-third
of sentences. This, in addition to the warning participants received regarding the presence of
incongruent sentences, should have biased participants against using the sentence context as a
basis for responding.

2.1.4 Memory task
2.1.4.1 Memory task stimuli
Susceptibility to false memory was assessed using the memory task from Jacoby et al. (2005,
Experiment 2). Participants completed two phases in this task, a study phase and a test phase.
Stimuli in the study phase were 99 semantically related cue-target word pairs (e.g., head – skull).
Cue words ranged from three to nine letters in length (M = 5.08, SD = 1.41), and target words
ranged from three to seven letters in length (M = 4.59, SD = .79). Stimuli in the test phase
consisted of the same cue words from the study phase matched with a fragment of its paired
target word created by replacing certain letters with dashes (e.g., head – s--l-). Target words in
the test phase had between one and five letters replaced by dashes (M = 2.21, SD = .71), and
retained between one and four letters (M = 2.38, SD = .63), although all but one fragment (-u- for
the target word “mug”) retained at least two letters. Prior to presenting the target fragment in the
test phase, participants saw one of three types of prime words: 1) the target word from the study
phase (congruent condition; e.g., skull), 2) an alternative word that could complete the target
fragment and that was semantically related to the cue word (incongruent condition; e.g., scalp),
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or 3) a string of five ampersands (&&&&&), which provided no predictive value for the
fragment completion task (baseline condition). There were no differences in target word length
between the congruent (M = 4.57, SD = .73), incongruent (M = 4.47, SD = .78), and baseline
conditions (M = 4.73, SD = .87), F(2,87) = .87, p > .05. I obtained the log frequencies for target
words in the congruent (M = 9.37, SD = 2.01), incongruent (M = 9.67, SD = 1.55), and baseline
conditions (M = 9.29, SD = 1.74) from the English Lexicon Project (Balota et al., 2007), and
found that there were no differences in target word frequency across conditions, F(2,87) = .38, p
> .05.

2.1.4.2 Memory task procedure
Participants were told to study a list of semantically related word pairs for a later memory test.
They were shown six cue-target word pairs as examples. Following the examples, participants
completed the study phase, in which 90 cue-target word pairs were presented. An additional
three cue-target word pairs were presented following the study phase to act as a buffer against
the recency effect. For younger adults, each word pair was presented for 1000 ms, whereas each
word pair was presented for 3000 ms for older adults, a manipulation used by Jacoby et al.
(2005, Experiment 2) to equate memory for words in the baseline condition. An interstimulus
interval (ISI) of 500 ms separated each cue-target word pair. To equate the interval from the first
word in the study phase to the last word in the buffer trials, younger adults were shown a screen
following the buffer trials for 186 seconds instructing them to relax and wait for the memory test
to begin in three minutes, whereas older adults started the memory test immediately following
the buffer trials. Stimuli in the study phase were presented in the same pre-determined random
order for all participants, and each cue-target word pair was presented only once.
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In the memory test, participants were again shown the word pairs from the learning
phase, but in each case the second word in the pair was fragmented by substituting dashes for
some of the letters. Participants were instructed to complete the word fragment by typing the full
word that accurately completed the learned word pair from the study phase. As noted, before
each cue-fragment pair was presented, a congruent, incongruent, or baseline prime was flashed
on screen. Participants were explicitly warned at the start of the study that primes would appear,
and were told that the prime would either be the target word from the study phase, in which case
they should use this word to complete the word fragment, an unstudied word that was
semantically related to the presented cue and that could complete the word fragment, in which
case they should not use this word to complete the word fragment, or a string of ampersands. The
prime remained on screen for 500 ms and offset 500 ms before presentation of the cue-fragment
pair. Participants completed 30 trials in each of the three prime conditions (baseline, congruent,
and incongruent), and trials were presented in a pre-determined random order.
After typing the word that completed each cue-target word pair, participants indicated
their reason for providing their response by selecting one of three options: remember, know, or
guess. Participants were told to select “remember” if they recalled specific details of the word’s
presentation in the study list, so they were certain that their response was the word from the
study list. They were told to select “know” if they knew that they had studied the word they
typed, but could not recall specific details about studying it. Finally, they were told to select
“guess” if they were purely guessing with no idea of the correct answer. The descriptions for
each these response types were presented on screen each time participants made the
remember/know/guess judgement. Participants indicated their response by pressing the number
key corresponding to their judgement. This task was self-paced, with participants having an
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unlimited amount of time to type their response for the fragment completion task and to make
their remember/know/guess judgement.
As was true of contextual cues in the SPIN task, the prime was only an accurate cue for
memory in one-third of trials, and participants were warned that the prime could be misleading.
Therefore, if anything, participants should have been biased against using the prime as a basis for
responding.

2.1.5 Shipley Vocabulary Test
Vocabulary knowledge was assessed using the Shipley Vocabulary Test (Shipley, 1940).
Participants completed 40 trials in which they decided which of four words was most similar in
meaning to a target word, and indicated their responses by pressing the number key
corresponding to their answer. The target word was presented at the top of the screen in capital
letters, and the four numbered response options were presented horizontally below. Participants
had an unlimited time to select their response. An interval of 1000 ms separated the input of a
response and the onset of the next trial. Older adults (M = 34.98, SD = 2.98) displayed
significantly better vocabulary knowledge than younger adults (M = 30.83, SD = 3.61), t(112.80)
= -6.79, p < .001.

2.1.6 Auditory Stroop task
Individual differences in the response suppression aspect of inhibitory control were assessed
using the auditory Stroop task (Stroop, 1935) from Sommers and Huff (2003, Experiment 2).
Stimuli in this task were three spoken words (male, female, and person) spoken by four different
talkers (two male and two female). Combinations of the words and talkers created three
conditions: 1) a neutral condition in which the word person was spoken by either a male or
female talker, 2) a congruent condition in which the word male or female was spoken by a talker
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of the same gender (e.g., a male talker saying male), and 3) an incongruent condition in which
the word male or female was spoken by a talker of the opposite gender (e.g., a female talker
saying male). Participants were tasked with pressing the “z” key on the keyboard if the speaker
was male and the “/” key if the speaker was female as quickly and accurately as possible, and
their response times and accuracy were recorded. Participants completed 24 trials in each
condition for a total of 72 test trials. As in the study by Sommers and Huff, inhibitory control
was assessed by the response time in the incongruent condition after controlling for response
time in the baseline condition, indexing the increased processing time needed to suppress
responding with the spoken word to accurately respond with the gender of the speaker.
Prior to completing the test trials, participants heard each sound stimulus and were tasked
with saying aloud the gender of the speaker and the word they said to ensure that participants
could accurately identify the gender of the speaker and the spoken word. Participants accurately
identified 98.93% of stimuli, on average. Participants then completed 12 practice trials divided
equally between baseline, congruent, and incongruent conditions before beginning test trials. All
auditory stimuli were recorded at 44,100 Hz and 16-bit resolution in a double-walled, soundattenuating booth, and were played at an average amplitude of 64 dB SPL.

2.1.7 Executive functioning battery
Executive functioning was assessed using a battery of five measures identified by Glisky et al.
(1995) as tapping into frontal lobe functioning – often used interchangeably with executive
functioning (see McCabe et al., 2010) – that has since been used in several studies of false
memory (Butler et al., 2004; Chan & McDermott, 2007; McCabe et al., 2009; Meade et al.,
2012; Roediger & Geraci, 2007). The tests were a computerized version of the modified
Wisconsin Card Sorting Test (Hart et al., 1988), the Arithmetic test from the Wechsler Adult
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Intelligence Scale – Revised (WAIS-R; Wechsler, 1981), the Mental Control test and Backward
Digit Span from the Wechsler Memory Scale – III (WMS-III; Wechsler, 1997), and the
Controlled Oral Word Association Test (Spreen & Benton, 1977). Following the procedure used
by Chan and McDermott (2007), the outcome measures from each of these tests were
standardized in the full sample then averaged together to form a composite executive functioning
score for each participant.

2.1.7.1 Wisconsin Card Sorting Test
In the modified Wisconsin Card Sorting Test (Hart et al., 1988), participants saw a series of
target cards one at a time and sorted them into one of four piles based on a changing sorting rule.
Cards could be sorted based on the shape depicted on the card, the number of shapes on the card,
or the color of the shapes on the card (the fourth pile did not match the target card on any of
these features). Participants were instructed to click on the pile that they believed the target card
belonged to based on the current sorting rule. Participants were not told the current sorting rule
but were given feedback after each trial indicating whether or not they had sorted the card
correctly. The sorting rule changed after the participant successfully sorted six cards in the
current response category. As in the study by Hart et al. (1988), the order of categories was
color, shape, number, color, shape, number. Participants continued until they had completed all
six response categories or until 72 trials elapsed. The number of categories completed within the
allotted 72 trials was the outcome measure.

2.1.7.2 WAIS-R Arithmetic test
In the Arithmetic test from the WAIS-R (Wechsler, 1981), the experimenter read arithmetic
problems aloud and the participant was tasked with solving the problems as quickly as possible
while being accurate. Participants were not allowed to write anything down, but the experimenter
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would repeat the question once if requested. Participants were scored based on the accuracy of
their response and received bonus points on questions 10-14 if the correct answer was given in
an amount of time specified on the WAIS-R scoring packet. Response time was recorded using a
handheld stopwatch.

2.1.7.3 WMS-III Mental Control test
In the Mental Control test from the WMS-III (Wechsler, 1997), participants were instructed to
say a sequence (e.g., list the days of the week in forward order starting with Sunday) aloud in the
proper order as quickly as possible. Participants were scored based on the number of errors
committed and received bonus points on perfectly accurate responses based on their response
time in accordance with the WMS-III scoring packet. Response time was recorded using a
handheld stopwatch.

2.1.7.4 WMS-III Backward Digit Span
In the Backward Digit Span from the WMS-III (Wechsler, 1997), the experimenter said strings
of numbers of increasing length aloud and participants were instructed to repeat the numbers
aloud in reverse order. Participants completed two strings of lengths two through eight and
testing was stopped either after all strings were completed or when participants were unable to
perfectly recall all numbers in both trials at a given string length. Participants were told that there
was no time limit, and received one point for each string recalled perfectly.

2.1.7.5 Controlled Oral Word Association Test
In the Controlled Oral Word Association Test (Spreen & Benton, 1977), participants said aloud
as many words as they could think of (other than proper names) starting with the letters F, A, and
S. The outcome measure was the total number of distinct words generated across the three letters
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given one minute for each letter. Responses were recorded by hand by the experimenter, and a
one-minute timer was used to indicate when the allotted time had elapsed.

2.1.8 General procedure
The experiment took place across two one-hour sessions on different days. During the first
session, participants read a consent document and completed the demographics form, then
completed the hearing test, SPIN task, auditory Stroop task, and Shipley Vocabulary Test.
During the second session, participants completed the memory task, Wisconsin Card Sorting
Test, Arithmetic test, Mental Control test, Backward Digit Span, and Controlled Oral Word
Association Test, in that order. Participants were offered breaks between each of the tasks.
Student participants received one course credit and older adults received a total of $15 ($10 + $5
to cover transportation costs) after completing each session of the experiment.

2.1.9 MPT modeling procedure
The capture model proposed by Jacoby et al. (2005, Experiment 2) – an MPT model – was fit to
the data from the SPIN and memory tasks using the fit.mpt function from the MPTinR package
in R (Singmann & Kellen, 2013). The model fit to the memory task data was the same as used by
Jacoby et al. (2005, Experiment 2; see Figure 3). The model fit to the SPIN task data can be seen
in Figure 4. Similar to the capture model proposed by Jacoby et al. (2005, Experiment 2), the
model fit to the SPIN data had five parameters: 1) a capture parameter (C) representing the
likelihood of responding based on context without listening to the target word, 2) a hearing
parameter (H) representing the likelihood of accurately hearing the target word when capture did
not occur, 3) an accessibility bias parameter (A) representing the likelihood of responding with
the most easily accessed response (i.e., the contextually predicted word in the
congruent/incongruent conditions and the presented word in the baseline condition) following an
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unsuccessful attempt to hear the target word, 4) a word generation parameter (W) representing
the likelihood of providing the pre-designated alternative word (e.g., the alternative word for box
in the sentence She put the toys in the box is fox), and 5) an attribution threshold parameter (AT)
signifying the likelihood of characterizing a response as “heard” or “known” versus “guessed.”

Figure 4. The capture model to be used in Experiment 1. The table indicates performance in
the three context conditions (congruent/incongruent/baseline). Correct responses are signified
by a plus sign (+), incorrect responses are signified by a minus sign (−), and “Other” refers to
responses other than the target word or the pre-determined alternative word. Responses are
characterized as either “heard” or “known” (HK) or as “guessed” (G).
I first ran two versions of this model to assess the role of inhibitory control (i.e., capture)
in the SPIN and memory tasks. One model constrained the capture parameter to 0 and the other
allowed the capture parameter to be estimated freely. The fit of these models to the data was then
compared using the Bayesian information criterion (BIC) to determine whether adding the
capture parameter to the model improved model fit. If adding the capture parameter improved
model fit, this would indicate that having a means of achieving an accurate response in the
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congruent condition or a false hearing/memory response in the incongruent condition other than
those provided by the other parameters in the model better explained the data. This would
provide evidence for the role of inhibitory control – or another cognitive process that would
result in the same response pattern – in these responses. For these models, all parameters were
assumed to be equal across groups.
Next, multiple versions of the model including the capture parameter were fit to assess
group differences in individual parameters. The simplest model assumed no group differences in
any of the model’s parameters. Increasingly complex iterations of the model allowing all
combinations of parameters to vary between age groups were fit to the data, and model fits were
compared using BIC values to determine which model best described the data.
In addition to BIC values, the goodness-of-fit of models to the data was assessed by
comparing G2 values to a critical G2 value. As in Millar et al. (2018), I performed a compromise
power analysis to set the critical value for each significance test using G*Power 3.1 (Faul et al.,
2009). This compromise power analysis was done to compensate for the hypersensitivity of MPT
models to detecting minor deviations between the observed values and those predicted by the
model, which results in models being deemed to be statistically “poor fits” to the data when they,
in fact, describe the observed data quite accurately (see Millar et al., 2018). Following the
procedure used by Millar et al., the minimum effect size for the compromise power analysis was
set at ω = .10, the β/α ratio was set at 1.0, and the total sample size was calculated as the number
of participants multiplied by the number of trials (SPIN task: 118 participants x 120 trials =
14,160; memory task: 118 participants x 90 trials = 10,620). When testing the fit of an individual
model, the degrees of freedom was the number of independent response categories (i.e., all of the
different possible response types in each context condition, such as baseline hits judged as
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guessed or cases of false memory in the incongruent condition judged as remembered or known)
minus the number of parameters estimated. When comparing the fit of two models, the degrees
of freedom was the number of models being compared minus one (2 – 1 = 1).
As in Jacoby et al. (2005), the accessibility bias and word generation parameters in all the
models described above were allowed to differ in the baseline condition relative to the congruent
and incongruent conditions. This was done under the assumption that accessibility of the target
word and the likelihood of generating the pre-selected alternative word would differ in cases
where context was unavailable relative to when it was available. However, unlike in the models
created by Jacoby et al., I did not constrain the accessibility bias parameter to .50 in the baseline
condition. Jacoby et al. set the accessibility bias parameter to .50 under the assumption that there
should be a 50% chance of generating the target word and a 50% chance of generating the
alternative word when the subject was unable to recollect the target word and there were no
contextual cues available. However, this explanation failed to account for the fact that words
other than the target word or the alternative word could be generated to complete the fragment.
For example, for the cue-fragment pair head – s--l-, participants could generate the target word
(skull), the alternative word (scalp), or a different word (e.g., smile). Thus, the probability of
generating the target word when recollection fails should be less than .50 assuming an equal
probability of generating all possible words in the absence of contextual cues. This issue is even
more apparent in the hearing task, where any word could plausibly complete the sentence in the
baseline condition (The word is…). For this reason, I allowed the accessibility bias parameter in
the baseline condition to be estimated freely rather than setting it to .50, although as mentioned
above, I allowed this parameter to differ in the baseline condition relative to the congruent and
incongruent conditions. This decision was justified by the accessibility bias parameter in the
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baseline condition being estimated at .36 in the memory task and .16 in the SPIN task when all
parameters were held constant across age groups.

2.2 Results
2.2.1 Stroop task
Before analyzing data from the SPIN and memory tasks to address my main hypotheses, I
conducted a mixed-effects linear regression model using the glmer function from the lme4
package in R (Bates et al., 2015) predicting reaction time within the auditory Stroop task to
ensure that participants experienced the typical Stroop effect and to determine whether the
magnitude of the Stroop effect differed across age groups, indicating the expected age difference
in inhibitory control (Cohn et al., 1984; MacLeod, 1991; Sommers & Danielson, 1999,
Experiment 2; Sommers & Huff, 2003, Experiment 2; West & Alain, 2000). This model was run
on a subset of the full data including only baseline and incongruent trials, the trial types used by
Sommers and Huff (2003, Experiment 2) to calculate the Stroop effect. Predictors in the model
were an intercept term representing reaction time in the baseline condition for younger adults, a
trial type variable representing the change in reaction time from the baseline condition to the
incongruent condition (i.e., the magnitude of the Stroop effect) for younger adults, an age group
variable representing the change in reaction time on baseline trials from younger to older adults,
and the interaction of age group and trial type representing the change in the magnitude of the
Stroop effect from younger to older adults. The reaction time in the baseline condition and the
change in reaction time from the baseline condition to the incongruent condition were allowed to
vary randomly across subjects, and reaction time was allowed to vary randomly across items
(i.e., audio files for each speaker/word combination). For these analyses, I used only trials in
which participants responded accurately (mean accuracy was .99 in the baseline condition and
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.98 in the incongruent condition). Additionally, I excluded reaction times that were two standard
deviations above or below the participants average in that trial type. On average, 5% of trials
were excluded in each age group for this reason.
Average reaction times for accurate responses in the baseline and incongruent conditions
of the auditory Stroop task are presented in Figure 5. The interaction of age group and trial type
was non-significant, so it was removed from the model to allow for interpretation of main
effects. This indicates that there was no difference in the magnitude of the Stroop effect across
groups. The model revealed a robust Stroop effect in both age groups, as exhibited by a main
effect of Stroop condition (Estimated difference [ED] = 73.24 ms, t = 2.72, p < .05).
Additionally, older adults were slower to respond than younger adults in the baseline condition
(ED = 201.16 ms, t = 5.64, p < .001). Thus, both groups experienced the predicted Stroop effect,
and although older adults experienced general slowing as indicated by slower reaction times in
the baseline condition, older adults did not experience an inflated Stroop effect as reported in
previous studies (Cohn et al., 1984; MacLeod, 1991; Sommers & Danielson, 1999, Experiment
2; Sommers & Huff, 2003, Experiment 2; West & Alain, 2000)3. The lack of age differences in
the magnitude of the Stroop effect foreshadows that inhibitory control as assessed by the
auditory Stroop task may not be a good predictor of false hearing or false memory given that
older adults are typically more susceptible than younger adults to false hearing (Rogers et al.,
2012; Sommers et al., 2015) and false memory (Jacoby et al., 2005, Experiment 2).

3

The same results were found when controlling for individual differences in hearing acuity by
including best-ear PTA and the interaction of condition and best-ear PTA as predictors.
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Figure 5. Average reaction times for accurate responses in the baseline
and incongruent conditions of the auditory Stroop task by younger and
older adults. Error bars represent 95% confidence intervals.

2.2.2 Executive functioning battery
Next, I conducted analyses to determine whether the five measures in the executive functioning
battery tapped into a single construct. Descriptive statistics for each of the tasks in the executive
functioning battery and results of t-tests comparing group means are presented in Table 1. Older
adults achieved fewer categories in the Wisconsin Card Sorting Test, t(61.95) = 5.39, p < .001,
and displayed poorer working memory capacity in the backward digit span than younger adults,
t(115.28) = 4.40, p < .001, but did not differ from younger adults in the other tasks, ps > .05.
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Table 1
Descriptive statistics for tasks comprising the executive functioning battery
Younger adults

Older adults

M

SD

M

SD

t-test

WCST

5.97

.26

5.09

1.22

***

Arithmetic score

11.90

2.99

12.62

3.80

n.s.

Mental Control

23.07

4.12

22.79

3.95

n.s.

Backwards Digit
Span

9.05

2.67

7.00

2.38

***

COWAT

47.62

10.76

46.31

13.90

n.s.

Note. WCST = Categories achieved in Wisconsin Card Sorting Test; COWAT =
Controlled Oral Word Association Test; *** = p < .001; n.s. = p > .05

I next sought to determine whether the individual components of the battery were
correlated. As can be seen in Table 2, there were significant correlations between each
component of the battery with the exception of the number of categories completed in the
Wisconsin Card Sorting Test, which was only significantly related to the Arithmetic score from
the WAIS-R and the Backwards Digit Span. The reason that the Wisconsin Card Sorting Test did
not correlate with the other tasks in the battery was likely that there was limited variability in the
number of categories that participants achieved. As can be seen in Table 1, nearly all younger
adults completed all six categories, as did most older adults. Thus, the lack of significant
correlations between the categories achieved on the Wisconsin Card Sorting Test and the other
tasks in the battery likely resulted from limited individual differences.
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Table 2
Bivariate correlations between components of executive functioning battery and auditory Stroop
interference
Mental
Arithmetic
Backwards
Stroop
WCST
Control
COWAT
score
Digit Span
Diff
score
WCST
Arithmetic
score
Mental
Control score
Backwards
Digit Span

1.00
.20*

1.00

.00

.28**

1.00

.23*

.31***

.22*

1.00

COWAT

.14

.19*

.32***

.34***

1.00

Stroop Diff

-.14

.04

.03

-.05

.03

1.00

Note. WCST = Categories achieved in Wisconsin Card Sorting Test; COWAT = Controlled
Oral Word Association Test; Stroop Diff = Difference in reaction time for accurate
responses between incongruent and baseline Stroop trials; * p < .05; ** p < .01; *** p <
.001

To supplement the basic correlational analysis, I conducted an exploratory factor analysis
(EFA) with varimax rotation using the factanal function from the stats package in R (R Core
Team, 2012) to determine whether all five measures in the executive functioning battery loaded
onto a single latent factor. Parallel analysis (Horn, 1965) was used to determine the optimal
number of factors to retain using the parallel function in the nFactors package in R (Raiche &
Magis, 2020)4. In parallel analysis, Monte Carlo simulations are conducted to create a
distribution of eigenvalues from randomly generated datasets, then the eigenvalues from the EFA
are compared to this distribution to determine whether the obtained eigenvalues were greater

Parallel analysis has been shown to be a better method of factor extraction than Kaiser’s (1960)
method of retaining any factor with an eigenvalue greater than 1.00, which tends to overestimate
the number of factors to retain (Zwick & Velicer, 1986).
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than 95% of generated eigenvalues (i.e., significant at the α = .05 level). If the EFA revealed that
a single-factor model could explain the data and that all five measures within the executive
functioning battery displayed high loadings on the single factor, then this would justify
combining the measures to create a composite score.
Parallel analysis determined that the first factor was significant (eigenvalue = 1.92,
critical = 1.15) and the second factor did not account for significant additional variance
(eigenvalue = 1.03, critical = 1.04). As can be seen in Table 3, each of the measures in the
executive functioning battery demonstrated moderate-to-strong loadings on the single factor,
although the Wisconsin Card Sorting Test displayed a weaker loading likely due to the limited
variability mentioned above. Based on the results of the correlations and the EFA, I felt justified
in combining the tasks into a single executive functioning composite score as in past studies
(Butler et al., 2004; Chan & McDermott, 2007; Meade et al., 2012; Roediger & Geraci, 2007).
Table 3
Factor loadings from the EFA of measures in the executive functioning battery
Factor loading
WCST

.29

Arithmetic score

.49

Mental Control score

.45

Backwards Digit Span

.62

COWAT

.54

Note. WCST = Categories achieved on the Wisconsin Card Sorting Test; COWAT =
Controlled Oral Word Association Test
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Having created the executive functioning composite, I next tested whether younger and
older adults differed in executive functioning. As expected, older adults (M = -.16, SD = .68)
exhibited poorer executive functioning than younger adults (M = .16, SD = .51), t(105.8) = 2.93,
p < .01. This converges with past research showing that executive functioning declines with age
(Chan & McDermott, 2007; McCabe et al., 2009; Roediger & McDaniel, 2007).
Finally, I conducted analyses to determine whether inhibitory control as assessed by the
auditory Stroop task was related to the measures in the executive functioning battery. As can be
seen in Table 2, the difference in reaction time for accurate responses between incongruent and
baseline Stroop trials did not correlate significantly with any of the measures of executive
functioning. This suggests that the aspect of inhibitory control captured by interference on the
auditory Stroop task was not related to performance on any individual component of the
executive functioning battery.
To supplement the correlational analysis, I conducted a second EFA to determine
whether inhibitory control as assessed by the auditory Stroop task loaded onto the same factor as
the measures in the executive functioning battery. Since inhibitory control is typically considered
an executive function (Jurado & Rosselli, 2007), inhibitory control as assessed by the auditory
Stroop task should load onto the same factor as the measures of executive functioning. It was
also important to establish that inhibitory control as assessed by the auditory Stroop task loaded
onto the executive functioning factor for the planned analysis described below in which the
executive functioning score is added to a mixed-effects logistic regression model including age
group, baseline Stroop reaction time, and incongruent Stroop reaction time to determine whether
executive functioning was predictive of false hearing and false memory after controlling for the
response suppression aspect of inhibitory control. If inhibitory control as assessed by the
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auditory Stroop task did not load onto the same factor as measures of executive functioning, then
this would suggest that the auditory Stroop task measured something other than what was
included in the executive functioning battery – either a different component of inhibitory control
(Kramer et al., 1994; Lustig et al., 2007) or something other than inhibitory control – and I
would not be able to draw the conclusion that the inhibitory control component of the executive
functioning battery was controlled for in this analysis. The EFA included each of the measures
from the executive functioning battery and a standardized difference score subtracting baseline
Stroop reaction time from incongruent Stroop reaction time. The difference score was calculated
to demonstrate differences in inhibitory control accounting for variability in processing speed.
Parallel analysis revealed a significant first factor (eigenvalue = 1.93, critical = 1.20) and
a significant second factor (eigenvalue = 1.16, critical = 1.08). As can be seen in Table 4, the
Stroop difference score only loaded onto the second factor, and the Wisconsin Card Sorting Test
loaded strongly onto this factor. However, the Stroop difference score only loaded weakly onto
this factor, suggesting that it shared little variance with either latent factor. All the other
measures in the executive functioning battery loaded strongly onto the first factor and only
weakly onto the second factor. The findings of the EFA in addition to the low correlations
between the auditory Stroop difference score and each measure in the executive functioning
battery suggest that inhibitory control as assessed by the auditory Stroop task tapped a latent
variable that was different from that tapped by measures in the executive functioning battery5.
Therefore, the analysis proposed above including age group, baseline Stroop reaction time,

5

I conducted this analysis again using incongruent Stroop reaction time as an index of inhibitory
control instead of the Stroop difference score and obtained similar results. The data indicated a
second significant factor (eigenvalue = 1.24, critical = 1.08), and both WCST and incongruent
Stroop reaction time loaded onto one factor whereas the other measures of executive functioning
loaded onto the other factor.
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incongruent Stroop reaction time, and executive functioning score as simultaneous predictors can
be used to determine whether the executive functioning score made an independent contribution
to predicting false memory and false hearing controlling for the other variables, but it cannot be
concluded that controlling for Stroop task performance fully partialled out the inhibitory control
component of the executive functioning battery. This issue will be discussed further below.
Table 4
Factor loadings from the EFA of measures in the executive functioning battery and the
Stroop difference score
Factor 1 loading

Factor 2 loading

WCST

.22

.57

Arithmetic score

.48

.12

Mental Control score

.57

-.22

Backwards Digit Span

.55

.23

COWAT

.55

Stroop difference score

-.23

Note. WCST = Categories achieved in Wisconsin Card Sorting Test; COWAT =
Controlled Oral Word Association Test; Stroop difference score = difference in reaction
time between the baseline and incongruent conditions of the auditory Stroop task

2.2.3 Memory task
2.2.3.1 Accuracy
Accuracy in the memory task was analyzed using mixed-effects logistic regression using the
glmer function from the lme4 package in R (Bates et al., 2015). The dependent variable in this
model was trial-by-trial accuracy. The model included an intercept term corresponding to the
odds of an accurate response for younger adults in the baseline condition, two dummy coded
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variables indicating the change in the odds of an accurate response from the baseline condition to
the congruent and incongruent conditions for younger adults, a group variable representing the
change in odds of an accurate response from younger to older adults in the baseline condition,
and the interaction of group with the congruent and incongruent condition dummy codes to
determine whether the change in the odds of an accurate response from the baseline condition to
the congruent and incongruent conditions differed between younger and older adults. The odds
of an accurate response in the baseline condition and the change in odds of an accurate response
from the baseline to the congruent and incongruent conditions were allowed to vary randomly
across subjects, and the odds of an accurate response were allowed to vary randomly across
items (i.e., target words).
As shown in Figure 6, patterns in the memory task closely resembled those from Jacoby
et al. (2005, Experiment 2). First, it is important to note that the age groups differed in baseline
accuracy, with the odds of an accurate response being 1.69 times greater in the older adult group
than in the younger adult group (z = 4.15, p < .001)6. As in Jacoby et al., however, I found that
younger adults’ performance improved in the congruent condition relative to the baseline
condition (OR = 5.96, z = 6.84, p < .001), and that older adults experienced marginally greater
improvement to performance from the baseline to the congruent condition relative to younger
adults (OR = 1.56, z = 1.96, p = .05). Similarly, younger adults’ performance was negatively
impacted in the incongruent condition relative to the baseline condition (OR = .47, z = -3.06, p <
.01), and older adults’ performance was negatively impacted to a significantly greater degree
than was that of younger adults (OR =.33, z = -5.60, p < .001). This supports the conclusion that
6

Age groups demonstrated equivalent performance in the baseline condition of the same task in
the study by Jacoby et al. (2005). It is possible that adding a 186 second retention interval for the
younger adult group to compensate for the shorter presentation duration of stimuli in the study
phase resulted in lower accuracy for younger, relative to older, adults in the present study.
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older adults were more likely to respond based on available context (i.e., the prime word) than
were younger adults.

Figure 6. Average proportion of hits and susceptibility to false memory (FM) for younger and
older adults in the memory task. Error bars represent 95% confidence intervals.

2.2.3.2 False memory
I then compared the odds of experiencing false memory across age groups in the incongruent
condition of the memory task. For this analysis, I created a mixed-effects logistic regression
model predicting trial-by-trial false memory on a subset of data that included only incongruent
trials. The predictors in this model were an intercept term corresponding to the odds of a false
memory response in the younger adult group and an age group variable corresponding to the
change in the odds of a false memory response from the younger adult group to the older adult
group. The odds of experiencing false memory was allowed to vary randomly across subjects
and across items.
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As in Jacoby et al. (2005, Experiment 2), older adults in Experiment 1 were more
susceptible to false memory than younger adults (see Figure 6). For younger adults, the odds of
experiencing a false memory was 1.39 times greater than the odds of giving any other response
combined on incongruent trials, which was not a significant difference (z = 1.62, p > .05). The
odds that an older adult would experience a false memory were 1.79 times greater than for
younger adults (z = 2.48, p < .05). This further supports the idea that older adults were more
likely to respond based on context, leading to false memory when context was misleading.

2.2.3.3 Subjective judgements of false memory
I next investigated the relative odds of rating false memories as remembered versus known or
guessed across groups. A mixed-effects multinomial logistic regression analysis was conducted
to assess group differences in susceptibility to false memory responses judged as remembered,
known, and guessed. This analysis was conducted using the brm function from the brms package
in R (Bürkner, 2017). The model separately generated the odds of giving a know or a guess
classification relative to a remember classification. An intercept term corresponding to the odds
of giving either a know or guess classification relative to a remember classification in younger
adults and a dummy-coded grouping variable corresponding to the change in those odds from
younger to older adults were included as predictors. The relative odds of experiencing a false
memory rated as remembered versus known or guessed was allowed to vary randomly across
subjects and items. The brm function does not output p-values, but the statistical significance of
estimates can be assessed by the 95% confidence interval (95% CI) surrounding the estimate: If
the confidence interval includes 1.00, then the estimated odds ratio is not statistically significant
at the α = .05 level.
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As can be seen in Figure 7, younger adults were numerically least likely to rate false
memories as remembered and most likely to rate false memories as guessed. However, there was
no significant difference in the odds of characterizing a false memory as known (OR = 1.18, 95%
CI = .73 – 1.95) or guessed (OR = 1.35, 95% CI = .78 – 2.37) relative to remembered for
younger adults. Older adults displayed the opposite pattern, rating most cases of false memory as
remembered and the fewest as guessed. The difference in pattern between younger and older
adults was reflected in a significant group difference in the change in odds from a remember
rating to a guess rating (OR = .16, 95% CI = .08 – .33). The change in odds from a remember
rating to a know rating did not differ significantly across age groups (OR = .52, 95% CI = .26 –
1.04). These findings suggest that younger adults had better metacognition regarding the
inaccuracy of their false memory experiences than did older adults.
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Figure 7. Proportion of false memory responses characterized as remembered,
known, or guessed for younger and older adults. Error bars represent 95%
confidence intervals.

2.2.3.4 Relationships with inhibitory control and executive functioning
To test the effects of the response suppression aspect of inhibitory control and executive
functioning, I conducted separate mixed-effects logistic regression models predicting trial-bytrial false memory. In the inhibitory control models, average reaction times from the baseline
condition of the auditory Stroop task standardized across all participants and age group were
entered as simultaneous predictors. I then added standardized average incongruent Stroop
reaction times to the model and compared it to the previous model using the anova function in R
to determine whether incongruent Stroop reaction time accounted for additional variance after
controlling for age group and general processing speed (i.e., baseline Stroop reaction time). The
executive functioning model included the executive functioning composite score standardized
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across all participants and age group as predictors to determine whether executive functioning
was predictive of false hearing or false memory after controlling for age group. I also tested the
interaction between age group and the cognitive predictors (baseline and incongruent Stroop
reaction times and the executive functioning score). However, none of the interaction effects
were significant, so they were removed from the models to allow for interpretation of the main
effects. The odds of experiencing false memory were allowed to vary randomly across subjects
and items in these models.
To test the relationship between the response suppression aspect of inhibitory control and
false memory, I first conducted the base model including age group and average baseline Stroop
reaction time standardized across groups as predictors. In this model, age group was marginally
significant, with the odds of experiencing a false memory being 1.62 times greater in older adults
than in younger adults controlling for average processing speed (z = 1.82, p = .07). Processing
speed was not a significant predictor of false memory after controlling for age group (OR = 1.15,
z = .84, p > .05). Adding incongruent Stroop reaction time did not improve the model (χ2 = .67, p
> .05), indicating that the response suppression aspect of inhibitory control was not a significant
predictor of false memory after controlling for age and processing speed. Age group remained a
marginally significant predictor of susceptibility to false memory controlling for average
baseline and incongruent Stroop reaction time (OR = 1.58, z = 1.72, p = .08), but the effects of
baseline and incongruent Stroop reaction times were not significant (ps > .05).
The relationship between executive functioning and false memory, however, was
significant. After controlling for age group, a one standard deviation increase in executive
functioning score decreased the odds of experiencing a false memory by a factor of 2.29 (z = 4.46, p < .001). Age group did not significantly predict false memory after controlling for
56

executive functioning (OR = 1.38, z = 1.44, p > .05), suggesting that differences in executive
functioning could fully account for age differences in false memory. Additionally, the full model
including group, baseline and incongruent Stroop reaction times, and executive functioning score
was a significantly better fit to the data than one that included only group and
baseline/incongruent Stroop reaction times (χ2 = 18.34, p < .001). Whereas executive functioning
score was a significant predictor of false memory in this full model (OR = .44, z = -4.45, p <
.001), none of the other predictors were significant (ps > .05). This indicates that executive
functioning accounted for significant variance in susceptibility to false memory after controlling
for age, processing speed, and the response suppression aspect of inhibitory control as assessed
by the auditory Stroop task. However, as discussed above, the results of an EFA suggested that
inhibitory control as assessed by the auditory Stroop task tapped into a different latent construct
than the executive functioning battery. Therefore, it cannot be concluded from this analysis that
executive functions other than the response suppression aspect of inhibitory control were
significantly related to susceptibility to false memory since the inhibitory control component of
the executive functioning battery may not have been fully partialled out by including incongruent
Stroop performance in the model.

2.2.4 SPIN task
Statistical analyses for the SPIN task were nearly identical to those for the memory task. The
only difference was that best-ear PTA was included as a covariate in analyses testing the
relationships between the response suppression aspect of inhibitory control, executive
functioning, and false hearing. This was done to further control for individual differences in
hearing acuity above and beyond the between-groups SNR manipulation, as individual
differences in hearing acuity may account for differences in susceptibility to false hearing.
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2.2.4.1 Accuracy
The patterns in the SPIN task closely resembled those in past studies of false hearing (see Figure
8; Rogers et al., 2012; Sommers et al., 2015). The SNR manipulation – i.e., using a -4 dB SPL
SNR for younger adults and a more favorable +1 dB SPL SNR for older adults to account for age
differences in hearing acuity (Morrell et al., 1996; Sommers et al., 2011) – did not successfully
equate performance in the baseline condition across age groups. The odds of an accurate
response in the baseline condition were 1.52 times greater in older than younger adults (z = 2.22,
p < .05), suggesting that the more favorable SNR allowed older adults to more accurately
identify target words in the absence of predictive context. Younger adults were significantly
more likely to accurately identify the target word in the congruent condition relative to the
baseline condition (OR = 15.96, z = 7.55, p < .001), demonstrating benefit to speech perception
from the presence of valid contextual cues. Despite being better able to identify the target words
in the baseline condition, older adults experienced significantly greater improvement from the
baseline to the congruent condition relative to younger adults (OR = 1.71, z = 2.34, p < .05). In
the incongruent condition, younger adults were less likely to accurately identify the target word
than in the baseline condition (OR = .26, z = -3.75, p < .001), and older adults experienced
significantly greater detriment to performance from the baseline to the incongruent condition
than did younger adults (OR = .62, z = -2.17, p < .05). Thus, as in the memory task, older adults’
performance was influenced to a greater degree by the presence of valid and invalid context
relative to younger adults.
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Figure 8. Average proportion of hits and susceptibility to false hearing (FH) for younger and
older adults in the SPIN task. Error bars represent 95% confidence intervals.

2.2.4.2 False hearing
As can be seen in Figure 8, younger and older adults both experienced false hearing in the
incongruent condition. Unlike for false memory, the odds of experiencing false hearing was 3.16
times lower than the odds of giving any other response combined on incongruent trials for
younger adults (z = -3.86, p < .001). As in past studies (Rogers et al., 2012; Sommers et al.,
2015), however, older adults were marginally more likely to experience false hearing than
younger adults, with the odds of experiencing false hearing being 1.71 times greater in older,
relative to younger, adults (z = 1.92, p = .05). Thus, as was true in the memory task, older adults
were more likely than younger adults to erroneously use invalid contextual cues in speech
perception, resulting in greater susceptibility to false hearing.
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2.2.4.3 Subjective judgements of false hearing
Unlike in the memory task, both age groups displayed poor metacognition in the SPIN task,
frequently characterizing cases of false hearing as heard. As can be seen clearly in Figure 9,
younger adults were less likely to characterize cases of false hearing as guessed relative to heard
(OR = .04, 95% CI = .02 – .08). Younger adults were also numerically less likely to characterize
cases of false hearing as known relative to heard, but this difference did not reach significance
(OR = .64, 95% CI = .39 – 1.04). The change in odds between hear and know judgements was
significantly greater in older adults (OR = .43, 95% CI = .25 – .74), although there was no group
difference in the change of odds between hear and guess judgements (OR = .88, 95% CI = .41 –
2.02). These findings suggest that both younger and older adults often had the subjective
experience of hearing the contextually predicted word in incongruent sentences even though a
different (but similar sounding) word was presented.
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Figure 9. Proportion of false hearing responses characterized as heard, known,
or guessed for younger and older adults. Error bars represent 95% confidence
intervals.

2.2.4.4 Relationship with false memory
Before testing the relationship between false hearing and both inhibitory control and executive
functioning, I first tested the direct relationship between false hearing and false memory. After
all, if there was no relationship between false hearing and false memory, it may be a moot point
to look for common mechanisms. Susceptibility to false hearing was positively correlated with
susceptibility to false memory (r = .39, p < .001; see Figure 10). This indicates that individuals
who were more susceptible to false memories also tended to be more susceptible to false hearing.
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Figure 10. Correlation between average susceptibility to false hearing and average
susceptibility to false memory (r = .39).

To supplement the basic correlational analysis, I conducted a mixed-effects logistic
regression with age group, average susceptibility to false memory standardized across
participants, and the interaction of age group and average susceptibility to false memory as
predictors of trial-by-trial false hearing. The interaction of age group and average susceptibility
to false memory was not significant, so it was removed from the model. The odds of
experiencing false hearing were allowed to vary randomly across subjects and items.
As was true of the correlational analysis, the mixed-effects logistic regression model
suggested that individuals who were more susceptible to false memory were also more
susceptible to false hearing: A one standard deviation increase in average susceptibility to false
memory increased the odds of false hearing by a factor of 1.97 after controlling for age group (z
= 5.19, p < .001). Age group was not a significant predictor of false hearing after controlling for
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average susceptibility to false memory (OR = 1.33, z = 1.10, p > .05). The presence of a direct
relationship between false hearing and false memory suggests that at least one common
mechanism may underlie these phenomena. I next examined the relationships between false
hearing and both the response suppression aspect of inhibitory control and executive functioning
to determine whether similar relationships to those observed in the false memory analyses
emerged.

2.2.4.5 Relationship with inhibitory control and executive functioning
In the base model assessing the response suppression aspect of inhibitory control, age group did
not significantly predict susceptibility to false hearing after controlling for individual differences
in processing speed and best-ear PTA (OR = .90, z = -.26, p > .05). However, the effect of
average baseline Stroop reaction time approached significance (OR = 1.89, z = 1.66, p = .10),
indicating that slower processing speed on the auditory Stroop task tended to be related to
increased susceptibility to false hearing in younger adults controlling for best-ear PTA7.
Additionally, as mentioned above, the interaction of age group and baseline Stroop reaction time
approached significance (OR = .46, z = -1.75, p = .08), suggesting that the relationship between
processing speed on the Stroop task and false hearing was weaker in older, relative to younger,
adults. Best-ear PTA was the only significant predictor of false hearing in this model, with a one
standard deviation increase in best-ear PTA increasing susceptibility to false hearing by a factor
of 1.44 controlling for age group and processing speed (z = 2.01, p < .05). Of interest was
whether adding average incongruent Stroop reaction time would account for additional variance
7

This effect only pertains to younger adults because the model also included age group. The
model controls for age group by assessing the effect of baseline Stroop reaction time when group
equals 0. Since the younger adult group was coded 0, the effect of baseline Stroop reaction time
pertains to the younger adult group, whereas the interaction of age group and baseline Stroop
reaction time indicates how this relationship changed from the younger adult group to the older
adult group.
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in the data, which was not the case (χ2 = 0.41, p > .05). This indicates that the response
suppression aspect of inhibitory control as assessed by the auditory Stroop task was not
predictive of false hearing after controlling for age, processing speed, and best-ear PTA. All
predictors were non-significant in this final model (ps > .05) aside from best-ear PTA, which was
marginally significant (OR = 1.42, z = 1.93, p = .05).
As was true in false memory, executive functioning was a significant predictor of false
hearing. After controlling for age group and best-ear PTA, a one standard deviation increase in
executive functioning reduced the odds of false hearing by a factor of 2.53 (z = -4.20, p < .001).
Age group was not a significant predictor of false hearing after controlling for executive
functioning and best-ear PTA (OR = .90, z = -.32, p > .05), again suggesting that differences in
executive functioning fully accounted for age-related differences in false hearing. Best-ear PTA
was also non-significant after controlling for age group and executive functioning (OR = 1.31, z
= 1.54, p > .05). Additionally, adding executive functioning to the model of inhibitory control
including age group, baseline/incongruent Stroop reaction times, the group by baseline Stroop
interaction, and best-ear PTA improved model fit (χ2 = 18.94, p < .001), indicating that executive
functioning was predictive of susceptibility to false hearing even after controlling for age,
processing speed, the response suppression aspect of inhibitory control as assessed by the
auditory Stroop task, and hearing acuity. However, as discussed above, the results of an EFA
suggested that inhibitory control as assessed by the auditory Stroop task tapped into a different
latent construct than the executive functioning battery. Therefore, as with false memory, I cannot
conclude from this analysis that executive functions other than the response suppression aspect
of inhibitory control were significantly related to susceptibility to false hearing. In this model,
both executive functioning (OR = .38, z = -4.51, p < .001) and the group by baseline Stroop
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reaction time interaction (OR = .41, z = -2.02, p < .05) were significant, but all other predictors
were non-significant (ps > .05).
To determine whether the relationship between false hearing and false memory could be
fully accounted for by individual differences in executive functioning, I tested whether the
relationship between false hearing and false memory remained significant after controlling for
executive functioning. For this analysis, I conducted a new mixed-effects logistic regression
model with age group, average susceptibility to false memory, and score on the executive
functioning battery as predictors of false hearing. Susceptibility to false hearing was allowed to
vary randomly across subjects and items. If the relationship between false hearing and false
memory remained significant after controlling for executive functioning, this would indicate that
factors above and beyond those captured by the executive functioning battery contributed to the
relationship between false hearing and false memory. In this model, both executive functioning
(OR = .52, z = -2.88, p < .01) and false memory (OR = 1.70, z = 3.87, p < .001) were
independently predictive of false hearing after controlling for age group. Age group was not
significant after controlling for average susceptibility to false memory and executive functioning
score (OR = 1.14, z = .53, p > .05). This suggests that despite being predictive of both false
hearing and false memory, executive functioning cannot fully account for the relationship
between these two phenomena. Additionally, it suggests that the executive functioning battery
accounted for unique variance in false hearing that was not accounted for by susceptibility to
false memory. Therefore, it is possible that aspects of the executive functioning battery tapped
into variability in susceptibility to false hearing related to individual differences in speech
perception or sentence processing abilities that were not captured by average susceptibility to
false memory.
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2.2.5 MPT modeling
2.2.5.1 Memory task
Beginning with the memory task, I found that neither the model in which the capture parameter
was constrained to 0 (G2(18) = 475.17, critical = 52.75, BIC = 530.79) nor the model in which
the capture parameter was freely estimated (G2(17) = 425.08, critical = 51.49, BIC = 489.97 ) –
which I will refer to simply as the capture model – provided good fits to the data. However, the
capture model did provide significantly better fit to the data than did the model that did not
include the capture parameter (ΔG2(1) = 50.09, critical = 27.23). This, in addition to the lower
BIC value in the capture model than in the model without capture, suggests that capture –
interpreted as representing inhibitory control – influenced responding in the memory task. This
finding may seem surprising given that inhibitory control as assessed by the auditory Stroop task
was unrelated to susceptibility to false memory. Potential reasons for this discrepancy are
outlined in the Experiment 1 discussion.
Since MPT modeling can be overly sensitive to small deviations between the observed
and estimated values when determining model fit (see Millar et al., 2018), I plotted the observed
and predicted values for the capture model to determine whether its fit was as poor as the G2
value would suggest (see Figure 11). The plot suggests that the capture model generally did a
good job of predicting responses in the memory task, although there were some deviations for
hits judged as remembered/known in the baseline and congruent conditions and false memory
responses in the incongruent condition. However, it is important to note that this was the most
basic model in which none of the parameters were allowed to deviate between younger and older
adults. Since younger and older adults differed in their responding in the memory task, we would
expect better fit for models that account for age differences.
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Figure 11. Observed versus predicted counts of responses in each context condition for the
base capture model of memory. FM = false memory; Other = responses other than the target
word or the pre-selected alternative word.

To assess whether individual parameters in the capture model differed between age
groups, I created models in which each individual parameter was allowed to vary between age
groups while the other parameters were held constant and compared these models to the base
capture model in which all parameters were held constant. I found significant age differences in
capture (ΔG2(1) = 245.59, critical = 27.22, BIC = 253.66), recollection (ΔG2(1) = 78.43, BIC =
420.81), accessibility bias (ΔG2(1) = 60.61, BIC = 447.90), and attribution threshold (ΔG2(1) =
176.58, BIC = 322.66), but not in word generation (ΔG2(1) = .61, BIC = 507.90). Looking at the
individual parameter estimates revealed that older adults were more likely to be captured by
67

context than younger adults (.37 vs. .01), were more likely to recollect the target word than
younger adults (.46 vs. .32), had greater accessibility bias than younger adults (in baseline
condition: .44 vs. .34; in congruent/incongruent conditions: .85 vs. .74), and were more likely to
characterize their responses as remember or know than younger adults (.80 vs. .62). While the
finding that older adults were deemed more likely to recollect the target word than younger
adults may seem to contradict past findings of age-related declines in memory (for a review, see
Nyberg et al., 2012), this merely indexes older adults’ better performance in the baseline
condition of the memory task relative to younger adults. Since the presentation-time
manipulation in the study phase (i.e., showing older adults the word pairs for 3000 ms vs. 1000
ms for younger adults) resulted in better performance by older, relative to younger, adults in the
present study, this difference was reflected in the MPT model.
Finally, I created models allowing all possible combinations of parameters to differ
across younger and older adults to determine which model best fit the memory task data. Table 5
lists the G2 and BIC values for each of these models. Comparing these models based on their
BIC values, the best fitting model allowed for group differences in capture and recollection. This
model is parsimonious, suggesting that only two of the five parameters needed to be allowed to
differ across age groups to best account for the observed data. It should be noted that this model
was still classified as a poor fit to the data according to its G2 value (G2(15) = 63.91, critical =
48.93). However, as can be seen in Figure 12, the model did a much better job of predicting
responses than the most basic capture model, with only minor deviations between the observed
and predicted response counts. Thus, I believe that the model accounting for age differences in
capture and recollection is useful for describing the data from the memory task.
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Table 5
Fit statistics for each MPT model in the memory task
Parameters allowed to vary

G2

BIC

None

425.08

489.97

C

179.49

253.66

R

346.65

420.81

A

364.47

447.9

W

424.47

507.9

AT

248.5

322.66

C, R

63.91

147.34

C, A

164.24

256.94

C, W

178.89

271.59

C, AT

138.48

221.91

R, A

312.68

405.38

R, W

344.61

437.32

R, AT

239

322.44

A, W

362.7

464.67

A, AT

160.86

253.56

W, AT

247.86

340.57

C, R, A

57.73

159.7

C, R, W

61.38

163.36

C, R, AT

62.97

155.68

C, A, W

163.67

274.92

C, A, AT

113.45

215.42

C, W, AT

137.91

239.88

R, A, W

308.48

419.72

R, A, AT

160.79

262.77

R, W, AT

238.4

340.37

A, W, AT

159.77

271.02

C, R, A, W

55.74

176.25

69

C, R, A, AT

57.47

168.71

C, R, W, AT

60.7

171.95

R, A, W, AT

159.75

280.27

C, R, A, W, AT

55.35

185.13

Note. BIC = Bayesian Information Criterion; C = Capture; R = Recollection; A = Accessibility bias; W
= Word generation; AT = Attribution threshold.

Figure 12. Observed versus predicted counts of responses in each context condition for the
capture model of memory allowing group differences in capture and recollection. FM = false
memory; Other = responses other than the target word or the pre-selected alternative word.
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2.2.5.2 SPIN task
Turning next to the SPIN task, I found that neither the model in which the capture parameter was
constrained to 0 (G2(18) = 1889.32, critical = 62.99, BIC = 1946.67) nor the capture model
(G2(17) = 1172.08, critical = 61.67, BIC = 1238.98) provided good fit to the data. However, once
again the capture model provided significantly better fit to the data than did the model that did
not include the capture parameter (ΔG2(1) = 717.24, critical = 36.08). This, along with the lower
BIC value in the capture model than in the model without capture, suggests that inhibitory
control – or another cognitive ability resulting the same pattern of responses – influenced
responding in the SPIN task. Thus, as was true for false memory, results of the MPT modelling
contradicted the findings of the auditory Stroop task, suggesting that inhibitory control may have
influenced susceptibility to false hearing. Reasons for these contradictory findings are discussed
below.
I again plotted the observed and predicted values for the capture model to determine
whether its fit to the SPIN data was as poor as the G2 value suggested (see Figure 13). The plot
suggests that the basic capture model struggled to fit correct responses rated as hear or know,
“other” responses (i.e., responses other than the target word or the pre-selected alternative to the
target word), and false hearing responses rated as hear or know in the incongruent condition, but
generally did well with other response types. However, since younger and older adults differed in
their responding in the SPIN task, we would expect better fit for models that account for age
differences.
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Figure 13. Observed versus predicted counts of responses in each context condition for the
base capture model of hearing. FH = false hearing; Other = responses other than the target
word or the pre-selected alternative word.

I next created models in which each individual parameter was allowed to vary between
age groups while the other parameters were held constant and compared these models to the
basic capture model in which all parameters were held constant to determine whether age groups
differed in any of the parameters. I found age differences in capture (ΔG2(1) = 46.66, critical =
36.08, BIC = 1201.88), hearing (ΔG2(1) = 41.53, BIC = 1207.01), and word generation (ΔG2(1)
= 37.45, BIC = 1220.65), but not in accessibility bias (ΔG2(1) = 33.20, BIC = 1224.91) or
attribution threshold (ΔG2(1) = 13.02, BIC = 1235.53). Looking at the individual parameter
estimates revealed that older adults were more likely to be captured by context than younger
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adults (.49 vs. .39), were more likely to hear the word than younger adults (.60 vs. .53), and were
less likely to generate the pre-selected alternative word in the baseline condition but more likely
to do so in the congruent and incongruent conditions than younger adults (in baseline condition:
.01 vs. .03; in congruent/incongruent conditions: .16 vs. .07). Again, while it may seem odd that
older adults were classified as more likely to hear the target word than younger adults given past
studies showing age-related hearing loss (Morrell et al., 1996; Sommers et al., 2011), this
difference simply reflects older adults’ higher accuracy in the baseline condition of the SPIN task
resulting because the SNRs chosen for each age group failed to equate performance.
Finally, I created models allowing all possible combinations of parameters to differ
across younger and older adults. Table 6 lists the G2 and BIC values for each of these models.
Comparing these models based on their BIC values, the best fitting model allowed for group
differences in the capture, hearing, word generation, and attribution threshold parameters. This
model was still classified as a poor fit to the data according to its G2 value (G2(12) = 1042.00,
critical = 54.85). Additionally, as can be seen in Figure 14, the model still had trouble fitting
correct responses rated as hear or know in the baseline and congruent conditions, “other”
responses, and false hearing responses rated as hear or know in the incongruent condition. This
suggests that there may be additional parameters beyond those considered here that are needed to
explain responding in the SPIN task.
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Table 6
Fit statistics for each MPT model in the SPIN task
Parameters allowed to vary

G2

BIC

None

1172.08

1238.98

C

1125.42

1201.88

H

1130.55

1207.01

A

1138.88

1224.91

W

1134.63

1220.65

AT

1159.06

1235.53

C, H

1101.83

1187.86

C, A

1096.5

1192.08

C, W

1087.97

1183.55

C, AT

1105.5

1191.52

H, A

1104.21

1199.79

H, W

1095.93

1191.51

H, AT

1099.35

1185.37

A, W

1101.83

1206.97

A, AT

1138.6

1234.18

W, AT

1127.8

1223.38

C, H, A

1077.01

1182.15

C, H, W

1066.6

1171.74

C, H, AT

1066.99

1162.57

C, A, W

1059.46

1174.16

C, A, AT

1092.22

1197.36

C, W, AT

1075.73

1180.87

H, A, W

1069.91

1184.61

H, A, AT

1092.93

1198.07

H, W, AT

1074.32

1179.46

A, W, AT

1101.08

1215.78

C, H, A, W

1042.06

1166.32
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C, H, A, AT

1061.74

1176.43

C, H, W, AT

1042

1156.7

H, A, W, AT

1065.08

1189.34

C, H, A, W, AT

1034.48

1168.29

Note. BIC = Bayesian Information Criterion; C = Capture; H = Hear; A = Accessibility bias; W =
Word generation; AT = Attribution threshold.

Figure 14. Observed versus predicted counts of responses in each context condition for the
capture model of hearing allowing for group differences in the capture, hearing, word
generation, and attribution threshold parameters. FH = false hearing; Other = responses other
than the target word or the pre-selected alternative word.
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2.3 Experiment 1 discussion
In Experiment 1, I successfully replicated findings of past studies of false memory (Jacoby et al.,
2005, Experiment 2) and false hearing (Rogers et al., 2012; Sommers et al., 2015). I found that
older adults’ responses in both the memory and SPIN tasks were more likely to be based on
available contextual cues than those of younger adults, as demonstrated by increased benefit
from valid contextual cues and increased detriment from invalid contextual cues. Additionally,
older adults were more susceptible than younger adults to both false memory and false hearing,
showing that older adults were more likely to respond based on available contextual cues than
younger adults even when these cues were invalid.
The primary goal of Experiment 1 was to test the hypothesis that false hearing and false
memory result from similar cognitive mechanisms. In support of this claim, I found a significant
positive relationship between susceptibility to false hearing and susceptibility to false memory.
This was the first demonstration of a direct relationship between these two phenomena. I then
investigated the roles of two potential mechanisms that may underlie this relationship, each of
which has been shown to be predictive of false memory in past studies: inhibitory control and
executive functioning.
Results with regards to inhibitory control were mixed. Inhibitory control as measured by
the auditory Stroop task was not a significant predictor of either false memory or false hearing.
This was surprising given that a relationship between inhibitory control and false memory was
observed by Sommers and Huff (2003, Experiment 2) using the same auditory Stroop task.
There are several potential explanations for why the predicted relationship between
inhibitory control as measured by the auditory Stroop task and false hearing and false memory
did not emerge in the present study. For example, it is possible that the auditory Stroop task was
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not sensitive enough to pick up on age differences in inhibitory control. Whereas both younger
and older adults experienced the typical Stroop effect (i.e., slower response time in the
incongruent condition than in the baseline condition), there was no difference in the magnitude
of the Stroop effect across groups, suggesting that younger and older adults did not differ in the
response suppression aspect of inhibitory control. Since I observed significant age differences in
susceptibility to both false hearing and false memory in the present study, the lack of age
differences in the magnitude of the Stroop effect would mitigate the correlation between auditory
Stroop performance and both false hearing and false memory. It is possible that the auditory
Stroop task used in the present study accurately measured individual differences in the response
suppression aspect of inhibitory control, in which case we would conclude that younger and
older adults did not differ in this ability and that this ability was unrelated to susceptibility to
false hearing and false memory. However, the lack of age differences in the Stroop effect in the
present study was surprising given the extensive literature demonstrating an age-related decline
in inhibitory control (Cohn et al., 1984; Hasher & Zacks, 1988; Hasher et al., 1997; Jacoby et al.,
2005; MacLeod, 1991; Sommers & Danielson, 1999, Experiment 2; Sommers & Huff, 2003,
Experiment 2; West & Alain, 2000) and the finding of increased interference in older, relative to
younger, adults on an identical auditory Stroop task in the study by Sommers and Huff (2003,
Experiment 2). The auditory Stroop paradigm has demonstrated inconsistency in detecting age
differences in the response suppression aspect of inhibitory control. Whereas some studies using
the auditory Stroop paradigm have found that older adults demonstrated greater interference than
younger adults (Sommers & Danielson, 1999, Experiment 2; Sommers & Huff, 2003,
Experiment 2), two recent studies detected no age differences (Mazaheri et al., 2015; Vervoort et
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al., 2019)8. The inconsistency of the auditory Stroop paradigm with regards to detecting age
differences in inhibitory control raises the concern that the null age difference in the present
study reflected lack of measurement sensitivity or reliability as opposed to lack of age
differences in inhibitory control per se. Therefore, it could be the case that the ability to suppress
a prepotent, but incorrect, response contributed to susceptibility to false hearing and false
memory, but this ability was not accurately measured by the auditory Stroop task.
A second possible reason for the discrepancy in findings with regards to age differences
in inhibitory control between the present study and the study by Sommers and Huff (2003,
Experiment 2) was that the statistical methods used to analyze the data differed across the two
studies. I used mixed-effects linear regression to analyze the Stroop data and mixed-effects
logistic regression to determine the relationship between Stroop reaction times and susceptibility
to trial-by-trial false hearing and false memory, whereas Sommers and Huff used repeatedmeasures ANOVA to analyze their Stroop data and linear regression to determine the
relationship between Stroop performance and average susceptibility to false memory. Mixedeffects modeling has the benefit of accounting for within-subject variability by using individual
trial outcomes as opposed to averages, but it is possible that accounting for this variability
suppressed the effect observed by Sommers and Huff. To test this possibility, I re-ran my
analyses using the same statistical method as Sommers and Huff. As in my original analyses, I

8

In the studies by Mazaheri et al. (2015) and Vervoort et al. (2019), the auditory Stroop task
involved listening to the words high and low spoken in high- or low-pitched voices and
identifying the pitch of the voice, whereas the task in the studies by Sommers and Danielson
(1999) and Sommers and Huff (2003) was to identify the gender of the speaker (male/female)
saying the words male (father in Sommers and Danielson), female (mother), or person.
Additionally, participants in the study by Mazaheri et al. (2015) completed the task while
walking on a treadmill, whereas participants in the other studies completed the task while seated.
It is possible that these methodological differences resulted in the different findings across
studies.
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found that there was a significant Stroop effect using repeated measures ANOVA, F(1,114) =
163.71, p < .001. However, there was once again no difference across age groups in the
magnitude of the Stroop effect, F(1,114) = .87, p > .05. Similarly, adding incongruent Stroop
reaction time to a linear regression model with age group and average baseline Stroop reaction
time did not improve model fit when predicting average susceptibility to either false memory,
F(1,114) = 1.20, p > .05, or false hearing, F(1,114) = 2.48, p > .05, suggesting that the response
suppression aspect of inhibitory control, as measured by the auditory Stroop task, was unrelated
to these phenomena. Thus, differences in statistical methods cannot account for the failure to
replicate Sommers and Huff’s findings in the present study.
Another difference between the present study and the study by Sommers and Huff (2003,
Experiment 2) is the memory task that was used. I used the process dissociation task from Jacoby
et al. (2005, Experiment 2), whereas Sommers and Huff used a phonological DRM paradigm. It
is possible that different paradigms used to evoke false memories place different requirements on
inhibitory control, and the process dissociation task I used required less inhibitory control, or a
different aspect of inhibitory control, than a phonological DRM paradigm. There is evidence
showing that susceptibility to false memories in the DRM paradigm is uncorrelated with
susceptibility to false memories in the misinformation paradigm (Ost et al., 2013; Patihis et al.,
2018) and that there is no significant correlation between false memories evoked using semantic
DRM paradigms and phonological DRM paradigms (Ballou & Sommers, 2008). Therefore, it is
plausible that false memories evoked using different paradigms rely on different cognitive
mechanisms. However, this would not account for the lack of age differences in the magnitude of
the Stroop effect. The inconsistency of age differences in the Stroop effect between the present
study and the study by Sommers and Huff makes it impossible to evaluate whether the failure to
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replicate their findings resulted from differences in the Stroop task, the memory task, or
elsewhere.
The results of the EFA showing that the Stroop difference score did not load onto the
same latent factor as the measures of executive functioning raises further concerns regarding the
auditory Stroop task as a measure of inhibitory control. Since inhibitory control is typically
considered a component of executive functioning (Jurado & Rosselli, 2007), we would expect it
to load onto the same factor as other measures of executive functioning. Showing that this was
not the case raises uncertainty regarding what the auditory Stroop task measured. It could be the
case that auditory Stroop performance indexed an aspect of inhibitory control that was not
captured by other measures of executive functioning in the present study, which would explain
why these measures did not load onto the same factor. In their update of Hasher and Zacks’
(1988) original theory of inhibitory control, Lustig et al. (2007) detailed three distinct functions
of inhibitory control: stopping irrelevant information from entering working memory, removing
irrelevant information from working memory, and suppressing highly activated, but incorrect,
responses. Therefore, it is possible that the auditory Stroop task tapped into a different
component of inhibitory control than the measures included in the executive functioning battery.
For example, the role of inhibitory control in the Wisconsin Card Sorting Test may be to remove
the previous sorting rule from working memory when it is no longer relevant, whereas the role of
inhibitory control in the auditory Stroop task is thought to be to suppress the response activated
by the spoken word. This conclusion is supported by past work showing that the number of
categories achieved on the Wisconsin Card Sorting Test loaded onto a different factor than
Stroop interference (Boone et al., 1998; Pineda & Merchan, 2003; Rodríguez-Aranda & Sundet,
2006). However, Rodríguez-Aranda and Sundet (2006) also found that Stroop interference
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loaded onto the same factor as the number of words generated on the COWAT, another of the
measures included in the executive functioning battery. I found no correlation between Stroop
interference and the number of words generated on the COWAT in the present study, and found
that these variables loaded onto different factors in the EFA. Given that relationships between
Stroop interference and other measures of executive functioning seem to be inconsistent or
absent, this suggests that the auditory Stroop task measured something that was not captured by
the executive functioning battery. It is possible, for example, that differences in reaction time
between the baseline and incongruent conditions of the auditory Stroop task indexed something
other than inhibitory control, like general confusion or strategic slowing to avoid errors. Due to
the uncertainty surrounding the sensitivity and validity of the auditory Stroop task as a measure
of inhibitory control in the present study, researchers should be cautious when interpreting
findings involving the auditory Stroop task.
Although results involving the auditory Stroop task indicated that the response
suppression aspect of inhibitory control might be unrelated to false hearing or false memory,
evidence for the role of inhibitory control in these phenomena was provided by the MPT models.
Specifically, adding the capture parameter – interpreted by Jacoby et al. (2005) as representing
inhibitory control – improved the fit of MPT models for both the SPIN task and the memory
task. Additionally, as in the study by Jacoby et al. (2005, Experiment 2; see also Millar et al.,
2018 for more recent use of the capture model), the best-fitting MPT model to the memory data
suggested that there were significant age differences in susceptibility to capture, supporting age
differences in inhibitory control observed in past studies (Cohn et al., 1984; Hasher & Zacks,
1988; Hasher et al., 1997; Jacoby et al., 2005; MacLeod, 1991; Sommers & Danielson, 1999,
Experiment 2; Sommers & Huff, 2003, Experiment 2; West & Alain, 2000). Therefore,
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Experiment 1 provided some evidence for the role of inhibitory control in false hearing and false
memory, and suggested that age differences in at least one aspect of inhibitory control may
account, in part, for age differences in susceptibility to false memory. However, as described
above, it is possible that the capture parameter may represent processes other than, or in addition
to, inhibitory control, and thus this finding should be interpreted with caution.
The MPT models also suggested a critical difference between responding in the memory
task and responding in the SPIN task. Whereas age differences in the memory task could be
accounted for by differences in the capture and recollection parameters, the best fitting model for
the SPIN data allowed age differences in the capture, hearing, word generation, and attribution
threshold parameters (i.e., all but the accessibility bias parameter). Even with this far more
complex model, the capture model was still a poor fit to the SPIN data, whereas a much simpler
model provided relatively good fit to the memory data. It is clear that additional parameters
would be necessary to explain responding in the SPIN task. For example, given that hits
characterized as hear/know tended to be overestimated in the baseline condition but
underestimated in the congruent condition, specifying a separate hearing parameter in the
baseline condition may help to resolve this issue. This change is theoretically justifiable given
that participants may need to try harder to hear the target word in the absence of contextual cues,
whereas the contextual cues may clue participants in to what sounds they should listen for in the
congruent and incongruent conditions. Similarly, specifying a separate accessibility bias
parameter in the congruent condition may help to resolve the tendency of the model to
underestimate “other” responses in the baseline and incongruent conditions and overestimate
“other” responses in the congruent condition. This change also makes sense given that we would
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expect the target word to be particularly accessible in the congruent condition due to the
availability of valid contextual cues.
To test this hypothesis, I re-ran the MPT model for the SPIN task specifying these
additional parameters. The basic capture model with no group differences between parameters
was still classified as a poor fit to the data (G2(15) = 662.17, critical = 58.99, BIC = 748.19), but
the predicted counts showed much closer correspondence to the observed counts than the models
above that did not specify condition differences in hearing and accessibility bias (see Figure 15).
Interestingly, the best-fitting model included group differences in only two parameters:
accessibility bias and word generation. Older adults were more biased towards the most easily
accessible word in all conditions (baseline = .58, congruent = .85, incongruent = .32) than were
younger adults (baseline = .50, congruent = .73, incongruent = .18). Older adults were also more
likely to generate the alternative word in the congruent and incongruent conditions than younger
adults (.30 vs. .16), but the likelihood of generating the alternative word in the baseline
condition was approximately equivalent across groups (.01 vs. .03)9. This MPT model was also
classified as a poor fit to the data (G2(10) = 519.96, critical = 51.97, BIC = 653.78), although
there was very good correspondence between the predicted and observed counts (see Figure 16).

9

The likelihood of generating the alternative word in the baseline condition was much lower
than in the combined congruent/incongruent conditions because the alternative word in the
incongruent condition was the contextually predicted word (e.g., box for the sentence She put the
toys in the fox). In the baseline condition, the alternative word was a phonological neighbor of
the target word selected at the outset of the study, and there were no contextual cues from which
to predict this word (e.g., cage for the sentence The word is page). Thus, the high predictability
of the alternative word in the incongruent condition resulted in the higher word generation
parameter in the combined congruent/incongruent conditions relative to the baseline condition.
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Figure 15. Observed versus predicted counts of responses in each context condition for the
basic capture model of hearing specifying a different hearing parameter in the baseline
condition and a different accessibility bias parameter in the congruent condition. FH = false
hearing; Other = responses other than the target word or the pre-selected alternative word.
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Figure 16. Observed versus predicted counts of responses in each context condition for the
capture model of hearing specifying a different hearing parameter in the baseline condition
and a different accessibility bias parameter in the congruent condition allowing age
differences in accessibility bias and word generation. FH = false hearing; Other = responses
other than the target word or the pre-selected alternative word.
When I re-ran the MPT analysis on the memory data with the same parameter changes, I
found that the best fitting model was still one in which age differences were permitted in capture
and recollection (G2(12) = 60.66, BIC = 171.90). Additionally, there was no significant
difference in fit between the original best-fitting model presented in the Results section above
and the more complex model described here (ΔG2(1) = 3.25, critical = 27.22), suggesting that the
additional parameters needed to fit the SPIN data were not necessary to fit the memory data.
Together with the findings above, this suggests that the parameters specified in the capture
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model may be able to account for responding in both the memory and SPIN tasks, but increased
model specificity is needed to accurately model responding in the SPIN task. Additionally, my
findings suggest that different processes may underlie age differences in responding in the
memory and SPIN tasks. Whereas age differences in the memory task could be accounted for by
differences in susceptibility to capture and ability to recollect the studied word, differences in the
SPIN task were best accounted for by differences in bias towards the most easily accessible word
and in the likelihood of generating the pre-selected alternative word. Thus, while similar
cognitive processes may be at work in both the memory and SPIN tasks, different processes may
underlie age differences in the two tasks.
Whereas evidence for the role of inhibitory control in false hearing and false memory was
mixed, executive functioning demonstrated consistent and significant relationships with both
phenomena. Specifically, participants who had better scores on the executive functioning
composite tended to be less susceptible to both false memory and false hearing after controlling
for age group. The relationship between executive functioning and false hearing also remained
significant after accounting for individual differences in hearing acuity, lending further credence
to the idea that false hearing results, in part, due to cognitive deficits as opposed to solely
sensory deficits (Rogers et al., 2012; Sommers et al., 2015). Importantly, the relationship
between age group and susceptibility to both false hearing and false memory became nonsignificant after controlling for the executive functioning battery. This suggests that differences
in executive functioning may be able to fully explain older adults’ increased susceptibility to
false hearing and false memory observed here and in past studies (Balota et al., 1999; Jacoby,
1999; Jacoby et al., 2005; Kensinger & Schacter, 1999; Mitchell et al., 2003; Roediger & Geraci,
2007; Rogers et al., 2012; Sommers et al., 2015; Watson et al., 2001).
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Executive functioning also accounted for significant variance in both false hearing and
false memory after controlling for the response suppression aspect of inhibitory control as
indexed by the auditory Stroop task. Whereas this may seem to suggest that executive functions
other than the response suppression aspect of inhibitory control played a role in false hearing and
false memory, this conclusion requires additional investigation given the results of the EFA
showing that the Stroop difference score did not load on the same latent factor as the measures of
executive functioning. This indicates that the mechanism causing slowing in the incongruent
condition of the auditory Stroop task relative to the baseline condition – be it the response
suppression aspect of inhibitory control or some other process – was best considered separate
from the latent executive functioning variable. Because of this complication, we cannot draw the
conclusion that controlling for Stroop performance accurately partialled out variance attributable
to the response suppression aspect of inhibitory control in the executive functioning battery.
Therefore, it could be the case that differences in one or more aspects of inhibitory control that
remained in the executive functioning battery after controlling for aspects of inhibition assessed
by the auditory Stroop task accounted for the relationships between executive functioning and
false hearing and false memory. However, it could also be the case that executive functions other
than inhibitory control accounted for these relationships. This will be discussed further in the
General Discussion.
Another novel contribution of the present study was an examination of the subjective
experience of cases of false hearing using a hear/know/guess paradigm. I found that both
younger and older adults were more likely to characterize cases of false hearing as heard than
either known or guessed, suggesting that cases of false hearing may be accompanied by a
subjective experience akin to veridical hearing. In the memory task, however, both younger and
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older adults displayed relatively similar odds of characterizing false memories as remembered
versus known or guessed. In fact, younger adults were numerically most likely to characterize
cases of false memory as guessed and least likely to characterize cases of false memory as
remembered, the opposite of the pattern observed for cases of false hearing. This suggests that
there may be qualitative differences between experiencing false memory and experiencing false
hearing, with false hearing being more easily confused with veridical hearing than false memory
with veridical memory.
It is possible that characteristics of the memory task used in the present study gave rise to
the approximately equal likelihood of characterizing false memories as remembered, known, or
guessed. Past studies have shown that the relative likelihood of characterizing false memories as
remembered versus known depends on the task being used, with DRM paradigms using
semantically related lists resulting in a higher rate of false memories characterized as
remembered than known (Norman & Schacter, 1997, Experiment 1; Roediger & McDermott,
1995, Experiment 2; Watson et al., 2003, Experiment 3), and DRM paradigms using
phonologically related lists resulting in a higher rate of false memories characterized as known
than remembered (Watson et al., 2003, Experiment 3). Therefore, it is possible that the high rate
of false memories judged as known or guessed in the present study may result from features of
the memory task itself as opposed to reflecting a common feature of all false memories. I believe
that the high proportion of know and guess ratings in the memory task relative to the SPIN task
resulted from it being easier to generate the contextually predicted word in this particular
memory task. Specifically, the remaining letters in the fragment completion task limited the
scope of plausible responses to words that could complete the fragment. For example, for the
cue-fragment pair head – s--l-, there are a limited number of words that could complete the
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fragment, increasing the likelihood of generating the response associated with false memory
(scalp) when participants were not captured by context or responding based on accessibility, but
rather were simply guessing a word that could plausibly complete the fragment. This could
account for the higher proportion of false memory responses being characterized as known or
guessed relative to remembered. In the SPIN task, however, the target word was fully masked by
background noise and there was no constraint on what word could be provided as a response.
Thus, participants may have been more likely to generate a response other than either the
predicted word or the target word (i.e., an “other” response) unless they were able to hear (or
falsely hear) the target word in the incongruent condition. This would result in the majority of
cases of false hearing being characterized as heard as opposed to known or guessed. To test the
hypothesis that participants were more likely to generate an “other” response in the incongruent
condition of the SPIN task than of the memory task, I conducted an ANOVA with age group,
task (memory vs. SPIN), and the age group by task interaction predicting proportion of “other”
responses on incongruent trials. The age group by task interaction was significant, F(1,232) =
18.47, p < .001, so I conducted t-tests within each age group to determine whether tasks differed
in proportion of “other” responses. In support of my hypothesis, younger adults were more than
nine times less likely to generate an “other” response in the memory task (M = .04) than in the
SPIN task (M = .30), t(106.49) = 17.50, p < .001. Older adults were also less likely to generate
an “other” response in the memory task (M = .03) than in the SPIN task (M = .21), t(79.10) =
14.86, p < .001, but as indicated by the significant interaction in the ANOVA, the difference
between tasks was smaller than for younger adults. This supports the conclusion that participants
characterized more cases of false memory as known or guessed relative to cases of false hearing
because the scaffolding provided in the memory task made it easier to generate the contextually
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predicted word in cases where the participant could not remember (or falsely remember) the
studied word. Therefore, differences observed in the subjective judgements of false hearing and
false memory may reflect task differences as opposed to indicating differences in the subjective
experience of these phenomena per se.
Given that inhibitory control has previously been shown to be related to false memory
(Colombel et al., 2016; Sommers & Huff, 2003, Experiment 2) and is hypothesized to be a
primary mechanism underlying false hearing in older adults (Rogers et al., 2012; Sommers et al.,
2015), it was surprising that inhibitory control as assessed by the auditory Stroop task was
unrelated to both false memory and false hearing in the present study. In Experiment 2, I further
examined the potential role of inhibitory control in false hearing. First, I tested whether the
predictive strength of sentences was related to the likelihood that false hearing would occur.
Then I used eye-tracking to gain insight into how sentence context influenced activation of the
sentence-final target word and to examine age differences in the ability to suppress this
activation when context turned out to be invalid.

Chapter 3: Experiment 2
False hearing is often described as resulting from an inability to suppress an expected response,
reflecting a failure of inhibitory control (Rogers et al., 2012; Sommers et al., 2015). Using the
stimuli from Experiment 1 as an example, the sentence “She put the toys in the…” creates a
strong expectation of what word should follow (box). In the case of incongruent sentences, the
participant must then suppress their expectation of the word box to correctly hear the presented
(but unpredicted) word fox. As described above, within the expanded version of the NAM (Luce
& Pisoni, 1998) proposed by Sommers and Danielson (1999), increasing expectation based on
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context can be thought of as increasing activation of the contextually predicted word in the
mental lexicon. This increased activation due to expectation increases the likelihood of
accurately hearing the predicted word when context is valid (i.e., in the congruent condition) and
increases the likelihood of experiencing false hearing when context is misleading (i.e., in the
incongruent condition). If false hearing results from an inability to suppress an expected
response, then the likelihood of false hearing may depend, in part, on the predictive strength of
the preceding sentence. Specifically, in the incongruent condition, sentences that are stronger
predictors of a phonological neighbor of the sentence-final word should result in higher rates of
false hearing due to increased activation of the predicted (but unpresented) word relative to less
predictive sentences.
Although the effect of predictive strength has yet to be investigated with regards to false
hearing, it has been investigated in false memory. Indeed, in Deese’s (1959) seminal study that
would later give rise to the DRM paradigm (Deese, 1959; Roediger & McDermott, 1995), the
likelihood of falsely recalling a critical word in a list-memory paradigm was shown to be
positively correlated with the associative strength between the words in the studied list and the
critical word (backward associative strength; see Figure 17). More recently, this effect was
replicated by Roediger et al. (2001b), who sought to determine which characteristics of critical
words in the DRM paradigm were related to the likelihood of false recall. The authors found that
backward associative strength was the best predictor of false recall and the second-best predictor
of false recognition (after only veridical recall) in the DRM paradigm. Therefore, the degree to
which a critical word is predicted by the words in the studied list is positively associated with the
likelihood that a false memory will occur.
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Figure 17. The correlation (r = .87)
between the likelihood of falsely
recalling a given word and the
likelihood of generating that word as
an associate of other words in the list
from Deese (1959).

In Experiment 2, I explored the possibility that the predictive strength of sentence stimuli
influenced the likelihood that false hearing would occur. I conducted analyses on data from both
Experiments 1 and 2 to determine whether the cloze probability of sentences was predictive of
susceptibility to false hearing. Cloze values were obtained from a sample of 34 participants on
Amazon’s Mechanical Turk for each sentence using a visual sentence-completion task. The
sentence-final target words were removed from each sentence (e.g., She put the toys in the
_____), and participants were instructed to type the first word that came to mind to complete
each sentence. In line with past findings in false memory (Deese, 1959; Roediger et al., 2001b), I
predicted that incongruent sentences with higher cloze values – indicating greater predictive
strength – would be more likely to result in false hearing than sentences with lower cloze values.
This would support the activation-based account of false hearing described above drawing upon
the NAM (Luce & Pisoni, 1998) and the findings of Sommers and Danielson (1999), suggesting
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that stronger contextual cues convey more activation to the predicted word than weaker
contextual cues, increasing the likelihood of hearing the predicted word even when it is not
presented.
To supplement the cloze value analyses, I conducted a novel experiment to determine
how activation of different response options changed in real time using eye-tracking in a visual
world paradigm. The visual world task was similar to the SPIN task from Experiment 1, but
while each sentence was played, four pictures were presented on the computer screen. The
pictures depicted the target word (e.g., box), a phonological neighbor of the target word (e.g.,
fox), and two words that did not sound like the target word and were not predicted by the
sentence context (e.g., key and paw). Using eye-tracking, I was able to determine how the
proportion of fixations on each of the images changed over the course of the sentence and after
the target word was presented. As mentioned above, the proportion of fixations on each image in
the visual world paradigm can be used as a proxy for changes in activation, with a greater
proportion of fixations relative to other images indicating higher activation (Tanenhaus et al.,
2000). Based on the findings of past studies using eye-tracking (Ito et al., 2018; Kukona, 2020),
hearing incongruent sentences should lead to increased fixations on an image depicting the
contextually predicted (but incorrect) word before the target word is presented, reflecting
increased activation of the response supported by context. If participants are able to suppress the
activation of the contextually predicted word when the unpredicted target word is presented,
fixations on the image depicting the contextually predicted word should decrease and fixations
on the image depicting the target word should increase following presentation of the target word.
The eye-tracking data also allowed me to test for age differences in the response suppression
aspect of inhibitory control by comparing younger and older adults’ likelihood of decreasing
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their proportion of fixations on the contextually predicted image after the target word was
presented in incongruent sentences.
I formed specific hypotheses regarding how younger and older adults’ fixation patterns
would change over the course of baseline, congruent, and incongruent sentences. In the baseline
condition, I predicted that the proportion of fixations on each of the images should remain
approximately equal until the target word was presented since there were no contextual cues
upon which to form an expectation. After the target word was presented in the baseline
condition, fixations on the target image should increase in accordance with participants’ ability
to accurately hear the target word. In congruent and incongruent sentences, I hypothesized that
both younger and older adults would become increasingly fixated on the contextually predicted
image leading up to presentation of the target word, demonstrating increasing anticipatory
activation of the word supported by context. I predicted that this increased focus on the
contextually predicted image might be greater for older than for younger adults, reflecting older
adults’ increased context-based responding, as demonstrated in Experiment 1 and in previous
studies (Rogers et al., 2012; Sommers et al., 2015). Whereas fixations on the target image should
continue to increase for both age groups once the target word was presented in the congruent
condition, I predicted that age groups would differ in their reaction to the target word’s
presentation in the incongruent condition. Specifically, I predicted that younger adults would
decrease their proportion of fixations on the contextually predicted image and increase their
fixations on the unpredicted target image after the target word was presented, reflecting their
ability to suppress the activation of the expected word. Older adults, on the other hand, were
expected to maintain or even increase their fixations on the contextually predicted image after
the target word was presented in incongruent sentences, reflecting an inability to suppress the
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activation of the expected word. This finding would support the theory that age differences in
susceptibility to false hearing result, in part, from an inability to inhibit a prepotent response.

3.1 Methods
3.1.1 Participants
Participants were 23 younger adults ages 18-29 (M = 21.00, SD = 2.68) and 19 older adults ages
66-81 (M = 73.31, SD = 4.45). I had planned to collect 30 participants in each age group, but
data collection had to be halted due to the COVID-19 pandemic. All participants completed the
demographics form described in Experiment 1 and the Shipley Vocabulary Test (Shipley, 1940).
Younger (M = 33.04, SD = 3.04) and older adults (M = 34.42, SD = 3.91) displayed equivalent
vocabulary knowledge, t(33.61) = -1.26, p > .05. As in Experiment 1, hearing thresholds were
assessed for octave frequencies from 250 to 8000 Hz in a sound-attenuating booth using standard
audiometry. Older adults (M = 23.68, SD = 11.78) had poorer best-ear PTAs (500/1000/2000 Hz
frequencies) than younger adults (M = 4.42, SD = 3.39), t(20.47) = -6.90, p < .001. All
participants were native English speakers who did not require the use of a hearing aid and selfreported normal or corrected-to-normal vision.

3.1.2 Materials
Materials were baseline, congruent, and incongruent sentences from the SPIN task in Experiment
1 in which the target words could easily be depicted in picture form. Periods of silence of
different lengths were inserted at the start of each sentence so that the onset of the target word
began at the same time on each trial to facilitate eye-tracking analyses. Four images were
gathered for each sentence: one depicting the target word (e.g., box for the sentence She put the
toys in the box), one depicting a semantically unrelated phonological neighbor of the target word
that acted as the target word in incongruent sentences (alternative image; e.g., fox), and two
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semantically unrelated foil words that did not sound like the target word (e.g., key and paw)10.
The length, frequency, phonological neighborhood density, and concreteness of target words
were collected from the English Lexicon Project (Balota et al., 2007), and averages across
sentence conditions are presented in Table 7. Target words did not differ significantly in terms of
any of these lexical characteristics across sentence conditions, all ps > .05. Additionally, the
alternative word and foil words were matched with the target word based on these lexical
characteristics within each sentence type, ps > .05.
Table 7
Means and standard deviations of lexical characteristics of target words across conditions
Baseline

Congruent

Incongruent

M

SD

M

SD

M

SD

Length

4.20

.76

4.37

.85

4.23

1.01

Frequency

33,266.53

77,434.77

28,985.50

44,531.67

32,123.90

44,336.55

Phono N

19.07

9.45

18.67

9.89

20.80

11.16

Concreteness

4.66

.26

4.71

.41

4.61

.39

Note. Phono N = Phonological neighborhood density

I selected an image depicting each target word, alternative word, and foil word, and
resized each image to 300 x 300 pixels. For images that did not have equal width and height, a
white border was added to the shorter dimension to achieve the 300 x 300 size. I conducted a
pilot test to ensure that all images to be used in the visual world task were identifiable as the
words they were meant to depict. Twenty younger adults participated in this pilot study. First,

10

Two foil images were included on each trial as opposed to including a second phonological
neighbor or a semantic competitor of the target word so that participants would not divide their
fixations across two images tapping the same source of information (semantic or phonological).
This allowed for clearer assessment of how fixations were impacted by semantic congruency and
phonological similarity.
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participants completed a study phase in which they saw each image along with the word the
image was meant to depict for 2000 ms. Participants then completed a test phase wherein each
written word was presented at the center of the screen one at a time along with four images. One
of the images depicted the written word at the center of the screen, and the other three images
were the images paired with the initial image on trials in the Experiment 2 SPIN task. For
example, when the target word was fox, the four images on screen depicted a fox, a box, a key,
and a paw, and the same four images were presented when the target word was box, key, and
paw. The images were randomly assigned to one of the four quadrants of the screen. Participants
were tasked with clicking on the image that depicted the word at the center of the screen.
Average accuracy for identifying the image depicting each target word was 99.42%. In fact, only
two images were identified correctly in less than 90% of cases, one of which was only used in
the practice trials of the SPIN task (joker, Accuracy = 75%) and the other was a foil (till,
Accuracy = 70%). Given the high identification accuracy of virtually all images in the pilot study
and the similarity of the pilot study’s procedure to that of the SPIN task in Experiment 211, I felt
confident that participants would associate each image with the word they were intended to
depict in the SPIN task.
Initial pilot testing revealed that accuracy on the SPIN task was at ceiling in the baseline
condition for younger adults using the -4 dB SPL SNR from Experiment 1 (M = .93), and older
adults’ performance at the +1 dB SPL SNR from Experiment 1 was also higher than the desired
.50 (M = .73). It was important to ensure that baseline performance was not too high so that
participants had room to improve with the addition of congruent context and so that there was

11

The only difference between the procedure of the pilot study and the SPIN task in Experiment
2 was that target words were visually presented at the middle of the screen in the pilot study
whereas target words were presented aurally in noise at the end of sentences in the SPIN task.
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enough ambiguity as to the identity of the target word for false hearing to occur. The high
accuracy in Experiment 2 was unsurprising given that the SPIN task was a four-alternative
forced-choice test as opposed to the open-set response format of Experiment 1. Further pilot
testing was conducted to determine what SNRs should be used to equate performance in younger
and older adults. It was determined that an SNR of -10 dB SPL for younger adults and -7 dB SPL
for older adults would achieve approximately equal performance across groups with accuracy
that left room for improvement from the baseline condition to the congruent condition.

3.1.3 Procedure
Participants first completed the demographic questionnaire and the audiogram inside a soundattenuating booth. Then participants were seated at an EyeLink 1000 eye-tracking-enabled
computer, where they completed the Shipley Vocabulary Test (Shipley, 1940) before beginning
the visual world task. Participants placed their chins on a chinrest with their foreheads against a
forehead rest to complete the visual world task. The distance from the back of the forehead rest
to the eyepiece of the eye-tracker was 52.07 cm and the distance from the back of the forehead
rest to the center of the computer monitor was 57.78 cm. Participants first completed a study
phase wherein each image to be shown in the visual world task was shown with the word the
image was meant to depict for 2000 ms to ensure that participants knew what each image
represented. Participants then completed three practice trials, followed by 90 test trials, equally
divided between the three sentence types (baseline/congruent/incongruent). Each trial began
when the participant clicked on a central fixation cross. On each trial, a sentence was played
through headphones with the final word in noise, and the four images associated with that
sentence were presented on screen, one randomly assigned to each quadrant (see Figure 18).
Participants were instructed to look at and click on the image corresponding to the word
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presented in noise, and were told that they could move their eyes freely about the screen as long
as the images were displayed. Images remained on screen until the participant clicked on one of
them. After clicking on an image, participants clicked on a number from one to five to indicate
their confidence that they had selected the correct image, where one indicated a complete guess
and five indicated absolute certainty.

Figure 18. An example of the screen during the visual world task for the
congruent sentence She put the toys in the box.

The eye-tracker was calibrated immediately before test trials to ensure accurate eyetracking. For the calibration task, dots appeared at 13 different locations on the screen and
participants were tasked with fixating on each dot when it appeared and continuing to look at the
dot until it disappeared. Participants completed the calibration task until it had been rated a
“good” calibration by the EyeLink program, then completed an additional validation calibration
to ensure that calibration was consistently accurate.
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3.2 Results
3.2.1 Accuracy
I first analyzed age differences in accuracy across the baseline, congruent, and incongruent
conditions using the same analyses as in Experiment 1. Average accuracy in the baseline,
congruent, and incongruent conditions is presented in Figure 19. Younger and older adults
differed significantly in their accuracy in the baseline condition, but unlike in Experiment 1,
younger adults displayed better baseline accuracy than older adults (OR = .64, z = -2.05, p < .05).
As expected, younger adults displayed improved performance in the congruent condition (OR =
3.17, z = 2.67, p < .01) and poorer performance in the incongruent condition (OR = .29, z = 3.25, p < .01) relative to the baseline condition. As in Experiment 1, however, older adults
experienced significantly greater benefit in the congruent condition (OR = 6.62, z = 4.15, p <
.001) and significantly greater detriment to performance in the incongruent condition (OR = .43,
z = -2.63, p < .01) relative to baseline than did younger adults. These results replicate those from
Experiment 1 and support the argument that older adults’ performance was influenced more by
available contextual cues than was that of younger adults.
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Figure 19. Average proportion of hits and susceptibility to false hearing (FH) and dramatic
false hearing (DFH) for younger and older adults. Error bars represent 95% confidence
intervals.

3.2.2 False hearing
I next employed the same statistical analysis as in Experiment 1 to determine whether younger
and older adults differed in susceptibility to false hearing. As shown in Figure 19, both younger
and older adults experienced false hearing. The odds that a younger adult would experience false
hearing on incongruent trials was equivalent to the odds of giving any other response combined
(OR = .98, z = -.05, p > .05). Older adults were more than four times as likely to experience false
hearing than were younger adults, which was significant (OR = 4.04, z = 3.47, p < .001).
I also analyzed the odds of experiencing false hearing with maximum confidence –
referred to in past studies as dramatic false hearing (Rogers et al., 2012; Sommers et al., 2015) –
in younger and older adults (see Figure 19). The odds that a younger adult would experience
dramatic false hearing was far less than the odds of giving any other response in the incongruent
condition combined (OR = .03, z = -8.14, p < .001). Similar to previous studies (Rogers et al.,
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2012; Sommers et al., 2015), the odds that older adults would experience dramatic false hearing
was more than 10 times greater than for younger adults (OR = 10.46, z = 4.97, p < .001). Thus,
despite having an image depicting the correct target word presented on screen, both younger and
older adults incorrectly reported hearing the contextually predicted word in over 50% of
incongruent sentences, with older adults doing so more often and being far more likely to report
maximum confidence in these errors than younger adults.

3.2.3 Confidence
3.2.3.1 Accurate responses
To determine whether sentence condition and age group differences existed for confidence in
accurate responses, I created a linear mixed-effects regression model using the lmer function
from the lme4 package in R (Bates et al., 2015) using a subset of data that included only accurate
responses. As in the accuracy analyses, the model included an intercept term corresponding to
confidence in accurate responses for younger adults in the baseline condition, two dummy coded
variables indicating the change in confidence from the baseline condition to the congruent and
incongruent conditions for younger adults, a group variable representing the change in
confidence from younger to older adults in the baseline condition, and the interaction of group
with the congruent and incongruent condition dummy codes to determine whether the change in
confidence from the baseline condition to the congruent and incongruent conditions differed
between younger and older adults. Confidence in the baseline condition and changes in
confidence from the baseline condition to the congruent and incongruent conditions were
allowed to vary randomly across subjects, and confidence was allowed to vary randomly across
items.
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Average confidence in accurate responses (hits) in the baseline, congruent, and
incongruent conditions is presented in Figure 20. Younger adults expressed confidence slightly
above a neutral rating for accurate responses in the baseline condition, with the model estimating
an average confidence of 3.53 out of 5. Younger and older adults’ confidence did not differ in
the baseline condition (ED = .06, t = .32, p > .05). Younger adults’ confidence did not differ in
either the congruent condition (ED = .10, t = .43, p > .05) or the incongruent condition (ED = .23, t = -1.10, p > .05) relative to the baseline condition. Additionally, the difference in
confidence between the baseline and incongruent conditions did not differ in older adults relative
to younger adults (ED = -.02, t = -.18, p > .05). However, there was a significant interaction
suggesting that older adults’ confidence increased to a greater degree than younger adults’ from
the baseline condition to the congruent condition (ED = .39, t = 2.18, p < .05). Overall, these
findings suggest that participants’ confidence in accurate responses remained quite stable
regardless of the context condition, aside from higher confidence in the congruent condition by
older, relative to younger, adults. This differs from in past studies (Rogers et al., 2012; Sommers
et al., 2015), where both younger and older adults have demonstrated lower confidence in
accurate responses in the baseline condition than in the congruent condition. It is possible that
changing to a four-alternative forced-choice paradigm resulted in the consistently high
confidence in accurate responses in the present study. For example, if a participant thought they
heard the word box, they might be more confident in that response because an image of a box
was among the four options on screen. Therefore, the feedback provided by images on screen
may have increased confidence in accurate perceptions.

103

Figure 20. Average confidence in hits in the baseline, congruent, and incongruent conditions,
and in cases of false hearing (FH) in the incongruent condition for younger and older adults.
Error bars represent 95% confidence intervals.

3.2.3.2 False hearing responses
I then conducted a second linear mixed-effects regression analysis to determine whether younger
and older adults differed in their confidence in cases of false hearing. This model was conducted
on a subset of data that included only cases of false hearing on incongruent trials. The model
included an intercept term corresponding to younger adults’ confidence in cases of false hearing
and a dummy-coded group variable indicating the change in confidence from younger to older
adults. Confidence in cases of false hearing was allowed to vary randomly across subjects and
items.
Although there was little difference between age groups for confidence in accurate
responses, younger and older adults did differ in their confidence in cases of false hearing (see
Figure 20). Younger adults expressed approximately neutral confidence in cases of false hearing,
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with the model estimating an average confidence of 3.12 out of 5. Older adults’ estimated
average confidence in cases of false hearing was .81 higher than that of younger adults, which
was a significant difference (t = 4.08, p < .001). Thus, older adults were both more susceptible to
and more confident in cases of false hearing than were younger adults.

3.2.4 Cloze value analyses
The analysis of the effect of cloze value on susceptibility to false hearing was conducted with
mixed-effects logistic regression using the glmer function from the lme4 package in R (Bates et
al., 2015). A similar analysis could have been conducted to examine the relationship between
cloze value and the odds of an accurate response in the congruent condition, but since
participants displayed nearly perfect accuracy in the congruent condition in both experiments, it
was unlikely that there would be sufficient variability for a relationship to emerge. For this
reason, I focused on the relationship between cloze value and susceptibility to false hearing.
Since I was specifically interested in false hearing, this analysis was conducted on a subset of
data that included only incongruent trials. The predictors of trial-by-trial false hearing in the
model were cloze value standardized across incongruent sentences, age group, and the cloze
value by age group interaction. Susceptibility to false hearing and the effect of cloze value were
allowed to vary randomly across participants. Susceptibility to false hearing was not allowed to
vary randomly across items because this variance may be systematically related to cloze value as
opposed to occurring randomly, so allowing false hearing to vary randomly across items may
suppress the effect of cloze value. This analysis was conducted once using data from the SPIN
task in Experiment 1 and again using data from the SPIN task in Experiment 2. For the analysis
of Experiment 1 data, a dummy-coded counterbalancing variable and the interaction of
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counterbalancing condition with cloze value were also included as predictors to account for
differences in average cloze value across counterbalancing conditions.
Looking first at the data from the SPIN task in Experiment 1, I found that the interaction
between cloze value and age group was non-significant, so I dropped the interaction term from
the model to allow for interpretation of main effects. In the updated model, the interaction
between cloze value and counterbalancing condition was significant (OR = 1.31, z = 3.85, p <
.001), so I analyzed the effect of age group and cloze value separately within each
counterbalancing condition. The interaction of age group and cloze value was not significant in
the first counterbalancing condition (OR = .95, z = -.47, p > .05) or the second counterbalancing
condition (OR = .85, z = -1.61, p > .05), so the interaction terms were dropped from the models.
In the first counterbalancing condition, a one standard deviation increase in cloze value increased
the odds of false hearing by a factor of 1.13, which was significant (z = 2.37, p < .05). Age group
was also a marginally significant predictor of false hearing after controlling for differences in
cloze value in the first counterbalancing condition (OR = 1.46, z = 1.79, p < .07), suggesting that
older adults tended to be more susceptible to false hearing than younger adults controlling for the
cloze value of sentences. In the second counterbalancing condition, cloze value had an even
greater effect on susceptibility to false hearing: A one standard deviation increase in cloze value
increased the odds of false hearing by a factor of 1.53 (z = 7.78, p < .001). Age group was not a
significant predictor of false hearing after controlling for differences in cloze value in the second
counterbalancing condition (OR = 1.31, z = 1.00, p > .05). Thus, although the magnitude of the
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effect of cloze value differed across counterbalancing conditions12, more predictive sentences
were more likely to evoke false hearing in Experiment 1.
Interestingly, the interaction between cloze value and age group was marginally
significant in Experiment 2 (OR = .77, z = -1.99, p = .05). To investigate this interaction, I tested
the relationship between cloze value and false hearing separately in each age group. Younger
adults in Experiment 2 looked much like the participants in Experiment 1, with a one standard
deviation increase in cloze value increasing the odds of false hearing by a factor of 1.39 (z =
4.07, p < .001). However, there was no significant relationship between cloze value and false
hearing for older adults (OR = 1.09, z = .81, p > .05). Thus, the predictive strength of contextual
cues was positively related to susceptibility to false hearing in all cases except for older adults in
Experiment 2. A possible reason for the absence of a relationship between cloze value and
susceptibility to false hearing for older adults in Experiment 2 is detailed in the Experiment 2
discussion.
The use of the hear/know/guess paradigm in the SPIN task from Experiment 1 also
allowed me to test whether sentences that were more predictive were more likely to result in
false hearing experiences characterized as heard relative to known or guessed. To test this
hypothesis, a mixed-effects multinomial logistic regression analysis was conducted using the
brm function from the brms package in R (Bürkner, 2017). Age group, standardized cloze value,
the age group by standardized cloze value interaction, counterbalancing condition, and the
counterbalancing condition by standardized cloze value interaction were entered as predictors.

12

The magnified effect of cloze value in the second counterbalancing condition may have
occurred because sentences were slightly more predictive on average in this condition relative to
the first counterbalancing condition (.78 vs .76).
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The odds of characterizing a response as heard relative to either known or guessed and the effect
of cloze value on those odds were allowed to vary randomly across subjects.
In the mixed-effects multinomial logistic regression model, the age group by standardized
cloze value interaction was non-significant when comparing both know and hear judgments (OR
= 1.07, 95% CI = .80 – 1.41) and guess and hear judgements (OR = 1.10, 95% CI = .69 – 1.73),
so it was removed as a predictor. The interaction between counterbalancing condition and cloze
value was also non-significant when comparing guess and hear judgements (OR = 1.09, 95% CI
= .69 – 1.75) but was significant when comparing know and hear judgements (OR = .68, 95% CI
= .51 – .89), so this interaction was left in the model. The counterbalancing condition by cloze
value interaction remained significant when comparing know and hear judgements in the updated
model (OR = .68, 95% CI = .51 – .90), so I conducted the analysis again within each
counterbalancing condition.
In the first counterbalancing condition, the odds of characterizing a false hearing
response as known relative to heard increased significantly as cloze value increased (OR = 1.26,
95% CI = 1.04 – 1.56), an effect in the opposite direction of what I had predicted. Cloze value
was unrelated to the odds of characterizing a false hearing response as guessed relative to heard
(OR = .95, 95% CI = .57 – 1.79). In this counterbalancing condition, older adults were less likely
than younger adults to characterize false hearing responses as known relative to heard controlling
for cloze value (OR = .50, 95% CI = .29 – .83), but there was no difference between age groups
for the odds of characterizing false hearing responses as guessed relative to heard (OR = 1.61,
95% CI = .50 – 5.28).
In the second counterbalancing condition, the odds of characterizing a false hearing
response as known relative to heard did not vary significantly with cloze value (OR = .85, 95%
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CI = .66 – 1.08), and the same was true for characterizing a false hearing response as guessed
relative to heard (OR = .93, 95% CI = .64 – 1.44). Older adults were again less likely than
younger adults to characterize false hearing responses as known relative to heard controlling for
cloze value (OR = .39, 95% CI = .17 – .92), and there was no difference between age groups for
the odds of characterizing false hearing responses as guessed relative to heard (OR = .63, 95% CI
= .26 – 1.58). Therefore, across counterbalancing conditions, I did not observe the predicted
increase in false hearing responses characterized as heard relative to known or guessed as
sentences became increasingly predictive, and I observed the opposite effect for heard versus
known responses in the first counterbalancing condition. A potential reason for these unpredicted
effects is discussed below.

3.2.5 Fixation analyses
To determine changes in the proportion of fixations on each image across time in the visual word
task, linear mixed-effects regression was used to analyze the proportion of fixations on each
image following the analyses used in a recent eye-tracking study that employed a similar visual
world paradigm (Ito et al., 2018). Separate analyses were conducted for each sentence type
(baseline, congruent, incongruent). Sentences were divided into three 2000 ms bins for fixation
analyses. The first bin started from 500 ms after the start of the trial since there were very few
fixations on any of the images before this time (participants tended to still be looking at the
central fixation cross). The second time bin started 2500 ms into the trial and continued until just
before the target word was presented. The third time bin started 4500 ms into the trial, exactly
when the target word onset. These three bins allowed me to determine the proportion of fixations
on each image early in the sentence (bin 1), late in the sentence but before the target word was
presented (bin 2), and from the presentation of the target word onwards (bin 3). Each mixed109

effects model had 24 dummy coded variables corresponding to the four picture types (target
image, alternative image, and two foil images) within each age group (younger/older adults) at
each time bin as fixed effects predicting the proportion of fixations. Proportion of fixations was
allowed to vary randomly across subjects and items for each image type within each time bin.
Linear combinations of the fixed effects were tested using the multcomp package in R (Hothorn
et al., 2008) to determine how the proportion of fixations on each image changed over time, and
whether these changes differed across age groups. Since the target image and the alternative
image (i.e., the contextually predicted image in incongruent sentences) were of primary interest
to my hypotheses, I will focus on fixation trends for these image types in the Results section. For
analysis of the fixation trends for the two unrelated foil images, see the Appendix.

3.2.5.1 Baseline sentences
The proportion of fixations over time for baseline sentences is presented in Figure 21. For
baseline sentences, I predicted that fixations on the target image would not increase until time
bin 3 since there were no contextual cues in baseline sentences to afford anticipatory activation
to any particular response. This prediction was supported by the fixation analysis. In baseline
sentences, there was no difference in fixations on the target image from time bin 1 to time bin 2
(ED = .03, z = 1.48, p > .05), but fixations on the target image increased from time bin 2 to time
bin 3 (ED = .27, z = 12.80, p < .001). There was no interaction with age group for the difference
from time bin 1 to time bin 2 (ED = .00, z = .08, p > .05) or from time bin 2 to time bin 3 (ED =
.02, z = .74, p > .05). Therefore, as predicted, both younger and older adults only increased
fixations on the target image after the target word had been presented in baseline sentences,
demonstrating that neither group experienced anticipatory activation of the target word when no
contextual cues were present.
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Bin 2

Bin 3

Figure 21. Proportion of fixations on each image type over time in baseline sentences for
younger and older adults. The vertical line at 4500 ms represents the onset of the target word.

I next considered changes in the proportion of fixations on the alternative image (i.e., the
image depicting the phonological neighbor of the target word). In baseline sentences, there was a
significant reduction in fixations on the alternative image from time bin 1 to time bin 2 (ED = .05, z = -2.24, p < .05). However, there was an interaction with age group (ED = .05, z = 2.68, p
< .01) that revealed that older adults reduced fixations on the alternative image from time bin 1
to time bin 2 (ED = -.05, z = -3.29, p < .01), whereas younger adults did not (ED = .00, z = .32, p
> .05) . From time bin 2 to time bin 3, there was a marginally significant decrease in proportion
of fixations on the alternative image (ED = -.04, z = -1.76, p = .08) and there was no significant
interaction with group (ED = -.03, z = -1.22, p > .05), demonstrating that the proportion of
fixations on alternative image decreased slightly as fixations on the target image continued to
increase for both groups.
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3.2.5.2 Congruent sentences
For congruent sentences, I had predicted that both age groups would begin looking towards the
contextually predicted target image before the target word was presented. Additionally, I
predicted that older adults might increase their fixations on the target image to a greater degree
than younger adults, reflecting increased influence of context over responding. As can be seen in
Figure 22, these predictions were mostly supported by the fixation data. Fixations on the target
image increased from time bin 1 to time bin 2 (ED = .25, z = 12.98, p < .001) and again from
time bin 2 to time bin 3 (ED = .26, z = 12.81, p < .001). Whereas there was no interaction
between age group and the change in fixations from time bin 1 to time bin 2 (ED = -.01, z = -.27,
p > .05), there was an interaction with age group for the change in fixations from time bin 2 to
time bin 3 (ED = -.15, z = -7.17, p < .001). For younger adults, there was a significant increase in
proportion of fixations on the target image from time bin 2 to time bin 3 (ED = .06, z = 4.13, p <
.001), but this increase was much greater for older adults (ED = .20, z = 13.69, p < .001). Thus,
both younger and older adults increased fixations on the target image before the target word was
presented, demonstrating anticipatory activation of the target word based on available contextual
cues. Older adults increased fixations on the target image to a greater degree than younger adults,
but only after the target word had been presented. This suggests that younger and older adults
formed context-based expectations at a similar rate, but older adults became more fixated on the
contextually predicted response once additional support for this response was provided by
presentation of the target word. The greater increase in fixations on the target image after the
target word was presented by older, relative to younger, adults suggests that older adults may use
the auditory signal to confirm their context-based expectations. When the auditory signal
supports the word they expected to hear, older adults become increasingly fixated on that
response option, whereas younger adults may be more cautious and consider alternative options.
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Figure 22. Proportion of fixations on each image type over time in congruent sentences for
younger and older adults. The vertical line at 4500 ms represents the onset of the target word.

As fixations increased on the target image, the proportion of fixations on the alternative
image decreased. Fixations decreased from time bin 1 to time bin 2 for the alternative image (ED
= -.08, z = -4.13, p < .001) and there was no interaction with group (ED = -.02, z = -.84, p > .05).
Fixations did not decrease significantly from time bin 2 to time bin 3 for the alternative image
(ED = -.02, z = -.96, p > .05). However, there was a significant interaction with age group (ED =
.06, z = 3.02, p < .01) indicating that younger adults did not reduce their fixations on the
alternative image from time bin 2 to time bin 3 (ED = .02, z = 1.51, p > .05), whereas older
adults did (ED = -.04, z = -2.73, p < .01).

3.2.5.3 Incongruent sentences
Finally, for incongruent sentences, I had again predicted that both younger and older adults
would look towards the contextually predicted image before the target word was presented. In
incongruent sentences, the alternative word was predicted by context as opposed to the target
113

word, so I predicted that fixations on the alternative image would increase before the target word
was presented. Here again I had predicted that older adults would increase fixations on the
alternative image to a greater degree than younger adults, reflecting greater influence of context
over responding. After the target word was presented, I predicted that fixations on the alternative
image would decrease and fixations on the target image would increase for younger adults as
they realized that the presented target word differed from the contextually predicted word.
However, I predicted that older adults would be less likely than younger adults to shift their
focus towards the target image, instead either maintaining or increasing fixations on the
alternative image, reflecting older adults’ poorer ability to suppress the expected response and
increased susceptibility to false hearing in incongruent sentences.
Average fixations over time in incongruent sentences can be seen in Figure 23. As
predicted, the proportion of fixations on the alternative image increased from time bin 1 to time
bin 2 (ED = .17, z = 8.87, p < .001), whereas fixations on the target image did not increase (ED =
-.02, z = -1.07, p > .05). There was no interaction with age group for the difference between time
bin 1 and time bin 2 for fixations on the alternative image (ED = -.01, z = -.70, p > .05), but there
was a marginally significant interaction for fixations on the target image (ED = -.04, z = -1.92, p
= .05). This interaction reflected that younger adults significantly decreased fixations on the
target image from time bin 1 to time bin 2 (ED = -.03, z = -2.24, p < .05) whereas older adults’
fixations on the target image did not change (ED = .01, z = .57, p > .05). Interestingly, fixations
increased from time bin 2 to time bin 3 for both the alternative image (ED = .04, z = 2.03, p <
.05) and the target image (ED = .16, z = 7.65, p < .001). However, as predicted, there were
significant interactions with age group for the difference in fixations from time bin 2 to time bin
3 for both the alternative image (ED = -.14, z = -6.90, p < .001) and the target image (ED = .12, z
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= 5.88, p < .001). Younger adults decreased fixations on the alternative image (ED = -.05, z = 3.51, p < .001) and increased fixations on the target image (ED = .14, z = 9.75, p < .001) from
time bin 2 to time bin 3. Older adults, however, increased fixations on the alternative image (ED
= .09, z = 6.20, p < .001) and did not increase fixations on the target image (ED = .02, z = 1.23, p
> .05) from time bin 2 to time bin 3. As can be seen in Figure 23, older adults only began to
slightly decrease fixations on the alternative image and increase fixations on the target image at
the very end of time bin 3, whereas younger adults made this change in fixations shortly after the
target word had been presented.

Bin 1

Bin 2

Bin 3

Figure 23. Proportion of fixations on each image type over time in incongruent sentences for
younger and older adults. The vertical line at 4500 ms represents the onset of the target word.

3.3 Experiment 2 discussion
The findings of Experiment 2 were interesting for several reasons. This was the first study of
false hearing to employ a four-alternative forced-choice test as opposed to using open-set
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responding. By having participants click on one of four images to indicate which word they
heard in noise as opposed to saying the word aloud as in previous studies (Rogers et al., 2012;
Sommers et al., 2015) or typing the word as in Experiment 1, I limited the range of words that
participants had to consider in the perceptual process. This resulted in a substantially easier task,
requiring the SNRs to be decreased to get similar baseline accuracy to that in Experiment 1.
However, despite having an image depicting the target word on screen in incongruent sentences,
participants – especially older adults – still experienced false hearing and even dramatic false
hearing. This demonstrates the robust effects of context on speech perception: Even when the
right answer was presented to participants in an image, younger adults still chose the
contextually predicted (but incorrect) option on approximately 50% of incongruent trials,
whereas older adults committed these context-based errors on approximately 70% of incongruent
trials.
This was also the first study to test the relationship between the strength of contextual
cues and susceptibility to false hearing, a relationship that has been observed in past studies of
false memory (Deese, 1959; Roediger et al., 2001b). As in false memory, the predictive strength
of sentences in the SPIN task was positively related to the likelihood of experiencing false
hearing in both Experiment 1 and Experiment 2 of the present study. This finding supports an
activation-based account of false hearing. Specifically, this finding lends credence to Sommers
and Danielson’s (1999) suggestion that hearing predictive contextual cues increases the
activation of words in the mental lexicon that are compatible with the context. However, this
finding expands upon Sommers and Danielson’s hypothesis by suggesting that the activation
allotted to contextually predicted words is proportional to the predictive strength of the sentence.
Thus, misleading sentences with greater predictive strength allotted more activation to the
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contextually predicted (but unpresented) word, resulting in increased probability that the
activation of the contextually predicted word would exceed that of the target word, resulting in
false hearing.
Interestingly, the relationship between cloze value and susceptibility to false hearing was
not observed for older adults in Experiment 2. One possible reason for this null finding is that
only one image was compatible with context on each incongruent trial. Even in cases where the
context provided by incongruent sentences was a relatively weak predictor, the alternative image
(e.g., the image depicting a box in the sentence She put the toys in the fox) was still the only one
that fit with the semantic structure of the sentence. So, if older adults were more likely to
respond based on context than younger adults, we would expect that they would select the
contextually compatible image even in cases where context was a relatively weak predictor. By
contrast, the open-set response format in Experiment 1 would allow older adults to generate
semantically viable words other than the pre-selected alternative word, and thus weaker contexts
would correspond to a lower probability of generating the specific alternative word. This would
account for the positive relationship between cloze value and susceptibility to false hearing for
older adults observed in Experiment 1 and the absence of a significant relationship in Experiment
2.
Although greater predictive strength of sentences was related to increased susceptibility
to false hearing, it was not related to increased odds of characterizing false hearing responses as
heard relative to known or guessed in Experiment 1. In fact, I found that the odds of
characterizing false hearing responses as known relative to heard increased as predictive strength
increased in one counterbalancing condition. It is possible that these unpredicted findings
resulted from restriction of range of cloze values. Given that the above findings established that
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sentences with greater predictive strength were more likely to evoke false hearing than those
with weaker predictive strength, it is possible that including only data in which false hearing
occurred limited the number of sentences with weaker predictive strength in the analysis. To test
this possibility, I conducted the same mixed-effects multinomial regression model including all
incongruent trials as opposed to just cases of false hearing to determine whether responses for
incongruent sentences with stronger predictive strength were more likely to be rated as heard
relative to known or guessed. It is important to note that this analysis included correct responses
on incongruent trials, which would be predicted to occur more often for sentences with low cloze
values (since sentences with high cloze values were more likely to result in false hearing) and to
be rated as heard (since the auditory signal was the only source of information supporting this
response). Thus, including these trials actually worked against my hypothesis that increasing
cloze value should increase the proportion of responses rated as heard on incongruent trials.
As in the original analysis, the age group by cloze value interaction was non-significant
for the comparison of incongruent responses rated as heard versus known (OR = .95, 95% CI =
.80 – 1.13) and heard versus guessed (OR = 1.07, 95% CI = .91 – 1.27), so it was removed from
the model to allow for interpretation of the main effects. The interaction between cloze value and
counterbalance condition was significant for the comparison of responses rated as heard versus
guessed (OR = 1.31, 95% CI = 1.11 – 1.56), so I tested the effect of age group and cloze value
within each counterbalancing condition. In the first counterbalancing condition, cloze value was
unrelated to the odds of characterizing responses as known versus heard (OR = 1.05, 95% CI =
.90 – 1.22), but more predictive sentences were less likely to be characterized as guessed than
heard (OR = .63, 95% CI = .54 – .72). There were no age effects for the odds of classifying
responses as known relative to heard (OR = 1.18, 95% CI = .66 – 2.08) or guessed relative to
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heard (OR = .86, 95% CI = .49 – 1.47). In the second counterbalancing condition, cloze value
was unrelated to the odds of characterizing responses as known versus heard (OR = .94, 95% CI
= .83 – 1.06), but more predictive sentences were again less likely to be characterized as guessed
than heard (OR = .82, 95% CI = .73 – .93). There were no age effects for the odds of classifying
responses as known relative to heard (OR = 1.04, 95% CI = .53 – 1.98) or guessed relative to
heard (OR = 1.03, 95% CI = .65 – 1.60) in the second counterbalancing condition. Therefore, as
misleading sentences became more predictive and participants became more likely to commit a
context-based error, the odds that participants would rate their responses as heard as opposed to
guessed increased. This suggests that increasing the predictive strength of sentences altered the
subjective experience associated with responses to be more similar to veridical hearing.
Finally, I presented eye-tracking data that provided the first visualization of the real-time
processing that occurred during baseline, congruent, and incongruent sentences. I found that
participants formed early expectations regarding what the target word would be in the congruent
and incongruent conditions, increasing their fixations on the image supported by context before
the target word was presented. Additionally, whereas older adults’ gaze tended to linger on the
contextually predicted (but incorrect) image after the target word was presented in incongruent
sentences, younger adults were more likely to shift their gaze to the correct target image. These
findings align with the idea that one can be “captured” by available contextual cues, and that
older adults are especially prone to being captured. These findings also support the role of the
response suppression aspect of inhibitory control in false hearing, suggesting that older adults
were less able than younger adults to suppress the highly activated (but incorrect) response in the
incongruent condition.
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One prediction that I had made at the outset of the study that was not reflected in the eyetracking data was increased expectation on the part of older adults relative to younger adults.
Specifically, I predicted that older adults would increase fixations on the contextually predicted
image to a greater degree than younger adults before the target word was presented in congruent
and incongruent sentences. I found that older adults did display a greater proportion of fixations
on the contextually predicted image, but only after the target word had been presented. This was
true in both the congruent and incongruent conditions, leading to increased fixations on the
correct image when context was valid and increased fixations on the incorrect image when
context was misleading for older, relative to younger, adults. This finding suggests that younger
and older adults formed expectations based on context at a similar rate, but older adults became
disproportionately fixated on the contextually predicted image after the target word was
presented. As described above, this may suggest that older adults used the auditory signal to
confirm their context-based expectations, whereas younger adults were more willing to consider
alternative responses to that predicted by context.

Chapter 4: General discussion
In the present study, I sought to learn more about the mechanisms underlying false hearing by
drawing upon the more expansive false memory literature and using a diverse set of research
methods, including behavioral assessments of performance, self-reports of subjective experience,
analyses of individual differences, MPT modeling, and eye-tracking. It has been suggested that
false hearing and false memory may rely upon similar cognitive mechanisms (Jacoby et al.,
2012; Rogers et al., 2012; Sommers et al., 2015), but this was the first study to directly test this
theory. I tested whether individual differences in two cognitive processes previously shown to be
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predictive of false memory – inhibitory control (Colombel et al., 2016; Sommers & Huff, 2003,
Experiment 2) and executive functioning (Butler et al., 2004; Chan & McDermott, 2007; Meade
et al., 2012; Roediger & Geraci, 2007) – were also predictive of false hearing. I then further
examined the role of inhibitory control by testing whether the predictive strength of sentences
was related to susceptibility to false hearing. Finally, I used eye-tracking to determine whether
participants became increasingly fixated on the contextually predicted response over the course
of sentences, and whether younger and older adults differed in their ability to suppress the
activation of the predicted response when context turned out to be invalid.

4.1 Relationship between false hearing and false memory
Supporting the idea that false hearing and false memory share at least one underlying cognitive
mechanism, I found a significant positive relationship between susceptibility to false hearing and
susceptibility to false memory. Importantly, I also found that age group was not a significant
predictor of false hearing after controlling for an individual’s average susceptibility to false
memory. This finding supports the theory that age differences in a common cognitive
mechanism, as opposed to age differences in sensory-specific or memory-specific mechanisms,
gave rise to older adults’ increased susceptibility to false hearing and false memory relative to
younger adults.
Whereas past studies have hypothesized that false hearing and false memory might rely
on common cognitive mechanisms (Jacoby et al., 2012; Rogers et al., 2012; Sommers et al.,
2015), the present study provided the first direct evidence for a relationship between the two
phenomena. Showing that false hearing and false memory are correlated does not, however,
identify what common mechanism(s) gave rise to these phenomena. To begin to investigate
specific mechanisms, I tested the effects of two related cognitive abilities that have been
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mentioned in past studies of false hearing as potential mechanisms underlying false hearing and
false memory: inhibitory control and executive functioning.

4.2 Evidence for mechanisms underlying the relationship
between false hearing and false memory
4.2.1 Inhibitory control
To test the role of inhibitory control in false hearing and false memory, I first employed an
auditory Stroop task that has previously been shown to be predictive of phonological false
memory in the DRM paradigm (Sommers & Huff, 2003, Experiment 2). I did not replicate the
relationship between the response suppression aspect of inhibitory control and false memory
observed by Sommers and Huff, nor did I observe a relationship between this aspect of inhibitory
control and false hearing. This suggests that inhibitory control as assessed by the auditory Stroop
task was not the common mechanism underlying false hearing and false memory. However, as
stated above, it is possible that this null finding resulted from insensitivity of the auditory Stroop
task to age differences in inhibitory control, lack of validity of the auditory Stroop task as a
measure of inhibitory control, different demands placed on inhibitory control in the auditory
Stroop task relative to the SPIN and memory tasks, or my use of a different memory task than
Sommers and Huff. It is also plausible that the auditory Stroop task measured a different aspect
of inhibitory control (see Lustig et al., 2007) than was involved in the incongruent conditions
SPIN and memory tasks. For example, as will be described in further detail below, the results of
the cloze and eye-tracking analyses suggest that false hearing results when participants are
unable to suppress a highly activated (but incorrect) response, but interference on the auditory
Stroop task may reflect the increased effort needed to stop the task-irrelevant spoken word from
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entering working memory. Future studies should investigate which aspect of inhibitory control is
measured by the auditory Stroop task to clarify this issue.
To further assess the role of inhibitory control in false hearing in the present study, I
analyzed the relationship between the predictive strength of sentences (i.e., cloze values) and
susceptibility to false hearing. Previous studies using the DRM paradigm have shown that the
associative strength of studied list words to the critical word is highly predictive of false memory
(Deese, 1959; Roediger et al., 2001b). Roediger et al. (2001b) interpreted their findings within an
activation/monitoring framework, which proposes that false memories arise when 1) an incorrect
response becomes highly activated in memory due to its association with contextual cues, and 2)
the individual is unable to distinguish whether this activation reflected a veridical memory trace
or resulted from context (i.e., a failure of source monitoring). The authors argued that the
stronger the association between the studied list words and the critical word, the more activation
should spread from the list items to the critical word, and that the likelihood of falsely
remembering the critical word should increase as the word became more highly activated. Within
this framework, inhibitory control can be used to suppress the spread of activation from studied
items to the unpresented critical word (Balota et al., 1999; Roediger et al., 2001a), and thus,
individual differences in inhibitory control may be related to individual differences in
susceptibility to false memory.
This activation-based explanation for false memory is similar to an explanation I
described above for false hearing based on the expanded version of the NAM (Luce & Pisoni,
1998) proposed by Sommers and Danielson (1999, Experiment 2). Specifically, Sommers and
Danielson suggested that inhibitory control is used to suppress activation of phonological
neighbors of the spoken word in the mental lexicon, and that placing the spoken word within a
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predictive semantic context reduces the need to inhibit semantically incongruent neighbors by
selectively increasing the activation of the spoken word. I argued that false hearing may occur
when a phonological neighbor of the spoken word is predicted by context whereas the spoken
word is not – as in the incongruent condition of the SPIN task – thereby selectively increasing
the activation of the contextually predicted phonological neighbor. This would increase reliance
on inhibitory control to suppress activation of contextually predicted phonological neighbors to
accurately hear the spoken word. In cases where the listener was unable to suppress the
activation of the contextually predicted neighbor to a level less than the activation of the spoken
word, false hearing could occur. Therefore, just as increasing activation of the critical word by
strengthening its association with studied words increased susceptibility to false memory (Deese,
1959; Roediger et al., 2001b), increasing the activation of a phonological neighbor of a spoken
word by strengthening contextual cues predicting this neighbor may also increase susceptibility
to false hearing. This was the first study to test this hypothesis.
Whereas analyses using the auditory Stroop task as a predictor of false hearing and false
memory suggested that the response suppression aspect of inhibitory control was not related to
either phenomenon, the relationship between this aspect of inhibitory control and false hearing
was supported by the cloze value analyses. Sentences that were stronger predictors of a
phonological neighbor of the spoken target word were more likely to evoke false hearing than
were less predictive sentences. This supports the hypothesis that false hearing occurs when
context increases the activation of a phonological neighbor of the target word beyond the
activation of the target word. However, given that even the most predictive sentences (Use a
comb to fix your… and He got a letter in the… each with cloze values of 1.00 indicating that all
participants completed the sentences with the same words, hair and mail) did not evoke false
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hearing in all cases (Hair: MYounger = .27 and MOlder = .45; Mail: MYounger = .14 and MOlder = .21),
participants may have been able to inhibit the activation gained from context to accurately hear
the target word. Therefore, the cloze value analyses suggest that failure to sufficiently inhibit the
activation of contextually predicted phonological neighbors of the spoken word in the mental
lexicon may contribute to false hearing. This explanation aligns with activation-based theories of
false memory (Balota et al., 1999; Roediger et al., 2001a).
The role of the response suppression aspect of inhibitory control in false hearing and the
activation-based explanation of false hearing presented above are supported by the fixation data
from the visual world paradigm used in Experiment 2. Increasing fixations on a particular image
may represent increasing activation of the word that the image depicts (Tanenhaus et al., 2000).
In incongruent sentences, the proportion of fixations on the contextually predicted alternative
image increased as the sentence was played for both younger and older adults, suggesting that
activation of the alternative image increased above the level of the other three response options
because it alone fit with the semantic context. Once the target word was presented in the
incongruent condition, younger adults decreased their fixations on the alternative image and
increased fixations on the target image, representing their ability to inhibit activation of the
contextually predicted alternative word to accurately hear the target word. Older adults, on the
other hand, did not decrease their fixations on the alternative image or increase their fixations on
the target image to the same extent as did younger adults, suggesting that older adults were less
able to inhibit the activation of the contextually predicted alternative word than younger adults.
This is in line with past findings of poorer inhibitory control in older, relative to younger, adults
(Cohn et al., 1984; Hasher & Zacks, 1988; Hasher et al., 1997; Jacoby et al., 2005; MacLeod,
1991; Sommers & Danielson, 1999, Experiment 2; Sommers & Huff, 2003, Experiment 2; West
125

& Alain, 2000), and would account for older adults’ increased susceptibility to false hearing
relative to younger adults. Thus, whereas the auditory Stroop task was unable to detect age
differences in inhibitory control in the present study, it is possible that these differences were
captured by fixation trends in the visual world task.
As a final assessment of the role of inhibitory control in false hearing, I fit the capture
model used by Jacoby et al. (2005, Experiment 2) to the SPIN and memory task data in
Experiment 1. I found that adding a capture parameter – interpreted by Jacoby et al. as
representing inhibitory control – to models significantly improved overall fit to data from both
the memory and SPIN tasks. This finding was important, as it suggested that the model that
accounted for hearing/recollecting the target word, accessibility-based responding, and guessing
was insufficient to accurately predict response rates. An additional capture parameter, allowing
for increased rates of both congruent hits and cases of false hearing and false memory in the
incongruent condition, improved the model’s predictive ability. Although it is possible that the
capture parameter could reflect processes other than, or in addition to, inhibitory control that
would result in similar patterns of responding, finding that adding the capture parameter
improved model fit, in conjunction with evidence from the cloze and eye-tracking analyses,
suggests that inhibitory control may indeed have played a role in both the memory and SPIN
tasks.
One interesting finding from the MPT models was that the best-fitting model to the SPIN
data described in the Experiment 1 discussion did not specify age differences in the capture
parameter. This seems to contradict the conclusion drawn from the fixation analyses and
suggests that younger and older adults did not differ in inhibitory control. There are several
potential explanations for these findings. First, it is possible that changing the paradigm from
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open-set responding in Experiment 1 to four-alternative forced-choice in Experiment 2 increased
the need to employ inhibitory control. It could be the case that having an image of the predicted
(but incorrect) word on screen on incongruent trials in Experiment 2 increased participants’
focus on that response option, thereby requiring increased inhibitory control to suppress this
response. This explanation is supported by substantially higher rates of false hearing for both
younger and older adults in Experiment 2 (see Figure 19) relative to Experiment 1 (see Figure 8).
Second, it is possible that the magnitude of age differences in the capture parameter was
suppressed by the capture parameter’s inclusion of both correct responses in the congruent
condition and false hearing responses in the incongruent condition. Since age differences
appeared to be smaller for congruent hits relative to cases of false hearing (see Figure 8),
potentially due to near-perfect performance by both groups in the congruent condition, it is
possible that including congruent hits reduced the ability of the model to detect age differences
in the capture parameter. Indeed, allowing the capture parameter to vary across age groups in this
model revealed that older adults were numerically more susceptible to capture than younger
adults (.32 vs. .26), but the BIC value indicated that this difference was not large enough to
justify the added model complexity. Therefore, both the fixation and MPT analyses are
suggestive of age differences in inhibitory control, but these differences were not large enough to
justify the added model complexity in the MPT analysis.
Although the MPT model provided additional evidence for the role of inhibitory control
in false hearing, it is important to note that the capture model I originally tested based on the
model used by Jacoby et al. (2005, Experiment 2) tended to overestimate the number of cases of
false hearing rated as heard or known. It was not until individual accessibility bias parameters
were specified in each sentence condition that the model was able to accurately estimate cases of
127

false hearing. This suggests that accessibility bias – the tendency to respond with the most easily
retrieved response – may play a role in false hearing. Additionally, whereas the best-fitting
model for the memory task specified age group differences in the capture parameter, the bestfitting model for the SPIN task did not specify group differences in capture but did specify group
differences in accessibility bias. This suggests that age differences in susceptibility to false
hearing may reflect, in part, older adults’ increased bias towards the most easily accessible word
relative to younger adults.
Importantly, age differences in accessibility bias can also account for the results of the
cloze value analyses and the age differences in fixation patterns observed in the visual world task
in Experiment 2. Above, I argued that strengthening predictability of sentences increased
susceptibility to false hearing because the increased activation afforded by context made it more
difficult to inhibit the contextually predicted (but unpresented) word. However, it could also be
the case that more predictive sentences were more likely to result in false hearing because these
sentences made the predicted word more easily accessible than other options. Participants may
thus have chosen this response in cases where they were unable to hear the target word because it
was the most easily accessed option, not because they were unable to resist this response.
Similarly, I explained above that older adults’ inability to reduce fixations on the contextually
predicted image after the target word was presented in the incongruent condition in Experiment 2
reflected a failure to inhibit the expected response. However, it could also be the case that older
adults did not decrease fixations on the expected image whereas younger adults did because
older adults were more heavily biased towards the most easily accessible option, whereas
younger adults were more likely to consider the less easily accessible target word. Therefore,
both inhibitory control and accessibility bias can explain these findings.
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Age differences in accessibility bias may also help to explain why older adults increased
fixations on the target image to a greater degree than younger adults after the target word was
presented in the congruent condition. Above, I argued that this increase may result because older
adults used the auditory signal to confirm their context-based expectation, becoming increasingly
fixated on the target response when it was supported by both context and the auditory signal. I
suggested that this increase in fixations on the target image may have been smaller in younger
adults because younger adults were more willing to consider alternative options. These patterns
can also be explained in terms of accessibility bias. According to the expanded version of the
NAM (Luce & Pisoni, 1998) proposed by Sommers and Danielson (1999), activation of words in
the mental lexicon is increased by both phonological similarity to the spoken word and
congruency with available context. Therefore, we would expect activation of the target word to
increase as contextual support is presented in congruent sentences, and that its activation would
also increase when the target word is presented due to phonological similarity, further increasing
the accessibility of this response. Older adults’ increased bias towards the most easily accessible
option would lead them to become more fixated on the target image after the target word was
presented, whereas younger adults may consider alternative options because they are less biased
towards the most easily accessible option. Therefore, differences in fixation patterns across
younger and older adults in both the congruent and incongruent conditions can be readily
explained by differences in accessibility bias.
The similarity of the effects of inhibitory control and accessibility bias is reflected in the
capture model itself. As can be seen in Figure 4, responding based on capture and accessibility
bias both result in accurate responding in the congruent condition and false hearing in the
incongruent condition. Additionally, like capture, responses based on accessibility bias can be
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characterized as heard/remembered or known in cases where the attribution threshold is met.
Thus, it is unsurprising that the inhibitory control and accessibility bias accounts are difficult to
disentangle.
The idea that differences in accessibility bias may contribute to age differences in false
hearing is not a new one. In discussing the high rate of accurate responses in the congruent
condition and high rate of false hearing responses in the incongruent condition of their study,
Rogers et al. (2012) stated that the “increase in both hits and false alarms provides evidence that
the effect of providing context was, at least, partially due to an influence on bias” (pp. 42). The
authors went on to suggest that age differences in false hearing resulted from decreased reliance
on controlled, effortful processing (i.e., careful listening) and increased reliance on automatic,
context-based responding by older, relative to younger, adults. Although Sommers et al. (2015)
described older adults’ increased reliance on automatic processing as potentially resulting from
failures of inhibitory control (i.e., failing to restrict responding to sensory information), it is
possible that this reflects a shift towards increased accessibility-based responding in older,
relative to younger, adults: Rather than expending the extra effort to listen carefully to the stimuli
in noise, older adults may simply provide the response made easily accessible by context.
Similarly, it is possible that the increased reliance on automatic memory processes and contextbased guessing attributed to older adults with low relative to high executive functioning in past
studies (Chan & McDermott, 2007; Meade et al., 2012) reflects a change in accessibility bias.
Thus, differences in accessibility bias could account for both age differences in susceptibility to
false hearing (Rogers et al., 2012; Sommers et al., 2015) and differences in susceptibility to false
memory attributed to executive functioning in past studies (Butler et al., 2004; Chan &
McDermott, 2007; Meade et al., 2012; Roediger & Geraci, 2007).
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As indicated within the capture model itself, both inhibitory control and accessibility bias
can independently contribute to false hearing. Indeed, demonstrating that model fit was improved
by adding a capture parameter to an MPT model that already included an accessibility bias
parameter suggests that capture – which may represent failure to inhibit the response activated by
context – accounted for unique variability in responding in both tasks. Even after specifying a
separate hearing parameter in the baseline condition and a separate accessibility bias parameter
in the congruent condition in the model described in the Experiment 1 discussion, model fit was
significantly better when the capture parameter was included relative to when it was constrained
to 0 (ΔG2(1) = 167.32, critical = 36.08). Similarly, it is possible that both inhibitory control and
accessibility bias influenced the effect of sentence predictability (i.e., cloze value) on false
hearing, and that age differences in each of these processes contributed to older adults’ inability
relative to younger adults to reduce fixations on the predicted image in the incongruent condition
of the visual word task. Future studies should seek to dissociate the influences of inhibitory
control and accessibility bias on false hearing and false memory.

4.2.2 Executive functioning
Whereas findings with regards to inhibitory control were mixed, I found that better executive
functioning was associated with decreased susceptibility to both false hearing and false memory.
Importantly, the relationship between executive functioning and false hearing remained
significant after controlling for best-ear PTA, suggesting that false hearing does not purely
reflect deficits in hearing acuity. Additionally, I found that age group was not a significant
predictor of either false hearing or false memory after controlling for performance on the
executive functioning battery, suggesting that differences in executive functioning can fully
account for age differences in each of these phenomena. This corroborated the findings of past
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studies showing that age differences in susceptibility to false memory are reduced or eliminated
when comparing younger adults to only older adults with high executive functioning (Butler et
al., 2004; Chan & McDermott, 2007; Meade et al., 2012; Roediger & Geraci, 2007), and
suggested that a common role of executive functioning may account for the observed
relationship between false memory and false hearing.
At the outset of the study, I had predicted that executive functioning would not account
for additional variance in susceptibility to false hearing and false memory after controlling for
individual differences in the response suppression aspect of inhibitory control. This prediction
was based on the fact that executive functioning is composed of several cognitive processes,
including inhibitory control, and the common theory that false hearing results from failures to
inhibit the context-based response (Rogers et al., 2012; Sommers et al., 2015). Therefore, it is
possible that the relationship between executive functioning and false memory observed in past
studies (Butler et al., 2004; Chan & McDermott, 2007; Meade et al., 2012; Roediger & Geraci,
2007) may, in fact, be indexing a relationship between the response suppression aspect of
inhibitory control and false memory.
To attempt to assess whether executive functions other than the response suppression
aspect of inhibitory control were related to susceptibility to false hearing and false memory, I
conducted an analysis of the relationship between the executive functioning battery and each of
these phenomena controlling for performance on the auditory Stroop task. Unfortunately, due to
concerns surrounding the auditory Stroop task as a measure of the response suppression aspect of
inhibitory control described in detail above, I was not able to draw conclusions regarding the
roles of other executive functions in false hearing and false memory in the present study.
However, showing that executive functioning, in general, was related to both false hearing and
132

false memory is important to advancing the theory that these phenomena rely on similar
cognitive mechanisms, and narrows the scope of potential mechanisms to be investigated in
greater detail in future studies.
Although I focused on inhibitory control as a specific component of executive
functioning that may explain the relationship between executive functioning and false memory in
past studies (Butler et al., 2004; Chan & McDermott, 2007; Meade et al., 2012; Roediger &
Geraci, 2007) and between executive functioning and both false hearing and false memory here,
it is possible that other aspects of executive functioning contribute to these phenomena. For
example, past studies have argued that different response strategies may explain differences in
susceptibility to false memory between individuals with low and high executive functioning
(Chan & McDermott, 2007; Meade et al., 2012). Above, I argued that this difference in strategies
could reflect either differences in inhibitory control or accessibility bias. Additionally, there is
some evidence that working memory capacity may play a role in false memory (Bixter & Daniel,
2013; Long et al., 2008; Unsworth & Brewer, 2010; Watson et al., 2005). Specifically, past
studies have shown that individuals with greater working memory capacity were less likely to
endorse lures as “old” on recognition tests (Long et al., 2008; Unsworth & Brewer, 2010) and
less likely to experience false memories in the DRM paradigm (Bixter & Daniel, 2013; Watson
et al., 2005) than individuals with lower working memory capacity. However, individuals with
greater working memory capacity were only less susceptible to false memories in the DRM
paradigm when participants were warned that the word lists were designed to elicit false
memories (Bixter & Daniel, 2013; Watson et al., 2005). This led the authors of these studies to
suggest that working memory capacity is involved in maintaining task goals as opposed to
having a direct effect on susceptibility to false memory. It is important that future studies
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investigate the contributions of individual components of executive functioning to false hearing
and false memory to better understand why these phenomena occur and to develop methods of
reducing susceptibility to these errors.

4.3 Implications for the common-mechanisms theory of
false hearing and false memory
The findings presented in this study provide substantial evidence in support of the theory that
false hearing and false memory result from at least one shared cognitive mechanism. The
findings that most strongly supported this theory were the demonstration of a positive correlation
between susceptibility to false hearing and false memory, and the finding of a positive
relationship between executive functioning and both false hearing and false memory. I not only
presented the first direct evidence of a relationship between false hearing and false memory,
suggesting that a common mechanism may give rise to these phenomena, but also presented
evidence that executive functioning may be one such mechanism (or set of mechanisms).
Further evidence for the common-mechanisms theory came from the demonstration that
false hearing was more likely to occur as the predictive strength of sentences increased, similar
to the finding of a positive relationship between backwards associative strength and false
memory observed in previous studies (Deese, 1959; Roediger et al., 2001b). Showing that
similar manipulations – in this case, increasing predictive strength of contextual cues – has a
similar effect on false hearing and false memory strengthens the case that similar processes
underlie these phenomena. I argued that either inhibitory control, accessibility bias, or a
combination of the two could account for the effect of increasing predictive strength on
susceptibility to false hearing, and the same could be argued for its effect on susceptibility to
false memory. Above, I described how inhibitory control may be needed to suppress spreading
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activation from studied list words to the critical word in the DRM paradigm, and how failures to
suppress this activation may result in false memory. However, it could also be argued that
participants endorse the critical word in the DRM paradigm because it has been made easily
accessible in memory due to its association with the studied list words, not because they are
unable to resist this response. Therefore, the similar effect of increasing predictive strength of
contextual cues on false hearing and false memory could be explained by similar roles of
inhibitory control, accessibility bias, or a combination of both.
This study also provided evidence for differences between false hearing and false
memory. For example, initial attempts to fit the MPT model revealed that this model was a better
fit to the memory task data than to the SPIN data: Additional parameters (a different hearing
parameter in the baseline condition and a different accessibility bias parameter in the congruent
condition) had to be specified to achieve accurate estimations of the observed SPIN data. This
suggests that the effect of context may have differed in the memory and SPIN tasks, resulting in
different patterns of responding that could not be accounted for with the same model. The MPT
models also suggested that age differences in responding in the memory and SPIN tasks were
best accounted for by different parameters: capture and recollection in the memory task, and
accessibility bias and word generation in the SPIN task. This suggests that whereas similar
processes may have contributed to responding in each task, different processes may have given
rise to age differences in responding in the memory and SPIN tasks.
There was also evidence that the subjective experience associated with false memories
differed from that associated with cases of false hearing. Specifically, whereas the vast majority
of cases of false hearing were characterized as heard, there was relatively equal likelihood of
characterizing false memories as remembered, known, or guessed. This could suggest that the
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subjective experience of false hearing was more similar to that of veridical hearing than the
subjective experience of false memory was to that of veridical memory. However, as described
above, it is also possible that characteristics of the specific memory task used in the present study
(e.g., the ease of generating the false memory response provided by the remaining letters in the
fragment completion task) gave rise to the high rate of false memories characterized as guesses,
rather than reflecting a characteristic common to all false memories.
Finally, showing that the relationship between age and false hearing persisted after
controlling for average susceptibility to false memory suggests that age differences in
mechanisms that are not shared with false memory contributed to age differences in false
hearing. For example, it could be the case that sensory-specific mechanisms, such as hearing
acuity, contributed to susceptibility to false hearing but did not impact susceptibility to false
memory. Conversely, memory-specific mechanisms, such as the ability to encode information
into long-term memory and the ability to retrieve this information, may have contributed to
susceptibility to false memory without affecting susceptibility to false hearing. The findings of
the present study provide compelling evidence for at least one shared mechanism, but also
suggest that additional, distinct mechanisms contribute to false hearing and false memory.

4.4 Implications for our understanding of speech
perception
In addition to informing the theory that false memory and false hearing share at least one
common mechanism, the findings of the present study also advance our understanding of speech
perception. The results of the cloze value analyses, for example, have important implications for
activation-based theories of speech perception. Whereas Sommers and Danielson (1999)
suggested that activation of words in the mental lexicon is greater when placed in the context of
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a highly predictive sentence relative to a sentence providing no predictive value, the results of
the cloze value analyses extended this argument by suggesting that the activation imparted by
context varies continuously with the predictive strength of contextual cues. This finding will
allow for better prediction of the outcome of perception by models such as the NAM (Luce &
Pisoni, 1998).
The fixation analyses from Experiment 2 also offered interesting insights into how
younger and older adults process contextual cues in speech perception. Specifically, these
analyses showed that both younger and older adults formed expectations regarding what would
be said in the future based on the semantic cues presented earlier in a sentence. Younger and
older adults formed these expectations at a similar rate, which countered my expectation that
older adults might become fixated on the expected word to a greater degree than younger adults,
reflecting increased reliance on context as a basis for responding. It was only after the target
word had been presented that older adults demonstrated increased fixation on the expected word
relative to younger adults: Older adults increased fixations on the expected word to a greater
degree than younger adults after presentation of the target word in congruent sentences and failed
to reduce fixations on the expected word in the incongruent condition to the same degree as
younger adults. This pattern of fixations after presentation of the target word suggests that older
adults may have used the target word to confirm, but not to override, their context-based
expectation. When the target word aligned with their expectation (i.e., in the congruent
condition), older adults increased their fixations on the expected image. When the target word
differed from their expectation (i.e., in the incongruent condition), older adults did not decrease
their fixations on the expected image. This lends further credence to the idea that context plays a
greater role in determining the outcome of perception for older, relative to younger, adults
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(Rogers et al., 2012; Sommers et al., 2015), and as argued above, may reflect increased bias
towards the most easily accessible response by older adults.
Finally, this study was the first to assess the subjective experience of cases of false
hearing, giving us greater insight into whether participants actually “hear” the incorrect word or
are simply making an informed guess based on context. To assess the subjective experience of
false hearing, I used a hear/know/guess paradigm – similar to the remember/familiar/guess
paradigm used in the study of false memory by Jacoby et al. (2005) – wherein participants
indicated whether they had heard the specific sounds of the word when it was presented, had not
heard the specific sounds of the word but knew their answer was the word that had been
presented, or had simply guessed. The findings of this study suggest that cases of false hearing
are accompanied by a subjective experience similar to that of veridical hearing, with the vast
majority of cases of false hearing being classified as heard. This not only advances our
understanding of false hearing, but also advances our understanding of speech perception,
generally, suggesting that the subjective experience of hearing is not always based on one’s
ability to discern the acoustic features of a spoken word, but can also be based on one’s
expectations regarding what word should have been presented.

4.5 Limitations and future directions
There are several limitations associated with the present study. One limitation is the use of a
single task (the auditory Stroop task) as opposed to a composite of multiple tasks to measure the
response suppression aspect of inhibitory control in Experiment 1. Above and beyond the
potential issues with the auditory Stroop task discussed above, using a composite of multiple
tasks assessing a particular construct provides a better measure than a single task since it allows
the researcher to partial out variance that is not shared across measures. This removes error
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variance and task-specific variance, thereby providing a more reliable measure of the latent
construct. For example, Colombel et al. (2016) used a composite of three measures of inhibitory
control – a Stroop task (Stroop, 1935), the Hayling task (Burgess & Shallice, 1997), and a
directed forgetting task (see Sego et al., 2006) – to test the relationship between inhibitory
control and false memory in the DRM paradigm.
There were two primary reasons for my decision to use only the auditory Stroop task as a
measure of the response suppression aspect of inhibitory control in the present study. First, one
of the primary goals of this study was to determine whether measures and manipulations that
have been shown to be related to susceptibility to false memory in past studies were also related
to susceptibility to false hearing. To accomplish this goal, I used the exact measures that have
previously demonstrated relationships with false memory. Since performance on the auditory
Stroop task was shown to be related to susceptibility to false memory by Sommers and Huff
(2003, Experiment 2), I wanted to determine whether this measure was also predictive of false
hearing. The second reason I decided to use only the auditory Stroop task was that I was
concerned that participants would experience cognitive fatigue if more tasks were added to the
procedure. Participants completed 10 distinct tasks split across two one-hour sessions in
Experiment 1. I was worried that adding more tasks would cause participants – older adults in
particular – to lose focus, resulting in data that was not representative of their cognitive ability
and defeating the purpose of having multiple measures of inhibitory control. However, in future
studies that focus specifically on inhibitory control, I recommend that researchers use multiple
measures of inhibitory control to increase the reliability of their measure.
A second limitation of Experiment 1 is that I only focused on false memories evoked
using the process dissociation paradigm (see Jacoby, 1991; Jacoby et al., 2005). Many other
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paradigms have been used to study false memory, including the DRM paradigm (Deese, 1959;
Roediger & McDermott, 1995), misinformation paradigms (Loftus, 1975), inference paradigms
(Brewer, 1977; Chan & McDermott, 2006; Chan & McDermott, 2007), schema paradigms
(Bartlett, 1932; Brewer & Treyens, 1981), and the imagination inflation paradigm (Goff &
Roediger, 1998). It is currently unclear whether false memories resulting from these diverse
paradigms result from similar mechanisms. As mentioned above, there is some evidence showing
that susceptibility to false memories evoked using the DRM paradigm is uncorrelated with
susceptibility to false memories evoked using a misinformation paradigm (Ost et al., 2013;
Patihis et al., 2018) and that there is no significant correlation between false memories evoked
using DRM paradigms with semantically related lists and those with phonologically related lists
(Ballou & Sommers, 2008), suggesting that different mechanisms may be involved in different
types of false memories even within the same basic paradigm. Therefore, whereas I have shown
that a correlation exists between susceptibility to false hearing and susceptibility to false memory
evoked using a process dissociation paradigm, it is not necessarily the case that susceptibility to
false hearing is related to susceptibility to false memories evoked using different paradigms.
Similarly, as mentioned above, it is possible that my inability to replicate Sommers and Huff’s
(2003, Experiment 2) finding of a relationship between the response suppression aspect of
inhibitory control and false memory resulted from my use of a process dissociation paradigm and
their use of a phonological DRM paradigm. Therefore, researchers should be cautious when
extrapolating the findings of this study to other types of false memory.
The final limitation that I will consider here is the truncated sample size in Experiment 2.
Experiment 2 was originally intended to have a sample of 30 younger and 30 older adults, but
data collection was halted due to the COVID-19 pandemic. The resulting sample size was
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approximately two-thirds of what was intended. Because of this limited sample size, it is possible
that results could change in a larger sample. However, given that the data followed all
predictions made at the outset of the study – including replicating the patterns in the SPIN task
from Experiment 1 – and that observed differences were statistically reliable, I believe that the
conclusions drawn are valid. Nonetheless, I recommend that future studies seek to replicate the
findings from Experiment 2 with a larger sample.
One reason, in particular, that it would be useful to replicate Experiment 2 with a larger
sample is to allow for more detailed analysis of fixations over time in the visual world paradigm.
My limited sample resulted in random fluctuations in the proportion of fixations, especially early
in sentences, that may have been smoothed in a larger sample size. To counteract this issue, I
decided to group fixations into three relatively large (2000 ms) time bins to simplify analyses.
While binning data in this way still allowed me to address my hypotheses, future studies with
more fixation data could potentially examine changes in the proportion of fixations on each
image in bins of 500 ms or shorter. This added level of detail could improve our understanding
of age differences in context-use in speech perception and of sentence processing, generally.

4.6 Conclusions
The present study offered several insights into false hearing and speech processing in general.
This was the first demonstration of the often-hypothesized relationship between false hearing and
false memory, furthering the theory that these phenomena rely on similar cognitive mechanisms.
Importantly, this study also offered evidence for a specific mechanism – or rather, a set of
mechanisms – that could underlie this relationship: executive functioning. Showing that
individuals with low executive functioning were more prone to both false hearing and false
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memory advances our theoretical understanding of these phenomena and helps to identify
individuals who may be most at risk of experiencing them.
In addition to identifying the individuals who were most susceptible to false hearing,
Experiment 2 offered insights into the stimuli that were most likely to give rise to false hearing. I
found that the greater the predictive strength of a sentence, the greater the likelihood that false
hearing would occur. Using eye-tracking, I was able to show how participants – older adults in
particular – became increasingly focused on the contextually supported response as predictive
sentences were presented. Older adults were less likely than younger adults to shift their gaze
from the contextually predicted word to the target word when context was misleading. These
findings were interpreted as evidence for the potential roles of the response suppression aspect of
inhibitory control and accessibility bias in speech perception. Predictive sentence context may
have increased activation of the expected word in the mental lexicon, resulting in an incorrect
response becoming highly activated when context was misleading. False hearing then occurred
when participants were either unable to suppress the activation of the contextually predicted
word or were biased towards responding with the most easily accessible response. Regardless of
the mechanism (or combination of mechanisms), these findings suggest that it is important to be
mindful of preceding information and the expectations of the listener when conversing, as it may
be difficult for listeners to abandon these expectations in cases where they are violated.
Finally, it is important to note that context is rarely misleading outside of the laboratory,
and thus, context-based responding is adaptive. Rather than seeing older adults’ increased
susceptibility to false hearing and false memory as a cognitive deficit, it could be viewed as the
result of an effective adaptation to changing life circumstances. The perceptual system may
recalibrate to emphasize easily accessible, context-based responses to compensate for declining
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hearing acuity across the lifespan. The results of this study increase our understanding of this
adaptation and should be used to improve communication with older adults. Knowing that older
adults – particularly those with low executive functioning – are prone to overuse of contextual
cues, speakers could increase their likelihood of being understood by carefully framing important
information within supporting context. Providing this type of scaffolding may improve both
initial perception and later memory of the presented information.
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Appendix
Here, I present analyses of the proportion of fixations on the two foil images – which I will refer
to as foil 1 and foil 2 – over the course of baseline, congruent, and incongruent sentences.
Baseline
Fixations did not change from time bin 1 to time bin 2 for either foil 1 (ED = .00, z = .18,
p > .05) or foil 2 (ED = .01, z = .60, p > .05). From time bin 2 to time bin 3, fixations decreased
significantly for both foil 1 (ED = -.12, z = -5.69, p < .001) and foil 2 (ED = -.11, z = -5.35, p <
.001) as fixations on the target image increased. There were no significant interactions with
group (ps > .05).
Congruent
Fixations decreased from time bin 1 to time bin 2 for foil 1 (ED = -.05, z = -2.39, p < .05)
and foil 2 (ED = -.13, z = -6.46, p < .001). There was no interaction with group for foil 1 (ED = .02, z = -.79, p > .05), but there was a marginally significant interaction for foil 2 (ED = .04, z =
1.90, p = .06). Younger adults decreased fixations on foil 2 from time bin 1 to time bin 2 (ED = .04, z = -3.41, p < .001) but older adults decreased their fixations on this image to a greater
degree (ED = -.08, z = -5.61, p < .001). Fixations decreased further from time bin 2 to time bin 3
for foil 1 (ED = -.13, z = -6.41, p < .001) and foil 2 (ED = -.11, z = -5.44, p < .001). There were
significant interactions with age group for the change in fixations between time bin 2 and time
bin 3 for foil 1 (ED = .06, z = 3.04, p < .01) but not for foil 2 (ED = .02, z = -1.11, p > .05). For
foil 1, younger adults reduced their fixations from time bin 2 to time bin 3 (ED = -.03, z = -2.47,
p < .05) but older adults reduced their fixations to an even greater degree (ED = -.10, z = -6.48, p
< .001).
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Incongruent
As fixations increased on the alternative image and, later, the target image, there was a
steady decrease in fixations on the two foil images in incongruent sentences. For foil 1, fixations
decreased from time bin 1 to time bin 2 (ED = -.07, z = -3.53, p < .001) and from time bin 2 to
time bin 3 (ED = -.11, z = -5.40, p < .001). Fixations on foil 2 also decreased from time bin 1 to
time bin 2 (ED = -.08, z = -4.28, p < .001) and from time bin 2 to time bin 3 (ED = -.09, z = 4.28, p < .001). There were no significant interactions with age group (ps > .05).
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